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Abstract 
 
This dissertation in Middle East Studies explores the creation of national identity through 
visual media in the contemporary United Arab Emirates. Within a framework of cultural and media 
studies the thesis analyses how forms of representation are negotiated by Emirati media producers. 
The research tests the applicability of cultural theories developed by Appadurai and Eickelman in the 
context of the Gulf Region. 
The UAE media industry is considered within a network of global media companies. The local 
industry's interaction with global media production companies illustrates a constructed divide 
between local and global identities. This creates specific patterns of media making and influences 
local audience perceptions of different narratives and representations. 
The research uses qualitative methods, based on interviews and focus groups conducted 
between September 2009 and April 2010 in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The interviewees were Emirati 
media professional and Students of Media Communication. They discuss how media producers and 
television presenters try to reconcile their notions of what a national media should be with the 
restrictive structure of the industry. The interviews demonstrate the challenges of a government-
controlled national media for the development of a public dialogue on national identity and confirm 
that the state-controlled television and film industry, does not account for the diversity of the 
Emirati community of nationals.  
The criticism of Emirati representation in the media is accompanied by a feeling of 
stagnation and inability to change the existing patterns. It results in their turning away towards 
commercial media. Going beyond an analysis of restrictive media praxis, the research provides an 
inside perspective on the complex issue of contemporary Emirati identity. 
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Spelling conventions 
 
In the United Arab Emirates many media companies, television brands, and other media use 
anglicised versions of Arabic terms for their brands. It is therefore difficult to apply a unified style of 
spelling which does not hinder the flow of reading and is truthful to the Arabic language. As a 
general rule names, titles, and headlines will be capitalised in both languages. 
The English spelling of Arabic personal names follows the preferences of the individuals 
named such (i.e. the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid). Since in the UAE English spelling 
of names is common (i.e. for business cards, registrations, or online) the transcription of them 
neither seems necessary nor easier to read.  
The same practice applies to the names of the emirates, cities, government institutions, or 
organisations: they will be dealt with as names/brands with the English spelling used in their English 
publications.  
To distinguish the internationally used official institutions from media companies and brand 
names, the latter will be written in Italics. This practice aligns companies with customary English 
names (i.e. Egyptian Radio) to the cases which do not follow usual spelling conventions: the 
companies TwoFour54 and Imagenation are examples for such cases of brand-names. 
Titles and headlines of television shows and films will be written in inverted commas. Arabic 
terms will be distinguished through Italics. 
Diacritical transcriptions will be used in this thesis for names and Arabic terms which are not 
usually written in English. In these cases the spelling of Arabic terms follows the guidelines of the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies with slight modifications for terms particular to the Gulf 
dialect. The transcription of i.e. the male attire customary in the Gulf will be transcribed the way it is 
pronounced, kandōra. Some of the dialect terms are consistently used throughout the UAE media in 
an anglicised way, such as the abaya and sheela (women’s’ garments). Rather than writing these 
terms in diacritics, they will be written in their customary spelling in Italic. Particularly challenging is 
the spelling of Arabic-anglicised terms which follow rules of grammar from both languages. The very 
specific term “Boyah” for example takes an English plural suffix (Boyahs) when written in Latin 
alphabet, but the Arabic plural ending –āt when written in Arabic. The main text of this thesis will 
align such terms to one spelling, but acknowledge the original language of secondary sources using 
the term. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In November 2011, in anticipation of the United Arab Emirates' 40th anniversary 
celebration of its founding, the national flag was everywhere. It was on every television 
screen. It was displayed in shop windows. It appeared on every imaginable public space and 
on products ranging from gadgets to t-shirts. Even the streetlights gleamed green, white, 
and red. Operating under the official slogan “Spirit of the Union”, merchandising efforts 
were thematically focused on evoking pride in this still young nation. The official narrative 
presented on TV was that of the transformation from a landscape of humble, nomadic (?) 
Bedouin people to a thriving, modern nation in which the Emiratis had enthusiastically 
embraced modern life but who had never forgotten where and what they had come from.  
At present, with daily life back to normal, observing public life in the UAE’s large 
malls presents a rather different picture. The space is dominated by international retailers 
and the customers are a mix of all nationalities. In the hot climate of the Emirates, the malls 
are like community centres: we find jogging groups in the mornings, shoppers, people 
meeting to chat, and in the evening “going out” often means heading to a mall to meet for a 
film, music, or to dine. At first sight the connection to and influence of the Bedouin culture 
is not obvious. The atmosphere is closer to that of an international airport where people 
from all over the world come together. They shop for popular global brands, from Valentino 
to Starbucks and although they speak Hindi, Tagalog, Chinese, French, or Arabic, English is 
the lingua franca for transactions. The overall impression is that of international diversity 
and of global consumer culture: everybody from everywhere is represented in this small 
Gulf country. In short, the Bedouin presence, distinguishable by the local attire, the white 
Bedouin dress for men and the black cloak for women, comprises only a tiny part of the 
actual makeup of the population in the UAE. 
For several reasons the UAE offers an ideal case to study the notion and relevance of 
national identities in a contemporary global consumer culture. It is a young nation with a 
high level of government control over public life. The discourse of national identity is 
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constructed and protected by the government who also provides the framework and 
boundaries for the level of internationalisation. UAE nationals are not only consumers of 
international goods and culture, but rentiers of the state – and with it, the state ideology. 
The power-relations between state and citizens are top-down and yet the citizens have all 
means to choose various other communities to identify with. Through daily contact with 
global media, through travelling, and education, Emiratis can experience collective identities 
which are not specifically national; just like the proportion of Emiratis in the mall-scenario 
form a minority in a potpourri of ethnicities, national identity can become just one of a 
myriad of consumable identities.  
In the context of Middle Eastern studies, the UAE is an exceptional case by which to 
study national identities because it is the last Arab state to become a nation. While most 
other Arab states gained independence during the 1940s, the UAE formulated a local 
national discourse relatively late during the 1960s and became independent in 1971. Since 
then the UAE has taken a rapid course towards the multi-national society it features today. 
Oil revenues have enabled the government to speed up the process of building a highly 
developed society and functioning government apparatus. Yet the government 
administration and infrastructure relies heavily on imported consultants and labourers. By 
the end of 2010 the population of the UAE was 8.2 million, only 11.5% of which were Emirati 
nationals.1 These demographic specifics pose a challenge to the country’s identity as a 
distinct Arab nation. Emirati nationals live as a minority among a multi-national mix of 
people. Among a highly diverse population, Emiratis have embraced a lifestyle which is 
dominated by global consumer goods and media. The high level of access to knowledge of 
and experience with multiple ways of living and forming collective identities challenges the 
relevance of a specifically local culture. A unique Emirati culture thus becomes tested on a 
daily basis. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 According to the National Bureau of Statistics, in mid 2010 the majority of Emirati nationals (42%) lived in 
Abu Dhabi Emirate, followed by 33% in Dubai and Sharjah. Demographic statistics released by the government 
are irregular and disputed however; for some years the Bureau has not released demographic imbalances at 
all. (See: Staff-Reporter, 2012. UAE Population put at 7.2 Million.) 
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Research aim and questions 
 
Strengthening national identity is a concern to the UAE government and Emirati 
nationals alike. At schools the raising of the flag and singing of the national anthem is an 
important ritual; pictures of the country’s rulers are present in all public places ranging from 
oil portraits in offices to glossy billboards along the highways. The political structure of the 
UAE gives the government a monopoly over the production of the identity discourse, and a 
major tool to circulate the discourse is the national media. Television campaigns and 
advertisements praise the achievements of the rulers, the country’s rapid modernisation, 
and the lasting link between old and new generation. TV commercials present images of 
Bedouins, camels, and traditional coffee ceremonies merged with high-rise buildings, 
expensive cars, and other phenomena of a modern urban life-style. The constant repetition 
of these images constructs an association between the symbols they use, and the identity of 
Emiratis today.  
These brief advertisements condense national identity into a brand of the UAE. Yet, 
such representations aside, the TV programmes are dominated by imported content. Series, 
daily soaps, and talk shows are mainly Egyptian, Lebanese or Kuwaiti productions or copied 
versions of globally successful game shows. Flipping through the local TV channels enforces 
the impression gained by the aforementioned stroll through the mall: Local identity is 
present on a visual level through distinct attire and symbols, while imported influences 
prevail in terms of actual content. The series and daily soaps do not tell stories from within 
Emirati society. Even the news reporters and talk show presenters are mainly Levantine 
Arabs who interview expatriates living in the UAE. Inevitably the question arises whether 
this content is of social relevance to the Emirati nationals. 
The producers of the local media seem to deem a isolated narrative enough to 
create an identity almost as if it were a kind of brand. Moreover, government censorship 
does not permit the media to act as a platform for different Emirati communities, social 
classes, or interest groups. The ruling elite determine what national identity is supposed to 
be. At the same time, the success of the government’s national identity project relies on the 
willingness of individuals to be part of the national community. They have to be encouraged 
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to identify with the narrative and thus become part of a creative dialogue, the outcome of 
which the ruling elite can never totally control. The editors, film makers, reporters, and 
designers have two tasks. First, they are the implementers or presenters of the 
government’s official narrative. Then, they are the creators of a narrative which represents 
and reflects on their own understanding of Emirati identity. These different narratives 
overlap somewhat but a gap between governmental narrative and variations of the ideal 
national identity will be apparent in the experiences of these media makers. Their 
observations and opinions on the national community will not necessarily be translated into 
the actual visual content that is distributed through the media. But the struggles of 
individual media producers with government censorship and guidelines will show which 
aspects of the government’s national identity construct are contested. 
The research presented in this dissertation explores how young Emirati media 
producers envision their contributions to visual representations of national identity. The 
Emiratis who work in the media industry grew up with international media as well as the 
ubiquitous government presentations of UAE history. In their professions they are 
challenged to negotiate their own concepts of identity with already established forms of 
representation and structures of media production. This research asks what impels Emirati 
media professionals to create a certain image of their national community on screen. 
Emirati media professionals are those UAE nationals who professionally work in media 
production. Behind the scenes or on screen, they contribute to the national media industry 
and thus to visualisations or derivations of the government’s ideology. 
National media is understood as more than a distributor and facilitator of ideologies 
but a potentially open interactive communication tool. National TV in particular is faced 
with the challenge of broadcasting an array of programmes which a diverse national 
community can experience as meaningful and relevant. Hence, TV has the potential to stage 
unity through diversity. By translating the national ideology into a media format, it becomes 
a product of consumption which has to be sold. Its success with audiences relies on its 
ability to provide entertainment and information. The power relationship between a 
prescribed ideology and the people is tested in the media. As a product of consumption, the 
ideology has to constantly justify its validity among other channels and media products.  
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The research presented in this dissertation will address two questions: 
1. What does the UAE media elite (representing the government) do to make the 
fabricated national ideology a successful product of consumption?  
2. How can media professionals (reporters, film makers or any people producing media 
as a profession) use the local media as a domain to experience, express, and 
negotiate, represent and reflect on their identities as Emiratis and also find a wide 
audience in order to fulfil their assignment from the government?  
 
 
Relevance and contribution to the field 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation lies in the perspective it takes on the 
representation of national identity through the perspective of Emirati media professionals, 
or media makers. In order to understand how Emirati media makers negotiate, represent 
and reflect on their national identity, it is necessary assume a grassroots perspective on the 
media landscape. This approach leads to a more differentiated view on UAE society and 
media. In the field of Gulf Studies most research on media is conducted on the transnational 
satellite channels in the region. Qatar’s news channel Al Jazeera in particular has attracted 
major attention either as a platform for diverse Arab communities, or a tool for the Qatari 
government to profile itself as a modern media society. Al-Nawawy and Iskandar, examine 
how Al Jazeera has enabled people to oppose government ideologies.2 Naomi Sakr’s two 
books on Arab media, “Satellite Realms” and “Arab Television Today” approach Arab media 
from the perspective of changing power relations between businesses and governments.3 
Her interest in censorship and import of global media formats to the Arab media domain 
offers relevant considerations for this dissertation. Yet her focus on shifting power relations 
                                                          
2
 See for example: Al-Nawawy, 2002. Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and 
Changed the Middle East, p.11. See also the works by Dabbous-Sensenig (2006) and Hafez (2004) which use 
case studies of selected aspects or shows to test whether the channel really complies with its self proclaimed 
agenda to provide balanced news. 
3
 See: Sakr, 2001. Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East and ibid., 2007. 
Arab Television Today. 
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from top-down government controlled media to a more business driven commercial media 
does not uncover the micro-dynamics of such changes. 
Marwan Kraidy and Joe Khalil in their book “Arab Television Industries” go a step 
further and examine not only local media regulations in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Dubai 
but politics and programming in individual channels.4 Here they draw attention to daily 
practices of media making, such as language, dress code, and programme order. In a second 
book, “Reality Television and Arab Politics”, Kraidy explores the potentials of Arab reality 
shows to provoke public dialogue. He analyses the reactions and arguments shows like the 
transnational singing contest “Star Academy” have caused between religious scholars and 
broadcasters, ultimately Arab media consumers and conservative authorities.5 Whilst a main 
part of Kraidy’s research is dedicated to conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, he 
also takes a closer look at how the UAE has incorporated reality shows into their television 
programmes. Using the example of the poetry competition shows “Prince of Poets” and 
“Poet of the Million” he highlights how more conservative societies have joined the popular 
trend of reality game shows in their own ways. Ultimately, as Kraidy demonstrates, the 
import of Western reality shows into the Arab media has led to an internal diversification, 
since religious and conservative interest groups are now in competition and debate with 
global formats. Ultimately the overall question is, “how can you be Arab and modern at the 
same time, without one of these identities usurping the other?”6 
The main focus of visual content on Arab satellite channels is on socio-economic as 
well as political balances of power. Based on economic and political frameworks, local 
government channels have changed in the post satellite era. Jones for example explores 
how the government controlled media in Jordan has lost control over the community of 
nationals due to the wide choice of other media and sources of information.7 Tracing and 
mapping counter-discourses to the dominant narratives of Arab governments delivers 
important insight into the diversity of Arab publics, government opposition, and grassroots 
channels of communication.  
                                                          
4
 Khalil & Kraidy, 2009. Arab Television Industries. 
5
 Kraidy, 2010. Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life. 
6
 Ibid., p.193. 
7
 See for example: Jones, 1999. Jordan: Press, Regime, and Society since 1989. Jones describes the Jordanian 
media sphere as retorting to oral information discourses, or to foreign media. 
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This dissertation focuses on those people who actually partake in the production of 
the dominant and oppressive discourse. It follows the example of scholars such as Lisa 
Wedeen who has analysed how people in Syria became part of the oppressive media against 
their own better judgement or personal opinions. Lisa Wedeen’s research has analysed why 
“Syrians of all sorts, at one time or another, have been compelled to bend their talents to 
the service of state propaganda.”8 Her interviews with producers of the state ideology show 
how individuals can reject the legitimacy of a regime yet simultaneously partake in its 
established personality cults and state ideology. Wedeen thus shows how a “loyalty-
producing regime and its anxiety-inducing simulacrum” manages to establish a structure of 
compliance.9  
Understanding the perspective of the media producers adds valuable insight into the 
micro-dynamics of non-democratic regimes who rely on top-down promulgations of a 
national identity. Analysing what the individuals working within the regime structures think 
and how they justify their own compliances opens the field to find solutions to problems of 
oppressive media from within. Unlike the propaganda machinery of the Assad regime in 
Syria, the UAE case has different characteristics which enable specific forms of negotiation 
for Emiratis. This research will illustrate how UAE government is struggling to reconcile an 
image of modernity and an open media with the aim to strengthen its own legitimacy 
through control of the media. The sometimes conflicting policies of media control and the 
subsequent media productions are used by Emiratis as one way to partake in the definition 
of their collective identity. 
For the field of regional studies of the Gulf this dissertation adds to the knowledge 
about socio-political dynamics in the contemporary UAE media landscape. Because most 
scholarly attention is on satellite channels in the Gulf, analysis of the national media 
industry have not been comprehensively reviewed. Several articles mention the national TV 
channels of the UAE to highlight significant developments but do not describe the industry 
as a whole. The development of the main national TV channel, Abu Dhabi TV and its role 
during the Gulf War in 2003, as mentioned by Kai Hafez, is a case in point.10 Other research, 
                                                          
8
 Wedeen. 1999. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, p.2. 
9
 Ibid., p.3. 
10
 See: Hafez, 2004. Arab Satellite Broadcasting: An Alternative to Political Parties? 
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such as the aforementioned by Kraidy and Khalil highlight specific UAE media productions 
and companies, such as the establishment of Dubai Media City. Pritchert-Duthler and Yunis 
review the development of film festivals in the country.11 Yet for the purpose of providing 
an overview of the UAE TV and film industry this research gathers a compilation of 
otherwise singular reviews. Without aiming to be an historical account, this dissertation 
delivers an account of the development and current state of the TV and film industry in the 
UAE. This research tracks developments, ideas and discarded media endeavours during 
2009 which can be important for historians interested in the establishment of this newest 
part of the UAE media landscape.  
This dissertation contributes to cultural studies of Gulf societies. Since the 
interaction of individuals with media is the main interest of this dissertation, contributions 
on social science in the Gulf become relevant to consider and draw from. John W. Fox, Nada 
Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa from the American University of Sharjah for 
example have co-published observations on media and material culture in the UAE.12 Their 
work traces how the “media marketplace” has shaped a new “Emirati ideal” of individualism 
directed by global brands, and how this potentially affects the official singular narrative of 
identity of UAE society as promulgated by the government. The researchers draw their 
conclusion from triangulating different concepts of lifestyle and comparing them with 
trends in the contemporary UAE. However, their framework readily accepts notions which 
form the basis of ‘ideal’ communities. This approach manifests itself in statements, such as 
“the traditional culture of the Bedouin [is] codified in the Qur’an and hadiths.”13 It is vital to 
question such seemingly established ‘beliefs’ which are often reflected in research on social 
phenomena in the Gulf. This does not devalue the meanings such ‘common’ perceptions 
have for individuals, who may frame their positions in society, as well as their personal and 
collective identities on these ideas. But they have to be understood instead as consciously 
constructed narratives rather than ‘truths’. 
                                                          
11
 Se: Yunis & Picherit-Duthler, 2011. Lights, Camera, Education: An Overview of the Future of Film Education in 
the United Arab Emirates.  
12
 Mourtada-Sabbah, Nada; Al-Mutawa, Mohammed; Fox, John W. & Walters, Tim. 2001. Media as Social 
Matrix in the United Arab Emirates.  
13
 Ibid., p.123. 
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Works on other aspects of modernity and heritage in the UAE are Suleiman Khalaf’s, 
“The Nationalisation of Culture” on (re-)invented traditions, Lubna Ahmed Al-Kazi’s, “Gulf 
Societies: Coexistence of Tradition and Modernity”14, or Sally Findlow’s research, “The 
United Arab Emirates: Nationalism and Arab-Islamic identity”.15 Despite their different 
topics and theoretical approaches these works share an underlying distrust of the 
phenomena they identify as ‘modern’. ‘Tradition’ becomes a value which needs to be 
protected. The Sharjah University team also edited “Globalisation in the Gulf”, a compilation 
of essays examining different aspects of globalisation in Gulf societies. The preface of the 
mainly political and economical compilation of essays addresses, or rather defends how the 
Gulf States have merged tradition and ‘postmodernism’ in a way which enabled them to be 
global players yet preserve their identities.16 As a conglomerate of research on Gulf societies 
these works provide insight into various aspects that play a role in a collective identity, such 
as mall culture, heritage, or sports. Their research tries to contribute to a better 
understanding of the region, for example: the eye-striking signs of materialism have raised 
the question whether the Emiratis lack authenticity or a unique identity. The works of the 
scholars from Sharjah University attempt to answer such questions and provide a more 
differentiated view on Gulf societies than just the stereotype of ‘decadent oil-rich Arabs’. 
But the notion of ‘tradition’ as cherished core of a national community, for example, is not 
questioned, nor is the concept of ‘identity’ as a value challenged. By accepting the concepts 
out of which such prejudices have evolved, their validity is ultimately strengthened.  
In this sense the research on Gulf societies will benefit from a framework which does 
not define ‘global media’ or ‘global culture’ as potentially threatening local identities; not 
because they are ‘good’ but because they part of a framework which reveals the dichotomy 
between local and global, or between authenticity and lack of identity. Rather than arguing 
from within such a framework it will be crucial to put the spotlight on individual nationals, 
who are both creators and reconcilers of dichotomies.  
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Methodological considerations 
 
To analyse the consolidation of identities around media images and narratives, the 
human perspective has to be the prism through which media is understood. The media 
consumers are the implementers and interpreters of said images, and it is the human effort 
of interpretation which creates notion of self. It is my belief that this process is not a 
planned or organised construction, but is ultimately a creative one. Therefore, while an 
outside observer may find similarities between media texts, the reasons why an individual 
chooses a certain way of expression cannot be answered by a mere text analysis. Attached 
to the interest in individual expressions of self is also a specific notion of media as a 
dialogical social tool. Media scholar Peter Dahlgren proposes a notion of media based on 
the observation that it has become such a broad force in culture that it now shapes civil 
society, the public sphere, and democracy itself.17 Barbie Zelizer, furthermore, defines 
media as agent which models “real life”, “setting in place a world with strategically 
fashioned categories that distinguish between here and there, now and then, and good and 
evil.”18 From this perspective media can be seen as a nexus of human interaction, which 
accordingly has to become the centre of observation. Media is simultaneously embedded in 
a macro-communication process as well as a micro-communication one. It becomes the 
prism through which people see themselves, experience notions of culture and identity, and 
equally express these notions. As such the significance of media messages, the “raw 
material for [the] individual’s interpretative work”19, lies in the moments of translation into 
meaning20 which takes form in actual consumption of the media and actual performance. 
For the aim of this research there can be no ‘objective’ definition of media which is as 
situational and subjective as those who encounter and use it. The focus is he positions 
individuals see themselves in within their experience among an imagined global community 
of media consumers. Accordingly the research acknowledges multi-coded communication 
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tools as important means through which the experience of identity is re-enacted on an 
individual and a collective level.  
The research requires examining the dominant state-controlled media discourse on 
identity. An epistemology and methodology has to be applied which aims to “unravel the 
social processes and relations that have constructed the social world in hierarchical ways.”21 
Taking this approach, the methodology of this dissertation is inspired by what Michel 
Foucault calls the “insurrection of subjugated knowledge.”22 Knowledge has to be 
understood as by nature partial, situated, subjective, and relational.23 Within this 
framework ‘official’ knowledge is questioned and the validity of an ‘official narrative’ of 
identity under scrutiny. The official media is viewed as an institution which aims to 
implement a pre-selective knowledge as seemingly comprehensive and unbiased. It 
executes this goal by fabricating and controlling a discourse of Emirati identity via legal 
frameworks and self-appointed agents. By pre-filtering which voices are admitted to the 
media sphere an empowered set of supposedly ‘common’ beliefs and truths is established.  
The exclusion of groups, predefined according to categories such as age, gender, 
class, or ethnicity, nevertheless triggers alternative discourses and debates. Stuart Hall 
argues that the capacity of such interest groups to influence the outcome is limited, due to 
the nature of the social practices within the media apparatus. However, the “sign-vehicles” 
(codes and code systems) which circulate the media product cannot control a continuous 
flow of meanings – and thus public opinions.24 The research of this dissertation aims to give 
voice to opinions which are subjected to an officially sanctioned reading and want to 
partake in the dominant ‘flow of meanings’, yet struggle with the boundaries procured by 
the discourse. At the same time they are free to ‘imagine’ their own self within a global 
media discourse and exchange of images. For Arjun Appadurai, “imagination” is a process 
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which creates fertile ground for creating notions of collective self within a globalised world 
of images. Globalised media imagination provides concrete images and narratives across 
cultural and national borders.25 He points out that the global media-flow both generates 
local problems of social wellbeing and encourages emancipatory politics by providing input 
to the imagination of communities. He introduces the term “grassroots globalisation” as an 
attempt to bring together Western scholarship and public intellectuals and thus challenge 
the unequal existing power relations between academy and non-researchers.26 The 
methodological approach of this dissertation follows Appadurai’s focus on the exploration 
of human experiences.27 In this framework media takes the position of a communication 
tool around which people gather, draw inspirations and into which they ideally translate 
their very individual narratives.  
The subjects of analysis are the individual notions of self as a result of an interpretive 
process, which is triggered and informed by experiences evolving around media images of 
identity and otherness, of uniqueness and mutuality. In his book “Modernity at Large: 
Cultural Dimensions of Globalization” Appadurai develops a cultural concept of group 
identity which is contextual, heuristic, and comparative. For him “situated and embodied 
difference” is a key characteristic of local communities.28 Their local ‘culture’ is understood 
as a codified construction or official corpus. In the case of the UAE this must be what will be 
referred to as the ‘official narrative’, ‘official identity’ or ‘dominant discourse.’ ‘Dominant’ 
because it is linked to an elite who invents it and who has the power to give their ‘culture’ a 
dominant place in media.  
It is important to acknowledge that the experience of individuals is the result of their 
personal history, social frameworks, as well as their imagined knowledge of their own 
historicity – as people using media, as members of a society, part of a gender, ethnicity etc. 
It effectively creates structures in which people might willingly or unwillingly make 
themselves agents of certain patterns of behaviour and which release the individual from 
the burden of reinterpreting and questioning their habits. Notions of collective memory or 
ethnicity can thus be understood by research participants as ‘perfectly natural’ 
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condensations of truth.29 Without dominating the research participants from the outside 
position of a researcher such notions have to be questioned and identified as categories 
reproduced perhaps by media but enforced ultimately by social performance. The latter will 
be the yardstick to interpret their validity.  
In practice these methodological considerations result in a fieldwork designed 
around personal interviews, completed by observations, as well as discussions with 
participants about such observations and impressions. At the same time, integrating media 
into the analysis means to have a look at how such notions are empowered by the affluent 
reproduction of legitimising narratives and images which become products of consumption, 
social knowledge, and entertainment.  
 
 
Fieldwork: context and outline 
 
The fieldwork conducted for this dissertation benefitted considerably from my 
formal status as a resident and employee in Abu Dhabi from 2006 to 2011. My role as editor 
for the Abu Dhabi e-government project should neither affect nor interfere with my 
research on UAE media. However, in practice both roles influenced each other. Prior to my 
research I had worked as an editor for the official internet portal of the Abu Dhabi 
government which was implemented by the Abu Dhabi Systems and Information Committee 
(ADSIC). The work provided me with firsthand experience of workflows within the local 
government departments, as well as valuable networking opportunities.30 Under the 
management of Emirati the teams of the government entities mainly consisted of foreign 
employees often employed as contractors. Although I tried to keep a strict separation 
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between my university research and my job, working closely with government institutions 
influenced my fieldwork in several ways. In some cases personal introductions to media 
makers were made through friends and work colleagues. On several occasions my long term 
residency and work in the UAE created a bond of understanding and trust between myself 
and research participants. Most importantly however, my affiliation to ADSIC provided 
unrestricted access to the management level of the emirate’s media company and to the 
campus of the TV channel. Thus it was easier to conduct observations and unofficially 
establish contacts in Abu Dhabi, whereas in Dubai access to the campus of the local media 
was only possible with an appointment. 
I conducted the main fieldwork for this dissertation between September 2009 and 
April 2010. During this eight month period I worked part-time in Abu Dhabi and took up a 
second residence in Dubai. In addition, I attended the two international UAE film festivals in 
Abu Dhabi (October 8-17) and Dubai (December 9 -16).Moreover, I was also able to observe 
the run-up to and re-launch of the Abu Dhabi Media Company, a company which produces 
TV and print media in the emirate. This was a major topic of discussion with research 
participants. Finally, I was there during the month of Ramadan during which television daily 
soaps are an integral part of daily culture. As such the fieldwork trip could incorporate 
observing and taking part in events first hand, and also experiencing how this most 
important event was presented and covered in various forms of media. In the following 
years 2010 and 2011 while evaluating and analysing the research I returned to the UAE for 
the annual film festivals and used the occasions to follow up with research participants. 
The interviews and focus groups are quotable mainly as MP3 recorded material and 
quoted as such. The names of the participants are encrypted to protect their anonymity. A 
noteworthy feature of the interviews is the general mix of languages that were spoken by 
the participants. Due to the daily interaction with non-Arabs, especially in the film industry 
but also television, it is common for young Emiratis in the field to speak English or adjust 
their local dialect to a Levantine or Egyptian dialect, which are dialects of the main Arab TV 
producing countries. As a courtesy, research participants therefore often mixed Lebanese 
Arabic with English during the interviews, as did I. The interviewees were all fluent in 
English, accustomed to consuming English media and thus comfortable speaking about the 
topic in English. The language-mix usually occurred in the heat of a discussion or to 
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emphasise a crucial point. Out of consideration of consistency, the original quotes used in 
this dissertation are either in their original English or translated from Arabic. 
 
 
Media Professionals 
 
The core interviews of this research were conducted with people who I refer to as 
media professionals throughout this dissertation. The term encompasses people who are 
professionally involved in media production, either as employees, freelancers, or 
independent company owners. Media professionals can be script writers and designers, 
editors, reporters, directors, or film producers. As a community they constitute an interest 
group which, apart from consuming media professionally, partakes in the production 
process, not on a decision making level but as contributors. They have to reconcile different 
personal interests, ambitions and notions of self with the options their employers give 
them. Hence the narratives of media professionals can show how the media framework and 
industry in the UAE affect individuals. 
The interviews with Emirati media professionals included 12 news reporters, six TV 
presenters, five script writers, as well as ten people working in film production. They were 
conducted as one-to-one interviews with the exception of one focus group of female 
employees of the Abu Dhabi TV channel. The topics discussed were how local media is 
perceived as representative of their own notions of UAE identity, how they would like to 
contribute to the local media, and which obstacles they encountered in the industry. The 
discussions were kept open, however, in order to allow participants to elaborate on topics 
not necessarily anticipated beforehand but of importance to their experiences with media. 
With the presenters we began the interviews with questions about their shows, what they 
wanted to convey, and which role models they tried to follow. In the case of two presenters 
from Abu Dhabi, I was able to monitor their talk shows from within the studio. The 
advantage was that more spontaneous discussions could be conducted on set between 
shooting and which also included editorial teams already present. 
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Because of this unrestricted access the field work in Abu Dhabi was more in-depth 
than in Dubai. Meetings during lunch or breaks, before or after work, led to informal 
meetings of a more social nature in, a mall or coffee shop. Whereas the first interviews were 
formally scheduled with the assistance of administrative staff, participants soon approached 
me individually. The informal approach to research participants and repeated meeting prior 
to recording interviews was valuable for the establishment of trust between the 
interviewees and me as a researcher.  
Due to close contact with the employees of the Abu Dhabi media company a focus 
group with five Emirati female employees was organised. Soon one of the research 
participants suggested meeting her colleagues from different departments for a recorded 
group interview. They used this focus group to relate how they came to work in the media. 
The animated exchange of stories resulted in a second meeting with the same group. The 
meetings with freelance media professionals followed similar patterns of initial contact 
through my observations of their shows or film screenings, followed by more casual 
meetings, at media events or exhibitions, or merely running errands. Many contacts to film 
makers were established during the film festivals during which we would attend screenings 
together and discuss directly about local productions or developments in the media 
industry. 
 
 
Students of Media and Communications 
 
Although I had initially intended to focus on interviews with media professionals, I 
decided to widen the circle of research participants to Emirati students of media and 
communication. Many students were familiar with working in the local media through 
internships they had in the media companies, or attending film production institutes which 
contributed to the film festivals. The universities also organised trips for students to attend 
selected festival screenings together. Not yet fully fledged media professionals, the students 
added valuable perspectives on the media industry they considered a potential future 
25 
 
employer. The view of media students on currents trends is specific, since they are 
consumers but also deal with media and media making as a challenge which will influence 
their future lives more urgently than other professions. Hence their view on the media they 
consume is different from the mere consumer and they cannot be indifferent towards the 
image of media people throughout society.  
To organise meetings with Emirati students I approached the national universities in 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. These were the Higher College of Technology which have campuses 
for male and female students in both cities, as well as the Zayed University. The latter was at 
the time exclusively for female Emirati nationals and also had a campus in each city. The 
departments of media and communications organised focus groups to support my research. 
In total 18 focus groups were conducted, each with 8-15 participants. Since they took place 
during class times the meeting usually lasted one hour. In some cases the classes were split 
in half, with half an hour discussion time for each group. Since I relied on the permission of 
the university departments I had no influence on whether the students were the same age 
or had matriculated at the same time. Nonetheless, most students were in their last year of 
studies, aged between late teens and early twenties, and mainly single. 
Zayed University in particular was anxious to protect the privacy of their students 
and asked me not to attempt arranging follow-up meetings outside the campus. There was 
a fear of receiving inquiries or complaints from parents who assumed that the students 
were strictly confined to the campus grounds and not interacting with persons other than 
university staff. The men’s colleges did not insist on such precautions, nor did the female 
campuses of the Higher College of Technology. According to university staff, the reason was 
that Zayed University students were from the upper classes of Emirati society and those 
parents more concerned with who their daughters interacted with outside their families.  
Initially I was apprehensive to conduct focus groups in the setting of classrooms, 
since it put me into the position of a semi-teacher or lecturer and I expected the discussions 
to be accordingly staged or generic. However, the focus groups provided useful insights into 
the perspective of the participating students. In order to establish a constructive 
conversation it was necessary to use considerable time explaining my position as a research 
student and to answer questions about my own heritage and personal background.  
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The discussions evolved around PowerPoint presentations as well as short video clips 
of local shows, channel advertisements and brands. The advantage of focus groups with 
students was the group dynamics which motivated the more tentative students to engage in 
the conversations. Usually we started by talking about their favourite channels and shows 
and the discussion quickly developed into discussions about their future plans with media 
and how they would make certain programmes. Since I had agreed not ask any students to 
meet outside the campus grounds, I provided my e-mail and Facebook contact information 
to the groups leaving it to them whether or not to seek further contact. Most of the male 
students and some females contacted me via Facebook and were extremely helpful in 
accessing discussions on current media events. I also met some of the students by chance at 
the film festivals and although those encounters were not recorded they helped form an 
impression of their interaction with media. 
 
 
Chapter outline 
 
The chapters of this dissertation are organised around central topics which were raised by 
both media professionals and students. Some issues (e.g. censorship) were more relevant to 
those working in the media than students, which explains the dominance of certain 
participant groups in some chapters. Following the two research questions, the first 
chapters will focus on introducing the subject and analysing the government’s perspective 
on the local media, including the media set-up, legal framework and structures in the 
workplace. The second half of the dissertation will explore the grassroots perspective of 
individuals within the previously described structure. 
 
I. The first chapter provides the historical background necessary to understand the 
development of the contemporary national identity project and media industry. The 
review also sketches the theoretical framework of the dissertation, basic concepts, 
and re-occurring themes. The central topic is the construction of a UAE national 
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identity by the government and its normalisation via media. Foremost concepts are 
dimensions of imagined communities and the dialogical nature of identity formation. 
The chapter explains how the sense of belonging to a community is always imagined 
and in dialogue with an equally imagined ‘other’.  
 
II. Chapter 2 shows how ideology and praxis contribute to the idea of national identity 
and explains the characteristics of the nationalist ideology in the UAE. The UAE ruling 
elite legitimises their own position as rulers through a nationalist ideology, which is 
circulated via a narrative of a shared ethnicity. 
The conflict between foreign and local concepts of national identity draws 
attention to the role of media as facilitator and ‘normaliser.’ The official narrative as 
part of the dialogical process has to compete with other media messages to win the 
attention of the largest possible audiences and with it the public approval of their 
national ideology. Since the official narrative forms a defined corpus it also claims an 
unchanging validity, which is difficult to maintain in a constantly changing media 
sphere. This challenge is met by adapting modern branding strategies to assure that 
images of local identity permeate all spaces of public life. This national myth 
becomes the nexus of an ideologically constructed dichotomy between local identity 
and global distractions from the supposedly authentic Emirati nationhood. In order 
to maintain the intactness of the official narrative, control over the media industry 
will become essential for the ruling elite which it legitimises. 
 
III. Chapter 3 will outline how the government has established itself as sole owner of 
the media sector, despite progressive privatisation. Furthermore this chapter will 
explore how changes in media technologies have triggered shifting notions of what 
media should be in the eyes of the viewers. The initial approach to using media as an 
educator for the nationals was ultimately challenged by the availability of different 
media styles. The satellite era exhilarated the loss of influence the one-sided 
government media had enjoyed over its citizens in the start up phase of the nation. 
Accordingly, the government media in the UAE shifted from political information 
media to entertainment. The idea behind this is that entertainment is more easily 
digested that political information, and it is watched with a non-critical eye. Thus it is 
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easier to transport messages and ideas through entertainment. Joint ventures with 
international media producers further the image of the UAE as a global media player. 
Yet, despite all proclaimed openness the government remains in control of national 
media production through an established and complex structure of selection and 
censorship. 
 
IV. Chapter 4 will explore the structures of control from the perspective of Emirati 
media professionals. The observations start with restrictions on the general political 
freedom of speech through the government and continue to the structures of self 
censorship. But the restrictions imposed on self-expression go beyond avoiding 
politically sensitive topics, and include modelling TV presenters into representations 
of the nation. Both content and physical appearances are controlled by an 
established structure of anticipatory compliance towards the rulers. Their public 
images act as blueprints, but (with few exceptions) these physically visible examples 
are only set by male members of the ruling families. This gendered public visibility 
translates into different possibilities for male and female presenters to express 
individuality through their attire on screen.  
The interviews with Emirati women who work for the local TV channels will 
illustrate how they can experience the predefined roles imposed by their employers 
as a way to emancipate themselves from other social structures which restrict their 
radius of public action. They can thus become willing agents of the government’s 
national identity discourse. Personal evaluations and experiences of the media 
industry will illustrate the effectiveness of the government’s media strategy: It 
actively invents the role of ‘Emirati national’ to be consumed by media audiences 
and over time perceived as ‘normal.’ The chapter will conclude with reflections on 
how the consumption of these media images is interrelated with notions of national 
representation beyond the screens of TV. 
 
V. Chapter 5 will draw the focus of the research to contestations of the government’s 
media strategy. The outlooks of Emirati students will be used to show why the local 
media cannot succeed with its attempt to mainstream representations of identity. As 
part of a global media landscape the UAE national media cannot compete with other 
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media spheres in terms of quality and diversity of content. Rather than uniting the 
community of nationals into one audience, it alienates Emiratis. The perception of 
the students even goes a step further to perceive the UAE media as a ‘foreign’ 
discourse, intrinsically connected to the expatriates working in the industry. They 
sum up the disconnection under the label of a ‘Lebanese Media Mafia’. The 
examination of this notion will reveal their beliefs that only insiders of the 
community can make convincing media for the community. Despite their 
appreciation and consumption of international media, the students want the local 
media to provide stories related to their daily lives. They accept the brands of 
national identity as ‘accurate’. Yet more complex visualisations such as talk shows 
are criticised as artificial and implausible constructions which do not reflect real life 
experiences in the emirates.  
Not finding engaging local discourses in the official media, the public dialogue 
shifts to alternative media spheres, such as the internet. My dissertation will 
establish that Emirati communities indeed want to partake in the discourse on 
national identity. The chosen example in this context is the ongoing dispute about 
Emirati men marrying foreign women. The course of the argument in the media will 
show how the official media can be challenged. In this particular case Emiratis from 
mixed ethnic backgrounds rallied around a journalist who attacked the dominant 
opinion of the official media directly. The observations will be indicative for 
possibilities Emirati media professionals have to diversify the one-sided official 
media message from a grassroots level. 
 
VI. Chapter 6 will explore different examples of such micro-dynamics of change in the 
controlled media landscape of the UAE. It will show different ways media producers 
choose to bypass the structures of control and to introduce different topics and 
forms of representation. Different as the reviewed Emiratis approach this challenge, 
they use the demand and shortage of Emirati media personalities to their advantage. 
One way to gain permission to talk about controversial topics can be linked to an 
entitlement which functions as an entry permit to the media stage. This can be 
gained through personal achievements, such as educational awards or an earned 
reputation.  
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Other Emirati media producers found their own businesses, which gives more 
space to develop their particular media style independent from the established ways 
of the TV channels. They carefully create public profiles and fan bases before they 
collaborate with the official media. Having thus escaped the roles media 
professionals are usually fostered into, these media producers add diversity to the 
otherwise one-sided media.  
VII. Chapter 7 rounds up the observations on representations of national identity by 
taking a look at the currently evolving UAE film industry. This new dimension of the 
UAE media is influenced by the same intents and restrictions from the government 
but its different outreach can highlight how the imagined ‘non-local’ influences the 
experience of national identity. The review of films shows that locals accept a 
stereotypical representation of their national community when it comes to films. The 
imagined other nations influence their perception of Emirati films, and the yardstick 
of success is how well the nation is represented. Whereas individual and personal 
stories are called for on TV, in film stereotypes reign supreme. The style and 
narrative of Hollywood films in other local film industries is pivotal in this context. 
Since the Emirati film industry wants to join the blockbuster movie industry, it tries 
to copy the Hollywood style. In practice, Emirati cinema audiences experience films 
through the eyes of ‘other’ national communities who they imagine have a negative 
idea about Emiratis and Arabs.  
In the TV industry, the government has established a pattern of 
representation and consumption of national identity. In the case of cinema, 
Hollywood films have established a certain way of feeling scrutinised. The imagined 
‘gaze’ of other national communities leads to a feeling of having to prove themselves 
as a national community. The chapter unravels similarities between the government 
and the Emirati nationals. Both want to control how media represents the 
community and both want to present themselves in the best possible light. To 
achieve this they want to control the media by making it one-sided. The government 
wants to present the nation they created as successful, authentic and thus legitimate 
to the people. The nationals want to present their community as equally coherent 
and valid to other national communities. In a way, the government and the nationals 
have more in common than one thinks at first. While the nationals are struggling 
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with government control and want more diversity, they are just as eager to act as 
censors and controllers when they face the imagined mass-audience of world 
cinema.  
This last chapter reinforces what the other chapters have addressed: the 
media identity is a reconciliation of different concepts and trends. Branding and 
individual expressions are appreciated in different situations and can be used to feel 
part of an imagined community of nationals. The situational view on different media 
also includes the imagined ‘other’ who plays a pivotal role in determining how 
people want to be represented in which situation. The concern with representation 
towards an imagined scrutinising ‘other’ in many cases hinders Emirati media 
producers from pushing boundaries towards a more diverse and realistic 
visualisation of UAE society. At the same time the research shows that the 
government’s insistence on the construct of an ethnical homogenous national 
community is challenged from a grassroots level. Due to the fact that most Emiratis 
are multi-ethnic, the pure lineage of the Bedouin myth is no longer maintainable. 
The brand of the nation is currently in a process of being re-interpreted to represent 
share moral ideals rather than biological heritage. The mere fact that this 
reinterpretation is possible demonstrates the success of a national brand which is so 
generic that it enables identification and reinterpretation from various communities 
without losing its social meaning. 
This dissertation explores how Emirati media professionals navigate government 
restrictions and envision their national identities in midst a conglomerate of global media 
styles. The multi-national population of the UAE, the easy access to global media, and the 
urgency of determining a distinct identity, makes the UAE case significant. In an 
environment where media mainstreams and brands dominate the interpretive material 
available to individuals, national identity is transformed into a mainstream itself. The aim of 
the UAE government to create a unified and stable national community is therefore 
challenged and contested by diverse publics it seeks to control. This dissertation illustrates 
the dynamics of the rapidly growing UAE media landscape and its implications on the 
national identity discourse. In addition, the dissertation will analyse how the government 
developed a strategy to control the community of nationals it aspires to create. Through the 
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perspective of Emirati film makers, reporters, and TV presenters, the success and 
implications of this strategy will be discussed. 
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1 Imagining and visualising nationhood: the dialogical character of 
imagined community and the legitimisation of a ruling elite 
 
 
Since the establishment of Dubai Media City in 2001 the United Arab Emirates has 
set out to be the centre of the media industry in the MENA (Middle East and North African) 
region. The country has enjoyed tremendous success in attracting global media makers and 
prides itself on being one of the leading countries worldwide in terms of media 
accessibility.31 Yet while the UAE is busy making deals with foreign investors, the national 
media is restricted by government censorship. Any content has to be in accordance with the 
country's official religious and cultural values, which has resulted in websites being blocked, 
imported magazines having content blacked out, and legislation being passed that states 
that all locally produced media content has to be approved by the government. Every 
internet user in the UAE is familiar with the blocked screen message that states that a 
particular page cannot be accessed because it does not comply with the customs of the 
UAE. The contradiction between high media accessibility and the censorship of that media 
makes any study of it much more than a survey of contemporary technological 
developments: it inevitably becomes a study of the nation’s social development. A working 
knowledge of the history of the Emirates is required in order to fully comprehend the 
magnitude of the achievement in creating a nation in a mere few decades. It also illustrates 
the importance of media in sustaining this newly-formed and full-fledged national 
community. 
This chapter combines a historical overview of the UAE nation building processes 
within the theoretical framework on which the research is based. Recurring themes will be 
introduced, such as the juxtaposition between local and global interests, and different 
perceptions of communities. A key notion will be the concept of “imagined communities”, 
which is enforced via media image. The challenges and modifications of the UAE national 
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 CNN have already developed an Arabic-language channel in 2009, and the newly-established Arabic National 
Geographic channel became the ninth most-viewed Ramadan show in the Arab world after only one year of 
broadcasting. (See Hawkes, 2010. Nat Geo Abu Dhabi Gears up for Oloum Al Qital.) 
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ideology mirror similar dynamics on the media industry. In their attempt to create a national 
identity, the UAE media landscape is characterised by a dichotomy of interests within the 
ruling elite as well as between the government and the UAE population. In order to obtain 
legitimacy the government had to merge tribal politics into the ideology of a UAE nation.  
Section 1.1 will ascertain how different concepts of nationhood have to be adjusted 
and reconciled according to the specific needs of the government’s nation building project. 
The legitimacy of the political status quo strongly relies on the perception of the community 
of UAE nationals as ‘naturally’ evolved from a shared heritage. It will be argued that the 
ideological ‘normalisation’ of this notion is part of a dialogical process of constant 
negotiation. 
This negotiation takes place on the level of circulated ideas and notions but also in 
direct visual encounters between members of the community. These face-to-face 
encounters with others of the imagined community are of specific relevance for the UAE 
case and suggest an extension of Anderson’s and Appadurai’s conceptualisations. As the 
section will show, in the UAE the community of nationals imagines itself to be potentially 
face-to-face. On an imaginary interpretive level this notion creates a community which is 
more personal than Anderson’s imagined community. This particular aspect does not only 
frame a certain way of experiencing the ‘other’, but, as section 1.1 will show, is part of the 
discourse of legitimacy constructed around the ruling elite. 
The historical evolution of this legitimising discourse will be reviewed in section 1.2. 
How it developed in response to other ideologies, which were circulated via mass-media will 
be shown. The competition between the Arabic language radio stations from the 1930s 
onwards demonstrated the propaganda potentials of audio (and visual) media for political 
means from which the rulers of the Gulf could profit. The experience with imported 
ideologies fuelled by the media during the Trucial States era showed a large gap in the 
rulers’ control over political stability. It became vital for the success of the nation building 
project to defuse any alternative nationalist ideologies and consequently a local media 
infrastructure was set up as educator in nationhood for the citizens. The rapid development 
of the local media during the 1970s led to characteristics which would remain significant 
features of the UAE media until today. 
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1.1 Imagining the nation 
 
The notions of nationhood which contributed to the UAE nationalist project have to 
be evaluated on the grounds of dialogical exchange. The process of negotiating overlapping 
or contradictory concepts which have contributed to an official narrative of Emirati 
nationhood ultimately forms the basic interpretive material for individual Emiratis. Since the 
process of identity formation as an interpretive notion develops into a recurring theme 
throughout the conducted research in the UAE, the following section will focus on 
conceptualisations of collective identities. The first two parts will evolve around the notion 
of a UAE national community and the historical development of the federation. The 
relevance of both ethnical and political concepts of nation will be discussed through the 
establishment of the political system. 
In the case of the UAE the notion of a tribal heritage is a vital part of the national 
identity. Therefore the third part of the following section will explore the importance of a 
reconciliation of tribal and national community for the legitimisation of the ruling elite. This 
part will show how in the UAE fabricating an ethnic ideology of the nation established a 
class system. This system extends from the Emirati population to its relation to expatriate 
residents who form the majority of the population. 
The discussion will proceed in part four to the concept of dialogism, which is crucial 
to the formation of collective identities. The relationship between different concepts of 
nationhood will be conceptualised as both distinguishing as well as symbiotic. Therefore 
notions of nations, as bound by a shared ethnicity or by a political aim, are only seemingly 
dichotomous. In the creation of a notion of nationhood each national ideology can create a 
characteristic reconciliation of such concepts. The complexity of notions of collective 
identity is expressed in the world views of individuals who contribute to the national media. 
Embedded in the nationalist discourse, the notion of a tribal community forms an imaginary 
bond between members of the UAE community of citizens, who do not know each other in 
real time. 
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Elaborating on the imaginary bond or sentiment between members of a community, 
the last part of the following section will highlight a characteristic of the UAE imagined 
community: the notion that in the UAE the community is at least potentially face-to-face. 
This concept will remain relevant for the development of individual and sub-communal 
selves throughout the research. It influences social public actions and displays of identity 
albeit an imagined watchful community who gains more power over individuals through the 
idea. 
 
 
1.1.1 National identity as a negotiation between ideology and experience 
 
To conceptualise the meaning of nationhood in the Emirati context it is necessary to 
provide a brief review on how the UAE was established. The nation-building process is a 
case for Ernest Gellner’s concept of nations which are formed and controlled by political and 
intellectual elite. The ruling elite then impose a national ideology on the population.32 In the 
case of the UAE borders of the state territory were not drawn along commonly accepted 
territorial claims landmarks, let alone the lines of ethnicity and religion.33 In fact, the 
Ottoman Empire, British agencies and the Government of India had all influenced the 
territorial boundaries. What was proclaimed state territory of the UAE was a result of 
fervent diplomacy pushed by political pressure.  
British interest in the region before the discovery of oil was primarily due to both 
their location (en route to India) and to pirate activity in their waters. Both had a serious 
impact on British trade interests. Prior to the foundation of the UAE the seven Emirates had 
entered, as other Sheikhdoms in the region, into mutually beneficial agreements with the 
British government, earning themselves the name of the ‘Trucial States.’ In 1897, the British 
were able to put the area under their Protectorate, thereby securing safe naval passage to 
India in return for stabilising the political position of the existing rulers. The exploitation of 
oil in the Arabian Peninsula, which started during the 1930s, shifted the balance of power in 
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 Gellner, 1983. Nations and Nationalism, p.6f. 
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 Until now border conflicts exist between the UAE and Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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favour of foreign companies and powers in the region, which were once again able to 
influence local politics. The emirate of Fujairah, for example, had been under the control of 
the Qawasim until 1952, when the American ARAMCO company tried to pay the local 
dominant tribe (the Al Sharqis) for oil exploration rights. To keep the Americans out of the 
region, the British upgraded Fujairah to a Trucial State, which set it under the 1835 
agreement that granted British companies exclusive rights to their resources.34  
When oil was found offshore in Abu Dhabi in 1958, it quickly became the most 
attractive Emirate to investors, exports started in 1962 and shortly thereafter, in 1966, the 
British supported a peaceful coup against the ruler, who it was deemed had not done 
enough to assist the British in building the infrastructure necessary for their business 
operations. The new ruler, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, would not only go on to 
develop the emirate in this crucial respect, but would eventually (together with the ruler of 
Dubai, Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum) become the driving force behind the federation itself. 
With a British-friendly ruler as head of the most important oil producer among the emirates, 
the British were able to gradually start withdrawing from the region; they announced in 
1968 that a complete withdrawal would be achieved by 1971.35 It was then that Sheikh 
Zayed and Sheikh Rashid launched what the former reportedly called “our experiment in 
federation.” 36 
The he territorial space of what is now the UAE shares ethnicity, religion, and even 
family ties with other neighbouring Gulf States. The initial plan of a union was not limited to 
the seven emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm Al Quwain, 
and Ajman. Bahrain and Qatar were also involved in the negotiations. A realistic fear of local 
rulers in the region was that after the British withdrawal their sheikhdoms would be 
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 See: Davidson, 2008. Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success, p. 27f. Ajman is an interesting example of a British 
intervention of a different sort: although no oil exploration was ever done in the emirate, the British put an 
army base there to deter American companies from attempting to win the favour of its sheikhs. The army base 
was, in essence, an excuse for the British to pay the local rulers and thus ensure their loyalty. (See: ibid. p.60). 
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 Immediately after his appointment Sheikh Zayed set about restoring Anglo-Emirati relations and investing 
the Emirate’s oil profits in infrastructure and various social welfare projects. Although the British had begun to 
withdraw in 1966, they had first ensured that Sheikh Zayed understood and was willing to fulfil the needs of 
their oil contractors, so British consultants (including for the army) continued to work in the country. 
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 The quotation is reprinted in Staff-Reporter, 2008. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan: A Special Tribute.p.17. 
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annexed by Saudi Arabia.37 Several scenarios for a federation were therefore discussed, but 
many rulers were reluctant to join the federation for fear of having to relinquish their 
titles.38 In addition to the pressures of attempting to negotiate a political union (which 
meant drafting a shared constitution, resolving old territorial disputes, and establishing a 
federal government), each emirate was also trying to keep up with necessary infrastructural 
developments. Incredibly, on the day of the unification itself on December 2nd 197139, the 
constitution was still a mere draft, developed under the assumption that Bahrain and Qatar 
would form part of the aspired federation.40 Considering the circumstances under which the 
nation state was built, it becomes clear just how important it was for the rulers to legitimate 
their political status. 
 Michael Herb and Greg Gause analyse the means by which ruling elites throughout 
the Gulf region ensure their power and political stability.41 Gause coins the term “tamed” 
tribalism to describe the relations to and control of tribes, which are core political 
challenges for the GCC-states.42 In the process of founding the nations tribal support was 
crucial for the rulers who at the same time managed to naturalise the influence of tribes 
through government institutions.43 In the UAE as in other GCC states urbanisation and 
sedentarisation politics were employed.44 To maintain political stability it is vital that the 
                                                          
37
 See: Gause, 1994. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, p.18.  
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 In the early stages of these negotiations it seemed that none of the region’s rulers could agree with each 
other on any issue. Abu Dhabi was far from the first choice of capital, for example: previous plans had 
favoured Sharjah or even Manama, the capital of Bahrain. Another proposal to merge the smaller emirates 
(Ra’s Al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm Al-Quwain, and Ajman) into one mini-union of Coastal Emirates in order to 
give them a stronger voice in the Council was rejected by Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Dubai. 
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 At this date, the federation consisted only of the six emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, 
and Umm Al Quwain. Ras Al Khaimah joined a few months later, in early 1972. Bahrain and Qatar became 
independent states in August and September 1971, shortly before the formation of the UAE. 
40
 The draft constitution of 1970 had been intended for a union which included Bahrain and Qatar, and was 
thus designed to preserve the autonomy of each member state: it therefore severely restricted the federal 
government as a central body by supporting established distributions of power. However, the provisory 
constitution that was eventually agreed upon by the Supreme Council was only moderately different from the 
original, which makes it a somewhat contradictory piece of legislation that still limits federal power. It has 
since been extended twice, so that it is still considered the basis of the UAE federal government to this day. 
Abdullah Omran Taryam discussed the pros and contras of the constitution in depth in his book Taryam, 1987. 
The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950 – 85, chapter 6. 
41
 See: Herb, 1999. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, 
p.21ff. and Gause, 1994. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, p.10ff. 
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 Gause, 1994. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, p.18. 
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 Ibid. p.14. 
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 Ibid.p.24. 
39 
 
“rulers portray their systems as representing the best of religious and cultural obligation.”45 
Gause’s remark summarises the importance for a national ideology to appear ‘natural’ while 
depending on the political willingness and initiative of a political elite. 
 
 
1.1.2 The political setup of the UAE: strengthening the ruling elite and defining its 
citizens 
 
The 40-year slogan “Spirit of the Union” does more than merely accentuate the 
achievement of creating a nation-state: it signifies the attitude of the nation’s ideological 
founding fathers, Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid and the relationship between the 
member emirates. Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Zayed was first elected president of the federation 
with Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Rashid, as Vice President, in 1971. According to the provisional 
constitution, the federation would be governed by a president elected by a supreme 
council, which consists of representatives of the ruling families of each emirate. Thanks to 
his continued re-election, Sheikh Zayed held his post until his death in 2004 (as did Rashid, 
who died in 1990). He was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Khalifa and Rashid’s son was also 
elected to his father’s old position, keeping power in the family. The Supreme Council also 
elects a council of ministers as the fifth executive body (after the President, Vice President, 
and the Supreme Council). The Council of Ministers (or Cabinet) until now is responsible for 
raising and maintaining the living-standard of its citizens and enhancing the development of 
the country as a whole. The 22 seats were again divided proportionally according to the size 
of the emirates, which gave preference to Abu Dhabi and Dubai. With the sole exception of 
Abu Dhabi, the Sheikhs have always appointed ministers from their own families, and a 
change in the constitution was required in order to admit other citizens.46  
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 Federal Decree No. 2 (9/12/1971) (See: Taryam, 1987. The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950 – 
85, p.208). The settlement of basic laws and establishment of ministerial bodies required lots of negotiation, 
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– mainly regarding business, of which Dubai was adamant by supportive – but also they could not easily agree 
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  The relationship between the emirates was established, the process of granting 
citizenship employed by the rulers in the founding years of the UAE further supports 
Gause’s definition of the Gulf States as monarchies who have “tamed” tribalism to ensure 
their political strength. Citizenship for versatile tribes could not simply be given on the basis 
of territorial belonging. Applicants were usually required to either approach the ruler 
personally or through an esteemed representative. Although the application process has 
predictably become increasingly stringent ever since, it is still at the discretion of the ruler. 
Nationality is now regarded as a privilege that may even be granted for special contributions 
to the state, which is perhaps the best testament to Ernest Gellner’s notion that “nations 
are the artifacts of men's loyalties and solidarities”.47 From a governmental perspective, the 
process of granting citizenship symbolises a continuation of tribal social structures and 
practices of legitimate tribal leadership: because tribes enter into alliances with one 
another, it is the leader who has the power to decide which other tribes may be admitted 
into the confederation. In terms of government-citizen relations, this set up establishes a 
patronage-benefactor relationship in which the citizens do not have a say in the political 
process. 
This initial setup changed gradually over time as illustrated in the transformation of 
the nation’s legislative and consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC) between 
2006 and 2011. It consists of 40 members and is reformed every two years. Since 2006 half 
of the FNC members are elected by select citizens.48 To widen the circle of citizens eligible 
for election, a new governmental body, the National Election Committee (NEC), was formed 
to oversee the elections in 2011.49 Subsequent steps were taken to ensure the satisfaction 
of the UAE population, in accordance with policies the state has pursued since its 
foundation. The rulers, in keeping with the tradition of a rentier state, provide their citizens 
with considerable benefits, from free education and healthcare, and government-allocated 
land and housing to financial assistance for weddings (available to nationals marrying 
nationals only) and employee benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(See: ibid. p.217). The Federal National Council was therefore formed by the Constitution in order to persuade 
and pressure all its members towards a quick establishment of federal ministerial system. (See: ibid.p.218f.) 
47
 Gellner, 1983. Nations and Nationalism, p.7. Such a sense of solidarity may explain why those families who 
originally refused to adopt the nationality face complications when they try to apply for it many years later. 
48
 See: Heard-Bey, 2007. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, p.377.  
49
 WAM, 2011. About the Federal National Council. 
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Following Gause, this relationship between rulers and citizens is part of the politics 
of diffusing tribal influences by making them part of and dependant on the government 
system.50 The state permeates into all levels of the lives of the nationals, thus establishing a 
monopoly on all public institutions. But although the state could formerly have been 
described as a rentier state, recent rhetoric suggests that the country is trying to develop 
more of a social welfare system, “by transitioning from social care to social development, 
ensuring integrated social service policy-making, and upgrading the quality of social 
services.“51 The focus of the research conducted in this thesis is on how members of the 
national community sees itself, in particular the grassroots perspective on national identity 
rather than how the UAE as a nation originated.  
 
 
1.1.3 The definition of tribes and a class-system based on ethnicity 
 
Defining the term tribe forms the basis of a community which imagines itself as tribal 
or at least rooted in a tribal past. The naturalization process of the UAE implies a variation of 
the Gellner nationhood model as formed and controlled by political elites. The tribal 
element inherent in government structures is important to both the legitimacy of the ruling 
families and the majority of citizens. In fact, the conflict between “taming” and using tribal 
notions of nationhood reflects the difference between the characterisations of tribal 
relations. The anthropologist Evans-Pritchard argued that tribes are constituted by lineage 
segments.52 . In other words, a tribe can be thought to have a dimension of shared descent. 
However, Dale Eickelman observed that the tribal system is determined not by blood 
relations, but by alliances, and that these alliances are subject to change. Attempts to 
classify and categorise tribal society are therefore shaped by the ideological position of the 
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theorist. 53 The ideological background of the observer is crucial to bear in mind: Eickelman 
criticises Western imperialist attempts to s define tribal societies from an outside 
perspective without considering the notions the tribes they were studying had of 
themselves. This criticism can also be applied to the Arab discourse. Descriptions of tribes 
were defined by outside observers and formed by the observers’ notions of their own 
society as well as their political agenda.54  
In the context of Gulf societies references to Bedouin tribes often becomes a 
framework by which create distinctions of class within society. Since the history of the 
states is imagined as tribal, those who come from a Bedouin family can feel closer to the 
ruling class. Anh Nga Longva, for example describes this form of constructing difference 
between sub-communities in Kuwait. She observes how in this particular national context 
the dichotomies linked to a Bedouin or urban heritage are not only linked to attributes of 
backwardness and development, but go further to describe loyalties to the nation state. The 
Bedouin Kuwaitis who have settled in the area since 1960 are considered to be less 
committed and obedient to the modern nation state than citizens from the pre-oil era.55 In 
the UAE this relationship between different communities of citizens is reversed: since the 
founding fathers were Bedouins, their tribes are considered the authentic and original 
Emiratis. 
It is a sign of a successful implementation of a national ideology that the ruling 
classes are imagined as legitimate due to their tribal Bedouin background. This includes a 
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 The utilization of ‘tribal culture’ as contrast to ‘urban society’ has a longstanding tradition in Arab thought. 
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genealogical purity, based on being part of the tribal notion.56 The idea that the members of 
a tribal federation share patrilineal descent is what Eickelman would call an ideology which 
constitutes cultural meaning.57 This is why, as Eickelman says, anthropological concepts 
have to acknowledge that there are several working definitions of what the cultural bases of 
a tribe are, depending on who is defining it.58 From the perspective of ruling families in the 
Gulf a tribal lineage is an element of legitimisation, which is why a genealogical notion 
seems natural. Andrew Shryock points out that  
 
in “the postcolonial era, when ‘modernity’ and ‘authenticity’ have become twin 
fixations of political thought in the Middle East, it is quite ordinary for the culture-
making classes to drape new identities in the legitimacy of older, genealogical 
traditions, and vice versa.”59  
 
Shryock’s remark can be linked to Gause’s characterisation of Gulf nationalism, 
which argued that the ruling families and inherently the tribes they belonged to initially 
used the tribal connections to justify their rule, and then made sure to neutralise the 
influences of tribes. Through the constitution and government institutions they ensured that 
the future of the Federation depended on their families.60 The UAE rulers validated their 
claim by building up and providing infrastructure, education, healthcare and other welfare 
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benefits which ensured the prosperity of the UAE nationals. The system of elitism based on 
ethnic background has grown increasingly convoluted over the years. Not only has this 
yielded a class system for the nationals, it has necessarily resulted in the development of a 
class of nationals. To achieve the country’s ambitious goals with a working population of 
merely around 293,788 in 1975,61 the emirates imported labourers to work on the 
numerous construction sites, as well as in the service industries and public sectors. 
Expatriate labourers were initially recruited from Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan and 
Lebanon, but increasing numbers of Asians came during the 1980s.62 According to 
government statistics, 219,580 working visas were issued in 1995 for a population which 
was already more than four times larger than it had been 20 years before (1,335,894).63 The 
number of working visas steadily increased until 1997 (461,705) and levelled out during the 
following two years to around 300,000.64 It is worth remembering that by that time the UAE 
had become one of the richest countries in the world with a per capita income of 19,270 US 
Dollars by 1985.65 
The relationship between ethnicity and social class is not, however, as simple as 
“locals versus internationals”. Immigrants play an important role in strengthening the ruling 
elite: Asian labourers are mainly in service and construction industries. The latter has 
brought the UAE and especially Dubai into disrepute for ignoring human rights' abuses 
suffered by unskilled labourers from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Western (or 
Westernised Levantine) expatriates on the other hand were and are often employed in 
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administrative positions. These foreign workers have an established presence in other areas, 
and not just in the private sector. By 2001 the number of Emiratis employed by the federal 
government was 25,738, whilst the number of expatiates was 30,890.66 
These expatriates form an elite of government administrators who do not challenge 
the regime. The allocation of jobs to specific ethnic groups already started with the need for 
professionals to work in the oil sector and infrastructure development.67 Effectively, linking 
skill and social status to origin, though caused by political circumstances68 repeats the 
structures of linking origin (of a tribe) to social status. Accordingly, parallel to different tribal 
classes of Emiratis, the expatriates are categorised among what is perceived as ethnic lines 
(these sometimes overlap with regional or national categories, such as Westerners, 
Pakistanis, Filipinos, Syrian Levantine, Lebanese etc.).69 An analogous notion of ethnicity 
linked to social status can be observed among the UAE nationals, although conflicting 
definitions of tribal and national identity emerge depending on who is doing the defining 
and under which circumstances. The following example illustrates how different notions of 
collective self can be negotiated by individuals who affiliate themselves with different 
communities.  
During the fieldwork with UAE media personalities, participants referred to their 
identity as “pure Emirati” (or as the phrase goes: “Emirati Emirati”). Those who identified 
with this as such saw this notion as equivalent to being a “true” UAE citizen, thus 
distinguishing themselves from citizens who have gained the status of nationals but who hail 
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from Yemeni, Saudi or other Gulf tribes. While these participants also considered 
themselves Emiratis, they were able to associate themselves with or distance themselves 
from specific social phenomena by either utilising their local credentials or by citing their 
‘extra-Emirati’ origins. A notable example of this was provided by a second-generation 
Emirati research participant of Bahraini origin, who remarked: “If something is positive [in 
the UAE] I’m so proud; if something is negative, I’m not local... I don’t know. It [Emirati 
culture] is my culture and I love it – well, I’ve been living here the past seventeen years, how 
can I not love it. There are just these minor things that make me question... [So] I use this 
technique, if I don’t like it here [I say] ‘Well, I’m Bahraini’; if I don’t like Bahrain: ‘I’m 
Emirati’”.70  
The participant aptly demonstrated here how different approaches to nationhood 
and collective identity can be represented in (and negotiated by) one individual and exposes 
the fluctuating nature of collective identity, which is always subject to prioritisation by the 
individual. Personal identities are not so unified that people can afford to belong to one 
imagined community at a time, which gives citizens the freedom to choose their circles 
accordingly – and to belong to several at once.71 Depending on the situation or topic under 
discussion, an individual may see social structure represented in different categories, 
imagined as triangle, mosaic, or merging colour-scale.72 With regards to the different 
categories Paul Dresch remarks that “there are commonly reckoned three circles of identity 
in Gulf society beyond that of muwāṭin or fellow citizen: khalījī or Gulf, then Arab, then 
ajnabī or foreign.”73 Research participants who identified themselves as “true” Emiratis 
often believed themselves to be descended from the tribal federation of the Bani Yas. Both 
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the ruling families of Abu Dhabi (Al Nahyan) and Dubai are believed to be originated from 
the Bani Yas (or “the seven families”).74 Linking ‘true’ Emiratiness to the Bani Yas indirectly 
applies a genealogical notion to notions of both the hierarchy of the tribe and of the UAE 
society in turn.75 It is significant that this hierarchical notion is important to some Emiratis, 
since it legitimises different classes of citizens. The Bani Yas tribal federation who initiated 
the UAE becomes not only the founding myth of the nation but the justification for a class 
distinction: those who can affiliate themselves to this elite can perceive themselves as 
legitimised as Emiratis by an inherited right older than the nation state itself – just like the 
ruling families. 
Far from disproving Eickelman’s theory of tribes as political alliances often set into a 
an ideological framework of segmentary lineage76, the observation that some Emiratis do in 
fact perceive themselves as community mirrors the different notions of tribe, communal 
cultural meaning and nationhood. As such the different ways of imagining community by 
individual Emiratis may be seen as evidence of the difficulties the UAE state has in 
legitimising itself. In his discussion of different tribal concepts, Eickelman highlights that 
ethno-political conceptions, including those utilised by state authorities, overlap with other 
definitions of tribe held by tribespeople which are not therefore subject to abstract 
reflection.77 How the tribal society is perceived by Emiratis is more a reflection of the 
individual than it is of the collective. What is more important to understand is how the 
community (or the ruling elite, as the case may be) reinforces perceptions of tribal 
structures in order to legitimise itself.  
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1.1.4 Identities and the dialogue between formal and practical ideologies 
 
The situational affiliation to a collective identity described by the example of the 
Bahraini-Emirati draws the attention to the reconciliation of ‘ideal’ identities. The research 
presented in this thesis conceptualises this negotiation as a creative interpretive process 
performed by individuals to make different affiliations meaningful for their own sense of 
identity. This creative process can be translated into various forms of social expression from 
conversation or visual appearance to media texts such as films. 
 A scholar who has outlined the correlation between concepts of national identities 
is Linda Layne. Drawing from an analysis of tribal and national identities in Jordan, she 
reconciles the coexistence of seemingly dichotomous concepts of identities within a 
community, by referring back to Michael Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue.78 A dialogical 
approach can acknowledge not only the overlapping character of notions of collective 
identity, but their fluctuant nature. However, whilst the application of Bakhtin’s textual 
concept of dialogism to social communities may well describe the flow of communication 
and information between these groups, one has to remember that Bakhtin’s concept does 
not consider the “other” to be a necessary constituent of one’s own identity. Although he 
sees “self” as evolved from a dialogic exchange (not self-sufficient or static),79 Hirschkopp 
observes that Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue takes place between two (or more) stable pre-
existent entities.80 Herein lies the major difference between Bakhtin’s theory and Dale 
Eickelman: the latter considers the concept of cross-fertilisation essential to the 
development and expression of “cultural meaning.” With ‘cultural meaning’, Eickelman does 
not mean a contrast to material artefacts, but a different level of meaning, which is “socially 
employed, produced and maintained in social action and interaction.”81 Hence cultural 
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meanings produce cultural conceptions which are adjustable, and although they result in as 
well as evolve around cultural artefacts, they are themselves under constant change as part 
of continuous reproduction processes.82 
Eickelman made an important distinction between what he called ‘formal’ and 
‘practical’ ideologies: whilst he thought of the former as mainly theoretical and often 
bureaucratic (what is referred to in this thesis as an ‘official narrative’), he described the 
latter as evident and inherent in people’s practices. There is, however, a danger of viewing 
these concepts as so dichotomous that they are completely independent of each other. To 
view national sentiments as an artificial political construction is to ignore its evident 
discursive strength in countries such as the UAE. For this reason, Eickelman suggested that 
formal and practical ideologies enjoy a bilateral relationship, suggesting not merely a 
Bakhtinian dialogic contrast but an influential exchange between them. He elaborated that 
such relationships are in fact “ways of making sense of the social world and of informing 
action within it”,83 implicating both its importance to a national population and the 
interpretative effort required on their behalf. It is therefore my belief that the creation of a 
national identity is a far more complex process of creating cultural meaning than that of 
constructing the nation. The latter is constructed by the political elite through legal and 
administrative frameworks; the former requires other citizens to accept and promote the 
concept. As an educative government-driven process, national identity as an ideology still 
relies on external agents (from outside the political elite) to promote it.  
Though creating a nation is a largely bureaucratic process which requires the 
understanding and assent of the nationals, the process of creating cultural meaning (and 
therefore, a national identity) requires the nationals to comprehend this sentiment. In other 
words, understanding is a mainly intellectual effort while comprehension is achieved by 
experiencing the sentiment: Arjun Appadurai conceives of imagined communities as 
communities of sentiment.84 Sentiments cannot however be simply constructed and 
indoctrinated as part of a top-down process, just as nationalism cannot exist statically but 
must be kept alive by the vigour and passion of the national community. In order to achieve 
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this, the nationals must both identify with the sentiment/ideology and live it in their 
everyday lives. Only through praxis and experience can the validity of a taught theory be 
internalised and accepted as common knowledge. Although an initial concept may be 
invented or fabricated, it requires a conglomerate of individuals to perform accordingly in 
order to become a social force: it is at this point (as was the case with collective memory) 
that assimilation must take place between intellect and experienced reality.  
Elaborating on his notion of ‘communities of sentiment’, Appadurai defined a 
national identity as “the consciousness of the cultural attributes and their naturalization”.85 
Though the political elite may construct what Eickelman calls a ‘formal’ ideology and 
educate their citizens accordingly, it must be subsequently ‘naturalised’ by the nationals if it 
is to become a ‘practical’ identity. Eickelman calls this practical ideology a ‘world view’, 
which indicates that the community share assumptions about social order which feel so 
‘natural’ to them that they are taken for granted.86 Michel Foucault discussed a similar 
notion, which he called ‘normalisation’: he noted that social norms which had actually been 
enforced are by now taken for granted as a result of what he called ‘normalisation’.87 The 
norms would only be negotiated by the community if they were subsequently 
‘problematised’ by the “development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that pose 
problems”.88 His theory implies that the process of creating a national identity requires a 
negotiation or at least an interpretation of normative notions. 
Rather than incorporating Foucault’s and Eickelman’s definitions into one, it is useful 
to consider ‘normalisation’ and ‘naturalisation’ as distinct concepts which describe different 
processes. The former may be considered to mean the process by which an elite promotes 
or enforces a national identity along certain lines (ethnic, if Smith’s theory is correct) in 
order to subjugate certain sectors of society. Naturalisation, on the other hand, may be 
considered an attempt to create a community united by a world view rather than to create 
a hierarchical social order. Though both are intertwined in social reality, one is consciously 
constructed and perceived as regulative and for an orderly formation of society; the other is 
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considered a more grassroots creation of cultural meaning which transforms enforced 
ideologies and individual experiences into multiple ways of mutual understanding 
community. The process of creating a national identity may be thought of as an attempt to 
create both a social structure and a corresponding ideology or as an enforcement of the 
legitimacy of the entire nation by promoting a distinct (yet common) culture. Both 
interpretations nonetheless rely on the comprehension of the resulting ideology by the 
community, which requires its successful negotiation by the citizens themselves.89  
I therefore regard the creation of national identity as a cyclical and infinite process 
based upon the negotiation of the formal ideology by the citizens; the subsequent 
naturalisation or problematisation of the ideas therein; and the resulting sentiment of 
collectiveness (practical ideology) which in turn informs the formal ideology. The process 
therefore requires both immense pedagogical finesse on the part of its promoters and much 
negotiation on the part of the citizens in order to succeed. Once successful, however, the 
resulting ideology provides a way “of making sense of the social world and of informing 
action within it”90.  
 
 
1.1.5 The extent of imagination: subsidiary imagined communities 
 
Both Eickelman’s and Appadurai’s concepts are linked to what Benedict Anderson 
has labelled as ‘imagined communities’ which, as a description of community formation, will 
be used as a central concept in this dissertation. Anderson argues that any sense of 
“comradeship” beyond what he calls the “face-to-face” (i.e. with people the individual has 
not personally met) is obviously imagined, regardless of whether it resulted as part of a top-
down imposition91 or was derived from “pre-modern ethnic identities and communities”.92 
In addition, his approach suggests that no matter what the citizens of a nation base their 
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imagined connection on, be it ethnicity, kinship, or tribal unions, they will all think of 
themselves as sharing a political identity, even if they all differ on what that identity is.93 
The dialogical and creative notion of identity formation means that the members of 
Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ give meaning to the narratives and experiences they 
encounter to ‘imagine’ a national identity. According to Anderson, the basis of national 
communities is that its individual members “will never know most of their fellow members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”94 With regard to Emirati society, however, Anderson’s notion has to be 
expanded to incorporate the role of second-hand information and subsidiary contact with 
other members of the community. Anderson claimed that imagined communities are 
formed when they become too large to rely solely on face-to-face communication and so 
come to depend on a mediator: media images and narratives thus become an empowering 
element for imagined communities. For the UAE community of nationals this important role 
of media correlates with another important source of interpretive material for the sense of 
communion, the second-hand knowledge (or imagined knowledge) of members of the 
imagined community of nationals. The size of the national population of the UAE was 
estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be 851,164 in 2006, as size which allows 
nationals to imagine themselves as a face-to-face community even though they are not.95  
The idea is that nationals may have an ‘imagined knowledge’ of people who they 
have never met in person, but who are either socially pre-defined by their tribe’s names or 
characterised through the narratives of somebody who has met them. Such an indirect 
knowledge of others and their actions, which can in many cases be characterised as the 
social phenomenon of gossip, is nevertheless an indisputably important part of membership 
of an imagined community. It creates the idea that ‘everyone knows everyone’ and 
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therefore contributes to its legitimacy in the eyes of its members. One research participant 
informed me: “everything goes [round] quickly [here] and people know about it, so this is 
what we hear every day before leaving the house: ‘be careful and remember that Dubai is 
small’”.96 Another provided me with a less gossip-related example of imagined knowledge 
by saying of her future husband: “I don’t have to see him, I know everything about him from 
my brothers”.97  
Such statements highlight the importance of mediators or informers of knowledge of 
others. Anderson is certainly right to see media as the key informer for an imagined 
community; after all it uses multiple codes (images, sound) which can provoke strong 
emotions to a mass audience in one simultaneous action of transmission. However, the 
media as informer cannot be isolated from or its role marginalised albeit personal 
informers. Both have to complement each other if what Eickelman calls ‘world view’ shall be 
enforced. A shared world view or notion of collective identity is therefore based on 
individual interpretive efforts and communication with others. Where the individual 
understands the own notions to be shared by others, the notion of a community evolves. 
However this communal notion is always imagined, even between two individuals in direct 
encounter. What links people together as an interpretive community is always subjective 
since it is based on individual interpretations and understandings.98 If the notion of 
connection and shared world views is an imagined interpretive notion on a micro-level 
between individuals, we must correct Anderson’s definition of imagined communities: even 
face-to-face communities are imagined since they are based on individual de-coding and 
interpretation. Mutual understanding and shared ways of interpreting signs are imagined, 
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which does not mean that there can be no notion of mutual understanding, but it is 
important to bear in mind that it is, after all a notion, an interpretation. Following Anderson 
we have to accept that every community is imagined, consisting of individuals linked by 
interpretations which are perceived as mutual and reassured through communication. Since 
the community is created via communication on a micro-level, media, as a form of mass 
communication, translates this interpretive process to a macro level, yet remains dependent 
on individual receptions. 
 
 
1.1.6 Imagined communities and imagined face-to-face communities 
 
Focussing on interpretive processes as key to the creation of an imagined community 
means that media cannot be analysed isolated from the individuals engaged with it. Media 
allows the translation of narratives into specific and complex forms (texts, images, sounds), 
but remains embedded in an even more complex system of communication and action. 
Notions of self within an imagined community therefore cannot be investigated by a strict 
analysis of the media text but only through the prism of what media is perceived as by those 
interacting with it. The role media plays as an enforcer of an imagined community depends 
on the intentions of those producing media, the consumers, but also on the size of the 
community within which it is circulated. I would go as far as to say that if an individual 
identifies herself or himself as a member of an imagined community, the importance of 
media for said person increases with the size of the community.  
Without getting into the dispute of whether gossip is an informal individual form of 
communication or a tool to enforce community norms, for the understanding of the Emirati 
imagined community it is important to acknowledge the limited number of Emirati citizens 
comprising it, and the notion of being connected to, having knowledge of, or having met any 
member of the community via a subsidiary. This notion goes beyond Anderson’s notion that 
the image of the connection is present in the mind of each of its members. Interestingly the 
notion of knowing everybody at least via subsidiaries extends to the relationship between 
citizens and rulers. Due to the nation being so young and the nationals’ imaginings of tribal 
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life, citizens imagine that the nation was a “face-to-face” community until very recently. As 
aforementioned, the notion seems to be derived from the limited number of UAE nationals 
embedded in the collective memory as one characterised by possible face-to-face 
interaction between the ruler and his people in the majlis. One research participant 
observed the imagined proximity between modern Emiratis and their nation’s origins in the 
figure of Sheikh Zayed: “for the young people Sheikh Zayed is a myth, but they all have 
family members who all met him and have stories about him”.99  
The underlying notion of this statement is that until now the essence of the Emirati 
community is a face-to-face close-knit tribe. The participant has readily adopted the idea 
that the rulers hold the community together as their representatives. The success of this 
conception is mainly thanks to a naturalisation of the official narrative of the Emirati nation 
state, on the basis of which the ruler’s majlis (plur. majālis) is interpreted as a continuation 
of a tribal social structure. It symbolises a communal space, where all the members can 
come together and be imagined as connected by the ruler, who thus assumes a symbolic 
role as the nexus of the community. Of course, the notion is for most members of the 
community a narrative reality only: it is never personally experienced by them, but rather 
communicated through narratives of experiences in the majlis. It is nevertheless a 
reassurance of the imagined intactness of the community and more importantly, of the 
continued intactness of the community since its origins, long before the foundation of the 
UAE.  
The interesting phenomenon of such a notion is that it is not limited to male citizens. 
Despite the fact that women would attend majālis for women and only in exceptional cases 
attend the ruler’s majlis, women can also envision themselves physically close to the ruling 
class. Stories about women going to the Sheikh asking for something support the notion 
that all Emiratis are politically close to the Sheikhs. Women may believe they could go to an 
audience with him should the occasion arise, though they would in reality hardly go 
themselves. The government ideology has an interest in fostering such beliefs since they 
constitute to their image of tribal leadership. Accordingly, stories of exceptional occasions in 
which women really approach the rulers in person always end with the woman being 
granted support and sponsorship by the government. In turn, film producers, for example, 
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who depend on funding to profile themselves, can count on a career boost if they adhere to 
the national myth. An example is a short documentary, screened during a film festival, 
which tells the story of a Bedouin widow in dire circumstances who went to seek help from 
Sheikh Zayed. The film shows how she thankfully made the most of the farmland Sheikh 
Zayed granted her. The film director thus neatly combines several government conform 
messages in the thirteen-minute documentary: a traditional Bedouin woman who 
personifies how conservative ideas of women’s role in society and emancipated self-
determination do not contradict each other and are in fact validated by the highest patron, 
Sheikh Zayed, as virtuous. The main protagonist, who is repeatedly called a pioneer, is 
shown as an obedient wife (though now a widow), caring matron to her children and 
employees, and a hardened farmer who lives in harmony with the land and animals she 
owns. Since the film brings together so many aspects of a governmental syllabus it is not 
astonishing that the director could garner the Authority of Culture and Heritage as the 
financial and executive producer.100 The example fits directly into the cultural politics of 
other Arab regimes, such as the aforementioned research of Lisa Wedeen in Syria.101 
Admittedly, the oppression of intellectuals and artists under the Syrian Assad regime is an 
extreme case, but the government strategy is ultimately the same as in the UAE: the 
oppression of freedom of speech through censorship institutions is complimented by 
government support of those intellectuals who support the ideology of the respective 
regime. It becomes common knowledge among intellectuals that compliance to the 
government ideology is beneficial for advancing individual careers. Therefore, if you want to 
gain experience and public recognition as a film director, why not choose a fairy tale from 
the imagined days of Sheikh Zayed.  
Governmental support of individuals who sport the notion of a close ruler-citizen 
relationship is one way to encourage the notions of closeness. Another way is the prevailing 
praxis of individuals from the ruling families to appear unexpectedly in public places. One 
might see for example a member of the Al Maktoum family strolling through the Dubai Mall 
on a weekend. Such phenomena are important to maintain the imagined community: while 
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it is of course a myth that pre-UAE tribal society was face-to-face, it is the notion of “their” 
history as such that endows otherwise meaningless acts with significance and requires 
symbolic figures, such as the rulers, to perform these politically loaded rituals in order to 
maintain the national’s connection with the imagined community.  
Though there are certainly more symbolic and ritualised actions of reassurance for 
members of an imagined community, the example of the majlis is still important to mention 
since it shows that not only is the state aware of its function as the nexus of the community, 
but because the ruler himself is the perceived link to an imagined tribal past. We are 
therefore presented with a government which, on the one hand, defines itself as a modern 
nation state buton the other hand consciously retains features of a tribal society – even if 
these are only symbolic. For the analysis of media such symbolic references to a close-knit 
community will be crucial. As media representations of national identity they stand as the 
result of a reconciliation process between concepts of nation, just as they become part of an 
ongoing media dialogue. How national media stands as a result of a multisided dialogical 
process between nationalisms will be explored in the following section. 
 
 
1.2 Dialogue with, and control of, media 
 
In the case of the UAE’s concept of nationhood, tribal notions of community had to be 
incorporated into an ideology of nationhood. This does not mean, however, that tribal ideas 
of society were the only ones known and promoted by members of the society. Although 
constructed with a narrative presenting the UAE as an untouched Bedouin society 
catapulted into modernity with the discovery of oil, the society in the Gulf was far from 
isolated from other nationalist discourses. It will therefore be necessary to evaluate the 
cultural notions of identity on which the state was built (and on which the rulers arguably 
capitalised) in order to identify the origins of what one might call a ‘national consciousness’ 
in the country. 
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The dominant social discourse certainly cannot be analysed without the political and 
economic context which gave rise to it, especially as these are so necessary for 
communication with those outside of the face-to-face community. However, the 
problematisation of the social structure was strongly dependent on contesting ideologies 
which had reached the emirates long before the discovery of oil in 1962 via media and 
cultural agents. The first part of the following section will illustrate how nationalism in the 
UAE developed as a dialogical process, in response to and in interaction with ideological 
discourses present in the Trucial States during the 1950s and onwards. The role of media in 
this process strengthens the argument of a dialogue between different notions of self and 
community, and shows that the notion of tribal society had already been contested both 
under the influence of British policies in the region and with the rise of pan-Arabism 
It is difficult to determine whether the conflict over access to the media is a struggle 
to gain a public sphere or merely a conflict of supremacy between governments and interest 
groups. For Habermas the public sphere is the social domain ultimately accessible to all 
citizens, in which ‘private’ people come together to form a ‘public’ and subsequently, 
through conversation, form a public opinion.102 According to his original definition, 
developed from within a Western society, a public sphere develops from a bourgeois 
society: specifically, from the interest of a given society to take an active part in politics.103 It 
is certainly problematic to try to adapt or discard Habermas’ notion vis-à-vis either 
contemporary or historical Arab societies. The main difficulty lies in his definition of ‘public’, 
which Habermas does not simply define as society, but as those who have access to 
information on state related activities and, as a consequence, are able to form a public 
opinion. The basic question that emerges with regard to media is: what role does media play 
as a communicator/transmitter of opinions, and how far can they be said to constitute the 
‘public opinion’ of the imagined community?104  
‘Public opinion’ is as superficially theoretical as assuming one public. Fraser 
conceptualises multiple overlapping publics, but with regards to media it suffices to speak of 
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audiences, fan communities, or consumers.105 Although connected by a shared consumption 
of a media product these communities are not homogenous: their perceptions are different 
and their assembly situational. Nevertheless, nationalist media aims to create a dominant 
discourse which it labels as ‘public opinion’. Because during the Nasserist era the Trucial 
States did not have a local media to enforce a mainstream ideology, media was imported – 
often from Egypt. Through newspapers and especially radio transmission, Nasserism thus 
became a dominant discourse. 
The second part of the section will describe the response of the different political 
powers (the British agents and the local rulers) to this discourse. The events illustrate 
different strategies of political power, which are also relevant for contemporary UAE media 
politics. Ultimately, the rulers would secure their legitimacy by a mixed approach of securing 
local loyalty and deflecting foreign influence. But in order to provide the nourishing ground 
for a national identity the construction of one’s own media infrastructure was necessary. 
The last part will provide an overview of its development, as a tool to legitimise the rulers, 
educate the nation’s citizens and strengthen an imagined community. 
 
 
1.2.1 Imported mass-media challenging local legitimacy 
 
As a ‘protected state’ of British India, Eastern Arabia enjoyed more independence 
than those areas that were under direct British administration and also benefited powerful 
families in the region.106 Whereas the tribal structure of the Gulf societies was characterised 
by shifting alliances and changes in leadership, the British ensured that power over certain 
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regions stayed in the hands of one family, thus indirectly establishing the modern structure 
of sheikhs as hereditary monarchs of a defined area.107 As a result, the ruling families, 
merchants and other civilians all had different attitudes toward the imperial power 
depending on whether or not they had personally profited from the British intervention. 
The Maritime Truce of 1835 between the British government, the Qasimi Empire, 
and the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ajman (which was repeatedly renewed), secured the 
rulers’ power and provided them with rentier payments from the British India Office in 
exchange for keeping piracy under control and for giving British agents exclusive 
contracts.108 The fact that the rule and legislation of the region were indirectly under the 
control of the British (by keeping their sympathisers in power) created a fertile ground for 
nationalist ideas well before the formation of the UAE. An additional cause for discontent, 
especially among the merchants, was that the rulers were not obliged to share the received 
oil revenues with the rest of the population. The discontent turned against both the British 
and the ruling families who were perceived as the puppets of the British agents.109 This 
discontent with the political situation was displayed both directly and indirectly and mass 
media became a turning point around which such ideologies evolved.  
In the case of the future UAE, this meant imported media, given that the first locally 
produced newspaper, Al-ʾIttiḥād (The Union), was first published in 1969, in the midst of the 
process of forming a nation state. In neighbouring Bahrain the situation was slightly 
different. The Bahraini rulers had initially supported the development of a local media 
industry; Sheikh Salman ibn Hamad Al Khalifa, for example, published a supportive 
statement for the first issue of Ṣawt al-Baḥrayn (Voice of Bahrain) in 1952. But when the 
paper shifted from publishing literary content to spreading anti-British and nationalist ideas, 
                                                          
107
 See: Peterson, 1977. Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia, p.302. 
108
 It would be hasty to assume that the ruling and powerful families (let alone the rest of the population) were 
consequently pro-British, given that Britain had forced the emirates (as well as Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait) into 
treaties which had enabled the India Office to interfere in local politics. James Onley discusses the double-
sided relationship between rulers and British agents in his essay: “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf”, New 
Arabian Studies, vol. 6 (2004), p.30-92. 
109
 Davidson writes how Egyptian papers such as Al-Hilāl (Crescent) and Ar-Risāla (Message) contributed by 
publishing caricatures, displaying the crown prince of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid, as the puppet of the British Agent. 
(See: Davidson, 2008. Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success, p.58.) 
61 
 
it was shut down three years later.110 While the struggle here was between the government 
and Bahraini press owners, the struggle over media control and supremacy in the Trucial 
States was fought on a transnational level. The threat to the rulers’ legitimacy was 
intensified by the media’s potential to create imagined communities beyond territorial 
boundaries. Radio added a persuasive power to this potential: not only did it skip time 
consuming circulation via export, but offered an experience of media consumption able to 
stir emotions on a different level from that of print media. With radio broadcast mass media 
was first able to incorporate complex code systems into its message which were accessible 
to everybody. Although radio stations were not set up in the Gulf until 1949 (with the Saudi 
Broadcasting Station), the population could receive Arabic language radio from the late 
1930s onwards, during which time Egypt was the predominant provider. During the 1920s 
several privately run broadcasting stations were established in Cairo, culminating in the 
1934 foundation of the Egyptian Radio.111 Radio sets were already being sold in Palestine 
around the year 1930, but they could only receive either short wave signals from Europe or 
the medium wave from Cairo, which is why the latter proved so influential in the Middle 
East.112.  
What role the media can play in stirring and channelling the emotions of the 
imagined community of media consumers can be illustrated through the rise and popularity 
of Nasserist Pan-Arabism in the 1950s, for which radio became an important political 
weapon. The socialist ideology did not only endanger the political stability but mass media 
played a crucial role in its influence in the Trucial States. Nasser had become the leading 
figure and symbol of Arab nationalism, even by those who did not support his socialist 
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agenda. For many Nasser was, as Barnett put it, a leader who “stirred the imaginations and 
the desires of the masses because of his vision of an Arab nation that was restored to 
greatness”.113 Nasser’s interpretation of Arabism developed rapidly during the late 1950s 
from the notion of needing to stand up to the West to establishing himself as the leader of 
the Arab resistance against Israel (which was perceived as the latest hostile Western 
presence in the Middle East) by 1964. In Cairo, the centre of this transnational ideology, 
radio broadcasts were used to its fullest as a mass medium to enforce an imagined 
community of Arab speaking peoples, and the programme Sawt al-ʿArab (Voice of the 
Arabs) was the symbolic focus point around which members of this imagined community 
would gather. Wireless broadcast had opened a new era of instant communication on a 
global level through the capacity to stir emotions on a level never achievable by print media. 
The emotional experience of media consumption in coffee shops, by illiterate and literate 
people alike, opened up completely new possibilities of getting entertainment in addition to 
information. One only has to think of the addition of music by singers such as Umm 
Kulthum, to the political discourse of pan-Arabism, in order to appreciate the possibilities of 
a widened code system.  
But for the ideological message to unfold agents were needed to transform it into a 
concrete threat of the political status quo.114 In the Trucial States schools became rallying 
centres of political action or, in Hall’s words, ‘transformations’ of the media message into 
praxis. Due to a lack of local staff, teachers from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen were 
frequently employed: these staff quickly assumed responsibility for the propagation of the 
Nasserist thinking they had imbibed in their own countries. The contemporary Easa Saleh Al-
Gurg even claimed in his autobiography that the Egyptian Educational Mission purposefully 
supplied teachers who were going abroad with nationalist propaganda to distribute.115 
These subversive voices were supported by political parties in the Trucial States, such as the 
Front for the Liberation of Occupied Eastern Arabia (FLOEA) and the Dubai National Front 
(DNF).116 They organised parades and distributed propaganda calling for political change and 
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organised sabotage actions against British installations.117 The DNF even went further than 
to simply oppose the British: their leaflets called for a new state structure with political 
parties and used cultural clubs and schools as political platforms to personally promote their 
ideas.118 
From the perspective of Gellner’s and Anderson’s theories of nationalism it is 
significant how the DNF shifted its notion of nationhood according to political events. 
According to Christopher Davidson, their initial ideal was an ethnically Arab state which led 
them to oppose the Persian and Indian residents in Dubai.119 However, under the influence 
of the Suez Crisis, which gave new hope to nationalist movements all over the Arab world, 
the DNF changed its attitude. It hoped to create a state which could stand alone against Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, by integrating the Persian families into their cause. The development 
shows how nationalist ideologies cannot only create but modify and reverse their narratives 
of comradeship. This flexibility of narratives makes it even more important for ruling elite to 
‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ the narrative which legitimises them.  
The different interest groups trying to gain influence over public opinion in the 
Trucial States also illustrate an argument made by Stuart Hall as well as Appadurai. Both 
emphasise that that globalisation as an exchange of ideas circulated among communities 
from different locations is not a modern phenomenon at all; merely the means of exchange 
have qualitatively developed.120 As such the notion of global and local discourses being in 
dialogical interaction is not connected to ‘modernity’ but a phenomenon inherent in all 
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societies.121 Nasserism as a socialist ideology opposed tribal hierarchical structures of 
political power. Translated into a local discourse, it was modified according to the needs of 
those who ‘translated’ it into social action.122 In a dialogical sense, the radio broadcasts 
made people question the status quo and thus differentiate themselves as a community 
from the ruling elite. The significance of radio is its potential to reaffirm the individual self 
and opinion by imagining it as part of a stronger political interest group than face-to-face 
parties or clubs.  
The interaction between the parties and the mediated imagined community of pan-
Arabists showed the ruling elite that it had to control both to ensure its claim for legitimacy. 
But while the parties could be directly persecuted, the agitator of the unrest (Egypt) had to 
be targeted via its media. As the following sections will show, the direct threat by local 
opponents would be pacified by extraction and bribe. Controlling the media would require a 
long term strategy that the British were not willing to invest in. The nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal, if used as a blueprint for the nationalisation of oil revenues, could potentially 
deprive them of their source of income. As a result the British government assumed the 
same position it did with regards to political rule: it ‘froze’ the balance of power towards 
ruling families leaving it to the local rulers to develop an additional long-term strategy. 
 
 
1.2.2 Securing local loyalties and deflecting foreign interference 
 
To secure their interests in the Trucial states during the 1950s and 1960s, the British 
agents stabilised their relationship with the rulers through purposeful demonstrations of 
military power and by strengthening administrative bodies established to secure the 
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position of the rulers.123 Dissidents were removed from their administration and replaced 
with loyal supporters. The judicial body was reorganised by assigning the post of Chief 
Justice to a pro-English Syrian magistrate and by appointing lawyers from Bahrain. Since the 
schools had played a major role in triggering nationalist sentiments (and as there was no 
local media to suppress), a new Sudanese Minister of Education was appointed, who 
promptly began firing selected (mainly Egyptian) teachers. The campaign was predominately 
targeted against Egyptians: Sudanese and Zanzibari candidates replaced Egyptian 
administrators in order to weaken the Egyptian presence in the administrative sector. In 
addition, the Egyptian airline EgyptAir was banned from the Gulf; and Egyptian delegations 
were not permitted into the country.  
The British also recognised that it was important to deter the locals from thinking 
that the Sheikhs were under their control: they accordingly diminished their presence at the 
Trucial Council, allowing the rulers to chair their own meetings in turn.124 The rulers were 
thus able to seemingly comply with anti-British demands by appearing to distance 
themselves from the British agents when it came to local politics. While such a strategy of 
replacement sufficiently secured the interests of the British, the rulers were posed with the 
need to find a long-term solution to stabilise their role as ruling elite. The British attack on 
potential agents of political unrest did not mean that nationalism automatically disappeared 
from the public discourse. 
Even though, as previously mentioned, the theoretical dichotomy between local and 
global is artificial, it becomes an important notion when trying to consolidate a local 
identity: imported ideas which are identified as ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ have to be localised in 
order to strengthen the aspired ‘local identity’. Following the reactionary strategy of the 
British agents a major task for the rulers was to secure local loyalties and deflect foreign 
influence. This was supported by the drastically transformed economic situation when Abu 
Dhabi struck oil offshore in 1959: they began exporting it in 1962 and soon found more 
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reserves inland (in the Bu Hasa field in 1963).125 The emirate swiftly became one of the 
largest oil producers in the Middle East, with 102.8 million barrels exported in 1965, which 
had increased to 253.7 million barrels per year by 1970 (which was one quarter of the oil 
produced by Kuwait).126 Their newfound wealth enabled the rulers to neutralise the 
discontent of influential families who had been adversely affected by their loss of monopoly 
over the international pearl trade.127 The Futtaim and Ghurair families, who had supported 
the DNF, were granted exclusive import rights for certain goods and thus had no longer any 
financial reason to challenge the rulers.  
But the mitigation of internal discontent was only one aspect of securing ‘locality’: 
approaching independence from the British agents, the most pressing threats to an inspired 
national community were neighbouring states. Just days before the emirates officially 
united, Iran annexed three islands belonging to the Al Qawasim Empire (Abu Musa and 
Tunb), threatening that it would not recognise the United Arab Emirates unless the disputed 
islands were declared Iranian territory.128 Saudi Arabia was also waiting for an opportunity 
to annex territory from Abu Dhabi, which it claimed as its own.129 Accordingly, no sooner 
had the UAE declared their federation they began to push for admittance into the Arab 
League and the United Nations Organisation. While they were accepted into the latter on 
December 9th, their acceptance by the Arab League on the 6th was met with opposition from 
both the South Yemeni Democratic People’s Republic and (of course) Saudi Arabia.  
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The Arab League took a more active role in the UAE’s troubles, but to the detriment 
of the Emirates: the Secretary General of the League negotiated between them and Iran 
only to decide that Abu Musa and the Tunb islands would remain with Iran.130 Both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran (and to a lesser extent, Oman too) continued their attempts to undermine 
the new federal government’s authority by dealing with each of the member emirates 
individually, hoping that this would make them reluctant to accept a federal authority.131 
While Iran had recognised the UAE as a state and Sheikh Zayed as its president, King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia refused to recognise the federation until Abu Dhabi relinquished a number 
of oil fields and renounced their claim to the Buraimi Oasis.132 It was not until 1974 that 
Saudi Arabia finally acquiesced and acknowledged the UAE, which was an important step for 
both the consolidation of the federal government and for the elimination of unilateral 
foreign politics by the member states.133 
Creating a strong political stand of the UAE in its regional context was an important 
step. Internally a notion of nationhood was procured mainly via education and the 
urbanisation projects, developed with the assistance of foreign experts.134 Whether this set-
up established a negative dependency on expatriates is questionable: Khalifa highlights their 
heterogeneity, political passiveness, and thus potentially negative effect on economic life, 
but in the beginning of the UAE it can be argued that the foreign experts strengthened the 
power of the ruling elite who employed them. A state that educates its citizens to take 
ownership over their country and state administration would not only make the immigrants 
redundant but destabilise the balance of power. As the Gellnerist Paul Brass points out, 
“Nationalism is most likely to develop when new elites arise to challenge […] an existing 
pattern of distribution of economic resources and political power”.135 Both the growing 
population of nationals and expatriates create a need for the government to tip the balance 
of economic participation towards the nationals, and thus appease possible discontent. The 
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education politics laid the foundations of breaking the distribution of government 
participation towards the tribal elite by enabling more and more citizens to enter higher job 
positions. 
From a Gellnerist perspective, a new elite of educated nationals, which does not fit 
into the structure of elite defined by tribe, would be important for a sense of collective 
identity based on nationality. Competing against foreigners but being privileged by the state 
could be an additional strengthening factor for the notion of national community. However, 
this would threaten the legitimacy of an elite group that considers themselves entitled 
privileged by ethnicity or tribal identity. Khalifa describes that tribal families were 
consciously positioned into the government administration, which supports the ‘tribal’ 
character of UAE nationalism discussed in section 1.1.136 As seen in the ideological shift of 
the DNF, nationalisms are modifiable, which underlines the need for the ruling elite to 
establish a strong narrative of national identity in their favour. This has to be designed as 
seemingly ‘timeless’, mainstream, and naturalised in the notions of the ‘community of 
sentiment.’ The spaces of social interaction as well as mass-communication would play a 
vital role in this process, and hence it is no surprise that Sheikh Zayed launched a 
comprehensive nation building project, already before the official unification. 
 
 
1.2.3 Establishing a media infrastructure for the nation building project 
 
While negotiations for the federation of the UAE were still going on, Sheikh Zayed 
laid the basis for the future UAE media network with the base in Abu Dhabi. In 1969, the 
first local newspaper (Al-ʾIttiḥād) and the Abu Dhabi Radio were founded, which developed 
into the National Federal Service with branches in each emirate.137 Seeing how it was 
possible to create support for unification using mass media, the first television station in the 
Trucial States went on air from Abu Dhabi in August 1969. This made the future UAE the 
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fourth Gulf country with local TV.138 The media sector developed rapidly and by 1980 the 
UAE not only had around twenty official government magazines, but also six daily 
newspapers, five women’s magazines, broadcasting stations in every emirate, and the 
second biggest sound studio in the world.139 
Promoting the nation in the media was an obvious goal, reflected especially in the 
names of the print media, with titles such as Al-ʾIttiḥād (The Union), Al-Waḥda (The Unity), 
Al-ʿAhd al-Jadīd (the New Truce), or Al-Fajr (The Dawn). The government media wanted to 
attract all people in the state to get their information on political developments from the 
local media. Accordingly, the two oldest Arabic daily newspapers Al-ʾIttiḥād (est. 1969) and 
Al-Ḫalīj (The Gulf, est. 1970) in their early years published the government’s legal 
declarations. Al-ʾIttiḥād (until 1972 published on a weekly basis) had replaced the former 
Abu Dhabi News (a bulletin run by the Abu Dhabi government) which published all protocols 
in connection with the establishment of the federation and additional political reports. With 
this step, detailed accounts of political developments were re-categorised from an English 
sounding headline to a specifically ‘local’ publication. When the paper was changed to a 
daily basis covering more general political topics, news from the Abu Dhabi local 
government were transferred to the monthly Al-Jarīdat ar-Rasmīyya li-l-ʾImārāt (The Official 
Magazine of the Emirates).140 Furthermore, it shows that by 1972 the distinction was 
necessary between the UAE federal government and the local government of Abu Dhabi, 
both based in the emirate. Also significant is the range of target audiences catered to by the 
newly established media. A shift in coverage from specialised topics to general topics 
developed and indicates mainstream interests at the time. An example is the business paper 
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Al-Fajr, which had initially printed news about oil-industry conferences, to later address 
economics and financial issues in general.141 Apart from the political economic target, a 
sports magazine (Ahli), was established in 1972 and the daily Al-Waḥda included an extra 
column for women’s issues since August 1973. The local radio programmes tell their own 
story of target audiences the government wanted to address. Especially the foreign 
language programmes indicate the amount and origins of foreigners in the country - or at 
least how prominent the governments judged different expatriates to be. The Abu Dhabi-
based Voice of the Emirates had English, French, and Urdu programmes, the Sharjah 
Broadcasting Station offered French and Urdu, Ras AlKhaimah English and Urdu, and Dubai 
English. Dubai and Abu Dhabi would eventually even expand their programmes to an extra 
frequency and in 1980 Abu Dhabi established an additional English pop-music channel 
(Capital Radio).142  
The development of television was just as well thought out as that of radio, even if 
television was not a normal household article in the beginning. But by 1974 when the United 
Arab Emirates TV (established in 1971) switched from monochrome to colour television it 
could already be received in the whole country.143 As with print media and radio, Abu 
Dhabi’s focus was on national issues about the union, reporting on activities of the 
president, culture and events within the region.144 Since media promoting the political 
ideology had to be produced locally (rather than relying on imported content), it was 
important for the national television service to have departments for different topics, and 
the necessary production facilities.145 During the late 1970s Abu Dhabi took the lead in 
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training staff from all the national television stations.146 With a more commercial agenda, 
Dubai also expanded their local production facilities, and bought additional foreign 
content.147 Their Programme One, which was especially targeting local audiences, bought 
Arabic movies from Egypt and offered English movies with Arabic subtitles. English language 
channel Programme Two for expatriates occasionally aired French programmes as well.148 
Whilst on a local level the two emirates thus developed their images as city-states, 
the media profile of the nation as a whole was also pushed ahead as early as the 1970s. In 
1974, the Ministry of Information and Culture established a news agency, which distributed 
news from the emirates to Reuters, UAE embassies abroad, and newspapers in Beirut.149 
Supported by Reuters, the ministry founded the Emirates News Agency (Wakālat Anbāʾ Al-
ʾImārāt) two years later with several branches all over the country, in order to distribute 
more UAE news not only to local but international print media.150 In the later 1970s and 
1980s the agency signed contracts for news exchange and cooperation with ten 
international news agencies, a number which was constantly increased to 48 by 2002.151 The 
activities also included sending staff for journalism trainings to different international media 
institutions in Arabic countries, as well as to the BBC in the UK.152 . The employees were 
mainly Arab expatriates from Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan.153 The ultimate goal was 
to change this reliance on imported know-how towards local staff. 
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Establishing a national media with a majority of foreign employees could pose a 
problem for the authenticity of the media, since the educational and ideological 
backgrounds of the people building the media would influence its content. To ensure loyalty 
to the nation’s leaders, the government followed a strategy similar to the appeasement 
policies during the Nasser era, by granting privileges to influential families. In Dubai, the 
major daily newspaper Gulf News was and is still in the hands of the Al-Tayyer family, who 
also have lots of relatives on the Dubai Municipality Council.154 In addition, the Sharjah daily 
news ʾAḫbār Al-ʿArab (News of the Arabs), is owned by the Al-Taryam family.155 In Abu 
Dhabi the government changed its media policy, from supporting privately-owned media in 
the Trucial States era, over nationalisation of the media, to companies owned or chaired by 
individual members of the ruling Al Nahyan family. They initially supported the private 
newspapers Al-ʾIttiḥād, Al Bayān (The Statement), and Al-Waḥda (established 1973) but 
incorporated them into the government owned Emirates News Inc. (EMI) in 1989.156 
Founded as a (supposedly) ministry independent entity the EMI took over all newspapers, 
television, and radio stations.157 In 2006 the EMI was reorganized into a shareholding 
company.158  
Whether nationalised or seemingly privatised, the government remained in control 
of the media. In so doing, the potential development of a public sphere in the Habermasian 
sense was reduced. The government would channel diversification of the media range in 
order to attract different communities within the population, but not allow them to 
establish their own community media. The idea of controlling the mass media was to 
educate the population to become citizens with one ‘public opinion’. The initial purpose of 
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the media, to convince people of the merits of the UAE nation state, would include another 
ideological aim. This one, convincing the Emirati nationals of one shared Bedouin heritage, 
will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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2 Enforcing a narrative of reconciliation between past and present 
 
 
The creation of an ideological link between an imagined past and present lifestyle 
requires more than a continuation of Bedouin traditions on an administrative level (i.e. 
through barza and majālis rhetoric and practices). Drawing on Eickelman’s concept of 
formal and practical ideologies, both have to harmonise in order to become 
comprehensible. This means that a mere top-down proclamation of a collective identity is 
not enough; it has to strike a chord with the target group, and this group have to actively 
embrace the idea. Eickelman even goes so far as to suggest that in “the late twentieth 
century, the major impetus for change in religious and political values is coming from 
‘below.’”159 Based on his observation one can envision a reactionary relationship between 
ruling elite/intellectuals and the grassroots of society, in which the official narrative has to 
be adjusted according to changing cultural practices and perceptions of the target audience. 
As Eickelman points out, “practices and the resulting social spaces involve both emotional 
and intellectual engagement among participants in overlapping circles of communication, 
solidarity, and the building of bonds of identity and trust.”160  
As described in the previous chapter, the UAE the government developed and set up 
a media infrastructure which was part of a plan to secure the nationals’ loyalty. Another 
part of the plan was to establish a welfare system, which was easy in terms of funding 
because of the income stemming from the country’s natural resources of gas and oil. Since 
the 1980s the UAE’s Human Development Index (HDI) has consistently risen. By 2011 the 
UAE would be ranked 30th worldwide, putting it in the UN’s “very high” category.161 By 
providing for health care, education, infrastructure, and housing, the government could 
create a positive image of the rulers in the eyes of the population. Simultaneously, the 
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rentier system and media infrastructure function as a framework for the distribution of a 
discourse on national identity. The latter had to be convincing and establish a distinction 
between the UAE and other nations. Differentiation and dialogue with other identities is 
still, after decades, an ongoing and vital priority of the UAE government and will be 
described in this chapter. Part 2.1 focuses on how the government circulated narrative to 
create an official and common collective notion of nationhood which in turn legitimised the 
ruling elite.  
In order to understand what national identity means from a grassroots perspective, 
it is necessary to first illustrate the dynamics and potentials of media as a facilitator of 
narratives of national identity. The first part will exemplify how the UAE media is used to 
create a one-sided image of national identity. In order to gain momentum, this constructed 
narrative is constructed around the UAE’s first president, Sheikh Zayed. He is presented and 
perceived as the personalised ideal of heritage and nationhood. To enforce a strong link 
between the invented heritage of the UAE and contemporary society, the UAE media is 
forced to adjust to changing public expectations towards media. This topic will be pivotal in 
further chapters yet has to be contextualised. The technological possibilities and media 
trends are constantly changing so that the same message can still be conveyed, no matter 
what form of communication is used to relay that message.  
Section 2.2 will illustrate the network of transnational media which the local UAE 
media is part of. By referring to the interrelation of local media landscape and transnational 
trendsetters, this part will discuss how regional media perceptions have changed through 
historical events and technological developments. The process of negotiating what media is 
transforms the relationship between government and citizens into one social discourse: 
media. In this context the question of local and transnational media communities is a 
recurring topic. Global media gives individuals a wider repertoire of images with which to 
identify and creates rituals, such as consumer consumption. Such rituals almost always take 
place in real-time public spaces which create a sense of belonging to not just the group 
present at the time, but of the unseen, imagined worldwide community of consumers. Such 
communities are represented for the individuals in real life spaces, i.e. of consumption, 
which can be visited in a ritualised act of affirming belonging, as well as in media spheres 
(TV, internet etc.). The nation state as a facilitator of local identities also engages in 
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interaction with global patterns of identity formation, by for example drawing from 
techniques of marketing and branding.  
 
 
2.1 The naturalisation of an invented identity through an official discourse 
 
The first part of the following section will sketch the general concern with preserving 
an Emirati local identity within the society that also includes a large number of expatriates. 
Foreign expertise was considered necessary from the early stages of the country's 
development in order to establish a state apparatus and to develop the education system. 
The strong reliance on expatriates in all economic sectors has led to the peculiar 
demographic imbalance, which makes UAE nationals a minority in their own country. This 
shift has led not only to demographic but significant cultural changes, which is especially 
evident in the importance of English as the lingua franca for conducting business. In fact, 
everything from high-level consultancy jobs to everyday exchanges in shops and taxis can be 
and is sometimes only possible in English. Throughout this thesis the necessity of having a 
strong local media will become a major topic around which interviews with media 
professionals evolve. Although not the centre of this dissertation itself, the official heritage 
discourse of the nation is therefore an important source for Emiratis to create their own 
notions of identity. 
Based on the general overview, the establishment of a dominant narrative of 
identity is explored in more detail from the perspective of creating an official history. In 
effect, the publication and distribution of the official narrative has to become a marketing 
project. As a result, producers of such narratives are professionals employed by the 
government, but also individual members of the political elite, who have a personal interest 
in stabilising the identity project. The second part of the section will show how marketing a 
collective identity in the contemporary UAE can be seen as a type of national branding 
project. The second part will discuss how the official narrative reconciles an imagined 
Bedouin past with an ambitious urban present to legitimise the socio-political status quo. 
The third part of the section will show how the official ideology is focussed around Sheikh 
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Zayed as the role model of their national identity. By idealising Sheikh Zayed into the ‘father 
of the nation’, the government has managed to replace formerly imported role models, such 
as Nasser, with a local figurehead. The values represented by Sheikh Zayed’s constructed 
image appeal to young Emiratis, although the historical figure is obscured by the myth.  
 
 
2.1.1 The official narrative of the UAE’s cultural journey 
 
In all public spaces the multi-national character of UAE society is visible. As a result, 
there are many ways that the government attempts to combat a perceived threat of foreign 
influence, from government-initiated identity conferences to official proclamations. The 
UAE government is eager to emphasise the significance and distinct identity of the 
community of nationals. The identity issue is constantly brought to the attention of people 
living in the Emirates, from every day interactions, where Emiratis work with, get served by, 
or go to school with expatriates, to advertisement boards and campaigns addressing the 
topic. Such advertisements convey a one-sided statement: the Emirati nationals are a 
Bedouin people lead by their genuine authentic rulers. Gause points out that the “issues of 
dress and public affirmation of tribal structures are part of a larger intellectual agenda 
pursued by the Gulf monarchies in the name of turath (heritage).”162 An example for such an 
affirmation was an advertisement board on the road from Abu Dhabi to Dubai in 2009. It 
showed the portrait of the president, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, captioned “Our 
heritage, our identity” (turāthna hawīyatna).163 In this example, the portrait of the current 
UAE president wearing the Emirati Bedouin attire is sufficient to enforce the Arabic 
statement. The rulers become representations of national identity and their dress, 
mannerisms, and language is a norm all Emiratis should follow.164 
                                                          
162
 Gause, 1994. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, p.27. 
163
 See: Image 2. 2, p.94. 
164
 By constantly reinforcing and finding new ways to present a national identity, the government stays on its 
strategic marketing course. Yet, this non-stop inundation also shows vulnerability, that perhaps there is a 
latent or very real fear of foreign influence reshaping national identity. 
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This local heritage is visibly enforced in the local attire obligatory for Emiratis 
working in government jobs, and in tourism paraphernalia.165 In addition, conferences and 
symposiums on heritage (or ‘the topic’ or ‘national identity’) are organised by the 
government, and 2008 was even proclaimed “the year of identity”, making the topic 
omnipresent in the media coverage of the various events related to it.166 Long-term 
government politics to preserve and nourish the local identity are outlined in the 
‘Government Strategy 2011-2013’, which reaffirms the government’s ambition to foster the 
Emirati citizens in all sectors of public life and at the same time counteract 
multiculturalism.167 These policies also include the preservation of the Arabic language and 
of marriages between Emirati citizens. The policies are backed by the development of an 
official narrative of the country’s identity. As is the case in other Gulf States, this national 
identity is constructed as a story of the constancy of deep rooted Bedouin values.168 The 
official narrative of the country’s rapid achievements showcases the positive sides of what 
some Emiratis rather see as a development craze. In the words of Emirati researcher Saoud 
Sultan Al Qasimi, in a commentary article for the Dubai School of Governance:  
 
“There may come a time soon when Emiratis realize that they have exchanged 
too much, too soon, for too little. By then the old generation would have passed 
on, and it will be a case of salvaging what is left of Emirati culture in a way like 
walking into a burned house to salvage what the fire has spared.”
169 
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Meanwhile the official discourse is built upon the rapidity of the development and success 
the UAE has achieved on all socio-economic and political levels, supported by government-endorsed 
historians and the official media.
170
 Book stores and government websites are full of “before and 
after” pictures of the nation and institutions have been established to collect and preserve historical 
artefacts and narratives. The historical consciousness enforced by this discourse is constructed 
around contrasts. It emphasises the country’s economic obscurity in the early 20th century, when the 
local pearl industry declined. Considering this, the rise to global recognition and prosperity with the 
discovery of oil in 1968 appears even more amazing. What is conveniently obscured by this 
simplified image
171
 is the interaction between the Trucial States and other nations (particularly 
Great Britain) before the discovery of oil, which resulted in the creation of the autocratic regime in 
place today. The outcome of this is the semblance of continuity and connection between the old 
Bedouin way of life and the modern Emirati society, which is enforced by a romanticised notion of 
the ‘purity’ of their ancestors’ lifestyles and the corresponding ‘need’ to retain such values even in 
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metropolitan conditions. In other words, the view that the importance of heritage has been heavily 
emphasised by the Emirati government in order to serve its ideological interests, and Emiratis’ 
conceptions of this heritage will have to be accordingly analysed in order to understand the official 
interests behind nationalist sentiment.  
The policy of filtering, censoring and simplifying the historical narrative is enforced by the 
lack of published historical accounts from insiders. As the records and archives of the British Foreign 
Office are not sufficient to form an authentic national canon, the UAE government has repeatedly 
launched historical research initiatives. In 2010, for example, the National Library bought the private 
research collection of an Emirati historian to add to its historical archive. A few years previously, the 
Centre for Documentation and Research collaborated with Zayed University to train researchers as 
oral historians. The Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage launched a comprehensive 
initiative to preserve local poetry, which strongly relies on oral tradition. The latter initiative 
combines the documentation of oral poetry with courses in the art of this specific genre, in order to 
preserve the understanding and appreciation of its language and style. The support of historical 
documentation simultaneously enables government entities to control publication and accessibility 
to historical records. This makes it easy for the UAE government to establish an almost Oceania-like 
institutionalised discourse on the UAE history, with a distinct identity supported by an array of 
pioneers and builders of the union. How the creation of the official history is established will be 
demonstrated in a more detailed discussion of one prominent element, the topos of the Bedouin 
heritage. Its reconciliation with the present-day urban character of the country and its focus on the 
figure of Sheikh Zayed are at the centre of visualisations of identity, as coming chapters will show. 
 
 
2.1.2 The myth of the urban Bedouin: a narrative of legitimisation 
 
During the founding phase of the UAE, spaces of communication had to be 
constructed to distribute the national ideology among the community. Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
faced different challenges in planning their urban developments. Abu Dhabi, the new capital 
of the nation, was confronted with a demographic challenge: if they were to circulate 
narratives which would consolidate the new national identity with any degree of success, 
they would have to provide adequate urban areas in order to consolidate the population 
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into a space so as to ensure access to media outlets. Dubai had enjoyed more international 
attention than Abu Dhabi, and had already amply demonstrated its potential as a trading 
hub between East and West. Abu Dhabi on the other hand lacked any such tradition and as 
a result was in dire need of both a historic centre and an urban character. The government 
was therefore forced to intervene and, in so doing, created what Elsheshtawy called a 
“sudden” city.172 He characterises the urban development of Abu Dhabi until now as “a 
conflict between a desire to modernize while still harking back to the old ways of the 
Bedouin.”173 To create an urban identity, basic places for interaction, such as parks and 
other urban landmarks had to be built. During the 1970s, Dubai expanded the existing Port 
Rashid, whilst Abu Dhabi invested in the central area project (from 1969-1981), which 
included four markets and the Hosn Palace (with a Cultural Foundation) all of which were to 
represent “traditional Islamic” architecture.174 As part of the second urban planning phase 
of 1969-1988 (as it was categorised by the Abu Dhabi Municipality from) Sheikh Zayed hired 
an Egyptian Director General of Town Planning175 to design houses for the newly 
nationalised Bedouins. He specified that the architecture should be in accordance with the 
lifestyle the Bedouins had led and should resemble their original homes to create an 
emotional link to the new city-life.176The task of redefining an imagined tribal community as 
a national urban community was further complicated by a lack of basic infrastructure to 
provide easy access to cities from rural areas. A contemporary of this building phase is 
Abdullah Omran Taryam, who describes how every aspect of urbanisation was meticulously 
planned. He recalls that the population was generally supportive of the union, claiming that 
people enthusiastically celebrated each successfully-formed federal governmental body, 
and were eager to embrace the stability of a “sovereign state with a distinct identity”.177 
One must, however, consider that Taryam, who was in 1971 a Federal National Council 
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member, was obviously part of the political elite himself, and could therefore have had a 
notion of the people through their representatives. He may not therefore have had any 
knowledge of others’ sentiments towards the union, shaped as his perception was by his 
own social circle.  
Mohammed Al Fahim, another auto-biographer from a similar circle described how 
difficult it was for the rulers to induce people to comprehend the new notion of a national 
community.178 According to him, the tribal identity of the people was so strong that their 
sense of collective identity, belonging, and allegiance did not extend beyond their tribal 
group (and even inter-tribal alliances shifting). Speaking as a supporter of the ‘new’ form of 
tribal sentiments, it is significant how this particular characteristic of a tribal imagined 
community is discussed: Fahim remembers how tribe members would not easily accept a 
bureaucratic government apparatus over a personal leader. Worse still, although inter-
emirate travel had always been problematic due to the lack of proper roads, the new 
requirement of 1959 to carry a passport on such journeys meant that each emirate was 
destined to develop distinctly, constituting what he called “cultural barriers” between the 
emirates.179 By highlighting these difficulties he indirectly acknowledges the necessity of the 
tribal sentiment to change in order to suit a nation-state identity. This does not diminish the 
tribal element per se. On the contrary, the difficulties of connection and solidarity between 
tribes indicate a ‘difficult lifestyle’ connected to this micro-form of tribal sentiment. This can 
be dissolved by expanding the solidarity to a macro-level and connect all people to one big 
community.  
Nation building thus becomes a mission of enlightenment and transformation of 
tribal identities to an improved level. According to Al Fahim Sheikh Zayed personally visited 
the tribal chiefs of his emirate, with whom he already had good relations from his time as 
ruler of Al Ain, to convince them of the benefits a unified nation had in store for them: “His 
long-term objective was for them to become useful citizens who made significant 
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contributions to the economy either by getting an education, farming, or working in the oil 
industry. In keeping with this goal tribe members were often recruited by the military or the 
police.”180 Fahim’s description is notable for understanding the difficulties the rulers faced 
in communicating their idea of a national identity, as well as the obstacles posed by a lack of 
mass-education and infrastructure.  
His focus on these deficient aspects also adds another legitimising discourse constructed 
around Sheikh Zayed: his speedy solution to all difficulties indirectly justifies his coup against 
his brother Shakhbout, who was ruler during that time of deprivation. Under Sheikh 
Shakhbout, Abu Dhabi’s infrastructure had developed much more slowly than that of 
Dubai’s, even after the former had become a major oil exporter (and was consequently the 
wealthiest of the emirates). The resulting lack of roads, supplies and services caused many 
oil companies to move to Dubai, and some even went to Bahrain and Qatar to procure 
supplies and to recruit technical experts.181 Although Sheikh Zayed had taken advantage of 
his brother’s absence in 1961 to build Abu Dhabi’s first mud road,182 there was still no 
electricity until 1963 except in the ruler’s palace.183 Although Shakhbout did invest in social 
development, by recruiting teachers from Jordan, and looking for new water sources184, for 
example, he also imposed a ban on new constructions in Abu Dhabi, arguing that proper 
planning was necessary.185 His relationship with the British government and their oil 
contractors was marred by his mistrust of their procedures and of the contracts they offered 
him, mainly because the British exclusivity law forbade him from comparing British policies 
to French or American alternatives.  
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According to Al Fahim, Shakhbout’s politics ultimately alienated the Emirati population 
and the British government, who both demanded that he be removed.186 One has to 
remember that Al Fahim’s autobiography is part of an approved historical narrative. The 
account therefore provides an insight into how the UAE government wants its history to be 
remembered. Whether it was really a majority of the population or merely influential 
families who backed the bloodless coup of Sheikh Zayed against his brother, remains 
unanswered it is not politically opportune to ask: what if his approach of slow 
modernisation had prevailed; would Abu Dhabi’s society rely less on foreign labourers and 
Emiratis work in all sectors and not only white collar jobs? Presenting Shakhbout as 
alienated from the Emirati population does serve to indirectly legitimise these 
developments.187  
The autobiographies of Fahim and Taryam demonstrate the importance of selective 
historical accounts in the media to establish a set view of history. Both recollections are also 
indicative of a different retrospective interpretation of the country’s situation during the 
1960s and 1970s. Both auto-biographers were from influential families, but whilst Taryam 
wrote enthusiastically about the imminent unification and its positive resonance among the 
people during the 1980s, Fahim’s history, written ten years later, highlighted the difficulties. 
The achievements, especially of Sheikh Zayed, seem even greater. The perspectives show 
how new ideologies are promoted and justified with different emphasis at different times. 
When the federation and the national identity were both still relatively new, and an 
infrastructure was still in the making, Al Taryam’s duty was to give the union validity by 
highlighting the support it had among the people. Fahim’s narrative was published once the 
country was more established and thus the idea of a union and nation can be seen as 
naturalised. His focus on Sheikh Zayed’s achievement, which was a recurring theme 
throughout his book, is part of a different phase of the UAE’s identity discourse: the 
retrospective glorification of Sheikh Zayed as the nation’s father. The narrative is written to 
highlight the achievement of creating a modern nation-state within a short amount of time 
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and thus gains significance and legitimisation from highlighting how many obstacles had 
been overcome. The title of Fahim’s book “From Rags to Riches” outlines this agenda. It has 
been translated into at least five languages and is available in every UAE bookstore, thus 
also sending the message of the UAE’s achievements to a global audience. Such a support 
can only be given from a notion of cultural achievement and strength. 
 
 
2.1.3 The acceptance of Sheikh Zayed as figurehead of Emirati identity 
 
Fahim’s autobiography gives ample evidence of patterns of justification, topoi, and 
symbols. These include not only collective memory but clothes, mannerisms, language, and 
other symbols of identity which can be enacted by individuals: in short, a cultural narrative. 
As a public figure Sheikh Zayed was an ideal local replacement for imported role models and 
leaders such as Nasser. A local identification figure was politically important for the fledging 
nation in order to inspire people to think on a local instead of a pan-Arab level. Culturally 
speaking, Emiratis sorely needed a representative figurehead which can be understood in 
modern terms as a ‘celebrity’. The political elite therefore required citizens who identified 
with the ‘nation building’ project on all levels, and not those who sought external inspiration 
for their collective identities. As Hall points out, culture is a momentarily produced 
interpretive act which is not necessarily constituted of the raw material (such as symbols, 
rituals etc.). The meanings of cultural actions are created in moments of re-enactment (by 
wearing a certain dress for example) and will change over time188  
Performed by a popular figure, such cultural re-enactments gain momentum and 
strength. Just as the pan-Arab ideology was strengthened for having Nasser as its 
figurehead, Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid both represented the national ideology, but 
Sheikh Zayed has proved a particularly successful cultural icon. This can be attributed partly 
to his prominent political role, which has made him the representative of the nation also on 
a global scale. It is important to remember that Sheikh Zayed was not only of local 
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importance but his political performance on a global stage served to legitimise him to both 
other Arab nations and the international community at large. His charity to Muslims around 
the world for example was just as important to the image of the country as the camel races 
he held for state visitors. In short, what he gave to the others was done and legitimised as in 
the name of the nation and contributed to the country’s profile. Thus Sheikh Zayed was not 
merely local, but in his performance on a global stage pathed the way for a pan-Arab and 
global image of the UAE.  
In addition to his political and representative achievements, the celebrity industry 
established around Sheikh Zayed as local hero has been operating at full capacity since his 
death in 2004. Portraits and posters of him are prevalent in every public space. There is 
even an online obituary where people can pay their written respects and comment on him. . 
By creating a public image of Sheikh Zayed which includes timeless and generally human 
values, such as foresight, vision, kindness etc. he becomes significant for any time and any 
generation. How successful the public image of Sheikh Zayed has been as a conceptualised 
nexus of Emirati culture can be seen not only from reinforcing narratives (such as Fahim’s), 
but of the way young Emiratis perceive him as a key personality for their national identity. 
In 2009 I was offered the opportunity to circulate an anonymous online survey 
among students at the Dubai Women’s college. The administration of the college used 
opportunity to launch small pilot project to collect a selected sample of impressions on how 
naturalised the constructed image of Sheikh Zayed as father of the nation was. In particular, 
I was interested in learning about the variations of his constructed image as ideal Bedouin 
considering the historical profile of Dubai. Although ruled by tribal leaders, (the Al Maktoum 
family) the population of Dubai during the pre-oil era had been mainly merchants. Sheikh 
Zayed’s image relies on the image of his Bedouin character, which could be difficult for 
members of urban merchant families to identify with. 
Since the online survey would be distributed within an official context (by the 
university to students of the college) I could not expect statements or opinions which 
contradicted the official narrative of Sheikh Zayed’s greatness and character.189 Therefore I 
formulated six questions about different aspects of the official image of Sheikh Zayed and 
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asked the participants to comment on them. The selection of keywords provided in the first 
three was designed to fit into the image of nation’s founder and president as an authentic 
Bedouin, a poet and philanthropist; and the father of all Emiratis. Two questions asked for 
concrete knowledge of important dates and sayings of Sheikh Zayed. The aim was to find 
out whether the image participants had of Sheikh Zayed was based on his concrete 
achievements (expected to be taught in UAE schools) or rather a more intuitive, or mythical 
idea about his greatness. For the last question, the participants were required to choose 
their favourite of a selection of six different pictures of Sheikh Zayed’s : one picture showed 
him in official robes next to the UAE flag; one was a portrait of him smiling at an unseen 
person to his right side; another was a black and white close-up of Sheikh Zayed with a kind 
but solemn gaze. The remaining three pictures were oriented towards the traditional image 
of the Bedouin. One black and white photo showed a young Zayed on a camel with a falcon 
on his arm,190 the other portrayed him dressed in a dove-blue kandōra with matching jacket 
and a falcon, the third sitting in a tent at night reading a paper by torchlight, with a hooded 
falcon on each side (see image on following page). This exercise or the survey as a whole was 
intended to determine which version or what kind of composite version the students had 
internalised; the official mythical version, the factual history, or aspects of both.191  
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Image No. 2. 1: The selection of pictures provided in the online questionnaire192 
 
 
A total of 97 female students submitted their answers between 26th November and 
31st December 2009. From these participants 52 skipped the question asking for historical 
dates, while all 97 students participated in choosing a picture. Although such a limited 
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questionnaire cannot be considered conclusive evidence, it does indicate the successful 
establishment of Sheikh Zayed as a mythological figure in the collective memory of Emiratis. 
It can also confirm the naturalisation of a state-induced terminology describing the former 
president. An interesting result of the questionnaire was that the young Emirati women 
from Dubai did not choose characteristics and values related to the topos of the “noble 
Bedouin” as the most important aspects of Sheikh Zayed. These same women did not see 
themselves as originally Bedouin either (only 19% identified themselves as such), but as ‘city 
people’ (64%).193 The most important aspect of Sheikh Zayed for the participants was his 
‘vision’ (chosen by 74.2%).  
The most popular picture, chosen by 42% of the participants echoed the image of a 
visionary personality. It was also the most recent picture, a black and white close-up, which 
thus shows him as a figure from the past looking into the future. The students were asked to 
give an explanation for their selection: 12 of the 29 who picked the photo justified their 
preference by citing his visionary expression, one student writing that “his strong gaze 
shows his vision and wisdom”. The second most popular picture was the portrait of a smiling 
Sheikh Zayed, chosen by 24.6% of the participants, who agreed that his smile represented 
him as kind, loving and caring. As one participant summarised, “he [was] always smiling, 
people feel comfortable to see him and they feel happy to chat and be close to him. This 
smile makes people always [want to be] around him, he was always encouraging people to 
talk and ask what they want and need.”  
The statements thus repeated exactly what the current mainstream media 
established, the image of a man who stands for general human values and the spirit of 
progress, although not specified. Considering the context in which the answers were given 
(distributed through the university, possible filled out on campus), the answers could be 
expected to repeat an official discourse. Accordingly, most of the students chose the latest 
trend, which obscures aspects of Sheikh Zayeds image such as a Bedouin patriarch, or 
patron of fine arts and architecture. The questionnaire answers indicate that there is a 
process of assimilation for role models which takes place whenever that figure is said to be 
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the archetype of a certain attitude. Since the participants do not mainly identify themselves 
as Bedouins, this aspect of Sheikh Zayed loses relevance for them. Although Sheikh Zayed 
himself was keen to express his Bedouin identity, his image in the media has been modified 
to more generic attributes, such as the kind-hearted leader with family values. Even for a 
generation which does not identify with the Bedouin image he can thus be part of the 
national identity discourse, as a mythological father of the nation behind which the 
complexity of the real person disappears. Historical events linked to political achievements 
have become secondary in this scenario. The question about milestones in Sheikh Zayed’s 
and therefore the UAE’s history was least popular. From the 48 students who answered the 
question, only 12 provided three historical events as asked for in the question. All 
participants listed the UAE National Day as first and thus most significant event associated 
with Sheikh Zayed. The few who provided more than one mentioned the urban 
development of Dubai (a project actually executed under the local ruler, Sheikh Rashid). 
 
 
2.2 Ways of experiencing reality and forming new imagined communities 
 
Stuart Hall remarked that national cultural identities are no longer exclusively facilitated and 
distributed by the state apparatus.194 Globalisation has resulted in the nation-state’s loss of 
control over both its local scene and its global cultural output. Modern technology has made 
it possible for the people of all or most social classes and walks of life to interact with each 
other and to the outside world, independent of governmental influence. Due to the 
immense possibilities offered by individual experiences and identities Appadurai believes 
that “standard cultural reproduction (like standard English) is now an endangered activity 
that succeeds only by conscious design and political will.”195 
The independent communication that technology provides people in the UAE creates 
a particular challenge for the those responsible for marketing and selling the official version 
of identity. As the first part of the section will show, Arab government media has created 
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‘image worlds’ for citizens to educate them towards an ideological national identity. In so 
doing, it has tried to determine and direct people’s experience in their Emirati identity. 
Personalities such as Sheikh Zayed have been constructed as prototypes of the national 
identity. Their performances represent an ‘ideal Emirati’ to the community of nationals. 
However, as media technologies constantly change, this mediated experience has to be 
constantly adjusted, as the example of the satellite era will show. The second part of the 
section will discuss the influence of corporate brands and their role in creating imagined 
communities which evolve around de-territorialised practices constituting identities.  
Global consumer products use marketing and branding to enforce rituals and 
experiences which challenge the supposedly local identities the state constructed. The 
nation state ideology risks losing relevance if it does not manage to incorporate the real life 
experiences of Emiratis into the national narrative. Since daily routines are framed by 
branded consumer products, the producers of the national narrative apply similar 
techniques – and brand itself. As a dominant commercially driven discourse they challenge 
supposedly ‘local’ identities in a new way and raise the question of authentic local identities 
– a question which challenges government ideology and imagined sub-communities alike. 
 
 
2.2.1 Trans-national TV reshuffling imagined communities 
 
The producers of the national narrative have recognized that media is n “a cultural 
agent, particularly as a provoker and circulator of meanings […] that serve dominant 
interests in society.”196 The dominant interest thus represented by the ruling elite, media is 
used by the rulers to inculcate the nation-building project and the idea of national identity 
“into” the viewers, as well as to prohibit anything potentially harmful to the state to be 
communicated through the media. Lila Abu Lughod describes a similar media-viewer 
relationship for Egyptian TV. She remarks that “the addressee was the citizen, not the 
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consumer. Audiences were to be brought into national and international political 
consciousness, mobilized, modernized, and culturally uplifted.”197 
Abu Lughod’s observation is equally true for the UAE media in its build-up phase.198 
The national media was on a mission ‒ a mission to secure loyalties on a local level; to 
identify with the UAE and its official identity while simultaneously presenting the country 
within a transnational community of nations. In a review of Arab TV broadcasts during the 
1980s and 1990s, Al-Nawawy describes common characteristics of national Arab television, 
saying that they were “non-controversial and do little else but serve as a public relations 
outlet for governments.”199 This top-down nationalistic input was contested by interest 
groups who felt that the media content was detached from their social reality. Unable to 
gain access to the media arena, oral discourses would become the focus of the national 
communities rather than the media.200 In this scenario the government media lost more and 
more credibility, especially in times of political crises when communities turned to media for 
reliable information but had to resort to rumours.201 This development highlights the 
difficulty in using media as a mere top-down tool for mass-education and the importance of 
the perspectives and intentions of those using it, as producers, consumers, or both.  
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Just as the new technology of radio broadcasting had changed the way media was 
experienced, the satellite era redefined the formation of imagined communities and their 
depth. A globally tradable repertoire of images, ideas, and opportunities that enable 
individuals to identify with others led to “a singular new power in social life.”202 This 
development transferred the challenge for governments to justify their politics and remain 
in charge of citizen-manipulation to a new level. The capacity to connect imagined 
communities not with privileged government officials but people from their social class was 
a major attraction satellite channels could offer.203 When the Qatari channel Al Jazeera was 
launched in November 1996, it successfully managed to use this asset. The channel provided 
diaspora people with a link to their communities in their homelands. But Al Jazeera’s news 
broadcast for an Arabic speaking audience also created new imagined communities of 
sentiment.204  
With a mixture of sensationalism, subjugated voices becoming a space, and its pan-
Arab outreach, Al Jazeera thus confirms the role of media as facilitating meanings and at the 
same time setting new “strategically fashioned categories.”205 The credibility and strength of 
these categories are achieved by the instantaneous communication of events from within a 
national community into the homes of the nation. The possibility of manipulating such 
seemingly ‘real’ events discredits satellite channels just as their ideological agendas. In the 
case of Al Jazeera the self-proclaimed agenda of unbiased news and accessibility of 
subjugated voices to the media has been undermined by its connection to the Qatari 
government. Nevertheless, Al Jazeera set a standard, which other satellite channels strived 
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to follow and governments tried to control. Due to the complex relationship between media 
and communities assembling around it, the nation state risks losing its role of dominance 
over the national community it constructs. To remain the “modelling agent”206 for the 
imagination of one national community it has to make the constructed narrative of a past 
relevant and meaningful in a constantly changing present. 
 
 
2.2.2 Global media practices to preserve locality: the power of brands and master 
narratives 
 
Appadurai describes the general features of globalisation as movement of money 
and people which transforms and deterritorialises culture.207 He remarks that in our 
globalised age, imagination and improvisation are stronger than ever before.208 One has to 
bear in mind that consumer culture carries its own social power allowing for the 
development of a mainstream, which follows best selling practices and master narratives.209 
In his enthusiasm for the power of imagination and improvisation, Appadurai does not 
reflect on the hegemonic relationship between the producers and the consumers of such 
new cultural practices. Dominant media discourses establish codes, styles, topoi, and 
symbolisms which nobody can surpass. Amidst countless narratives, characters and 
collected identities constructed by ‘dream factories’ such as Hollywood, the individual can 
merely produce an ‘intertext’ which reshuffles ingredients in a new way. Anthony Paul 
Cohen stipulates that media is simultaneously embedded in a macro- and micro 
communication process and as such delivers “raw material for individuals’ interpretative 
work.”210 Considering the global corporations fabricating persuasive master narratives one 
might put a more pessimistic slant on Appadurai’s outlook and say that global media has 
created a nourishing ground for global communities, constructed around brands. 
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As a tool to market a product, idea or person, branding relies on condensed images 
and narratives to convey human experiences. Pine and Gilmore pointed out that for 
marketing purposes the focus should not be on the quality of a product but the process of 
using it: “The focus would then shift to the user: how the individual performs while using 
the good.”211 Daryl Travis accordingly defines brand as “an artefact that points the way to an 
experience.”212 These two aspects of branding, experience and performance, are essential 
to enforce a community of loyal consumers. Brand expert Steve Davies described the 
relationship between brand and emotional experiences as follows: 
 
"We remember experiences more readily than facts, because experiences are 
more likely to be related to other experiences through one or more sensory 
triggers – the smell of a classic car reminds us of our childhood, the winding road 
in Jaguar’s F-TYPE video triggers memories of a favourite drive."213 
 
Branding, as a form of encoding reminiscences of experiences into a reproducible 
media text, tries to establish an associational link between the visual representations (logo, 
advertisements) and emotional stories. As part of a community which shares the supposed 
positive pleasures evoked by the experience of consumption, the branded product becomes 
a cultural agent.214 The idea is to cultivate the feeling in a consumer that if s/he buys 
something or buys into an idea, then the payback is one of the following: immediate 
pleasure, a feeling of pride, a feeling of belonging or identification with and embracing of an 
idea. Celebrities have always been used in marketing campaigns, to cultivate loyalty in 
consumers. The use of Sheik Zayed for marketing of national identity marks the same kind of 
strategy and success. During Sheikh Zayed’s lifetime, his public performances, which were 
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meticulously documented and reported on, enforced the image of a romantic Bedouin 
identity performed around camel-races, falcon hunting, and desert campsites.215 The 
circulation of images and film-material featuring Sheikh Zayed performing these symbolic 
actions established him as the ideal embodiment of the authentic Emirati. Since his death in 
2004 his image has remained present and effectively developed into a brand for the UAE’s 
heritage. His public image has been carefully constructed into a conglomerate of media 
codes (images, symbols, narratives) which link a consistent message of identity with his 
distinguishable characteristics and features. Thus the Gulf-wide narrative of a tribal heritage 
has become localised for the UAE.216 
 
Image No. 2. 2: The Sheikh Zayed brand, “Our Father Zayed” and Billboard in Abu Dhabi featuring the 
President of the UAE under the caption “Our Heritage, Our Identity”
217
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If a “brand is a collection of perceptions in the mind of the consumer”218, the 
branding of a national identity has to provide both a stable point of reference and 
contemporary relevance in the minds and experiences of nationals. Since the nationals 
simultaneously belong to local and deterritorialised communities, the national narrative has 
to enter into a creative dialogue with other image worlds. How the national media 
implements such dialogue can be exemplified through the following story from a popular 
Emirati cartoon.  
The episode from the animation series “Freej” (“Neighbourhood”) presents the 
holiday adventure of the Emirati teenager Jameela. She visits her old-fashioned aunt in 
Dubai and is stunned by her lifestyle. 219 Bursting into her aunt’s the traditional majlis she 
immediately takes pictures of the place with her mobile phone and calls friends to share her 
“vintage” and exotic experience with them. Her aunt is as equally surprised and dismayed 
by her niece’s attire (the fashionable sheela and abaya of young Dubai women), her 
designer handbag, flashy mobile phone, and by the mixture of Arabic and English she 
speaks. The character of Jameela mocks a stereotypical Emirati youth, whose identity is 
mostly based on material things. But true to the plot of a coming of age story, Jameela’s old 
aunt transforms her niece into a traditional Bedouin girl. By the end of the episode, a now 
soft-spoken Jameela elegantly waits upon her astonished mother. Although it is implied that 
after her visit at the grandmother’s house she will return to her cosmopolitan Dubai 
lifestyle, it is clear that the experience has improved her character. Jameela now 
understands ‘the old ways’, thus where she comes from and who she really is. 
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Image No. 2. 3: The transformation of Jameela from fashionable Dubai City girl to traditional Bedouin 
woman in the last picture
220
 
 
 
The example illustrates how corporate symbols and brands are presented as 
potential threat to local identities. Stories of reconciliation between global and local, 
modern lifestyle and tradition are recurring topics not only in the UAE media but across the 
region. Constantly on the lookout for suitable topics to present the discourse, two Gulf 
talkshows (from Saudi Arabia and the UAE) each produced elaborate episodes on Japanese 
society in 2009. 221 Both shows followed the same pattern: the presenter of each show 
interviewed various Japanese families and presented their habits or ways of life, their 
homes, and their places of work. An example of this is one episode, in which the Emirati 
presenter, talks to a couple who gives say how most women, though highly successful and 
powerful in their career, will nonetheless still be responsible for all of the household duties, 
not expecting their husbands to take a share in cooking or cleaning. Although most women 
have embraced a modern style of life in terms of having a career, they revert to traditional 
ways when it comes to household and parenting duties. In some way it can be said that 
these women are upholding the inherited role models. This presentation of Japanese society 
is constructed to show parallels to urban societies in the Gulf. Especially the hectic business-
life in Dubai comes to mind when looking at the skyscrapers of central Tokyo. The shows 
focus on the consumerist aspects of life and present Japanese youth as equally technology-
driven as i.e. Emirati youngsters. The overall message to Emirati audience is a story of 
reassurance that a life performed around malls and international brands does not have to 
lead to a loss of local authenticity. On the contrary, the presenters show how modern 
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utilities can be used to support a traditional way of living.222 These examples are neither 
singular media occurrences nor temporary trends. One only has to switch on UAE television 
to see the same message repeatedly enforced through the advertisements of the local TV 
channels: young men in Bedouin attire race cars through the desert, interact with business 
executives in suits while wearing kandōra themselves or, to use an even more urban image, 
groups of Bedouins on horseback weaving through the skyscrapers of Dubai. All of these 
narratives depict old values and inherited customs as harmonious with modern 
developments and merging local culture with global trends.  
To enforce the message even further, the rituals and performances of the rulers 
permeate all spaces in UAE society (from TV viewing in the privacy of a home, to the 
aforementioned billboard at the highway). A recent example is the new crown prince of 
Dubai, Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, whose début both as a 
cultural icon and a political figure was achieved through branding strategies: these include a 
designed public image condensed in a logo and consistent visual image of the identity he 
represents. His political image combines aspects of the traditional authentic Bedouin topos 
with the profile of a modern youthful sports fan and car enthusiast,223 thus targeting 
different age groups. In addition, he is often referred to as “Fazza”, his nickname or brand 
logo name, if you will. Whereas his father earned his nickname, “Sheikh Mo”, over time, 
Sheikh Hamdan is introduced to the public as a developed brand. 
His image as the future ruler of Dubai markets him as a celebrity, following the 
definition presented by Matthews, that “Celebrities can also be considered brands because 
they can be professionally managed and because they have additional associations and 
features of a brand.”224 They have a constructed public image which concentrates the 
complexity of their human characteristics into a one sided and consistent representation.225 
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Whereas Zayed effectively ended the search for a national icon, Hamdan can still promote 
himself as a brand. Whilst his image (like those of other Sheikhs before him) incorporates 
continuity of his Bedouin heritage (represented through his poetry in nabati-dialect), he is 
far more modern in his image of the Emirati patron of sports and motors.226 
 
Image No. 2. 4: Sheikh Hamdan’s official image as presented on his website, “Fazaa”
227
 
 
 
The circulations of stories about authenticity, together with the promotion of ruler-
celebrities, are attempts by the government to create “stable points of reference” for a 
national community.228 To maintain the relevance of the national narrative alternative non-
national communities are presented as threats to the authenticity of the Emirati identity. 
Local and global are constructed as dichotomies in this discourse. The protection of the local 
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authenticity is ensured through the performances of those who are presented as the 
authentic thus entitles representatives of the nation: the rulers. 
Appadurai promotes a different notion of locality. He stipulates that instead of 
looking for a local essence under the mesh of localities, practice itself dissolves this 
dichotomy.229 Accordingly, the “impact of de-territorialisation on the imaginative resources 
of lived local experiences”230 does not have to be interpreted as leading to a loss of local 
authenticity. On the contrary, being a local who imagines him or herself embedded in a 
global context can be just as authentically local. In the case of the UAE with its ethnically, 
economically global urbanity, a global frame of reference has to be acknowledged as part of 
local identity, and vice versa. The fact that the local media repeatedly addresses the concern 
of maintaining an ideal cultural identity shows the urgency of the topic in the eyes of the 
government’s media producers. Throughout the following chapters the actual daily 
experiences which challenge the heritage ideal will repeatedly be addressed by research 
participants. Attempts to either extract or reconcile these seemingly dichotomous 
constructions are relevant for TV, but even more cinema films. They become platforms of 
contest, just as daily life experiences are framed by both commercial brands and a 
fabricated national identity, thus posing a challenge of reconciliation for the individuals. 
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3. Controlling and securing the media: the balance between global 
outreach and local interests 
 
 
The UAE media’s relationship with global media has gone a long way from the 1970s 
when Emirati media professionals were sent abroad to be trained, and local channels 
reversely employed foreign media professionals. The exchange of personnel was extended 
by the set up of media free zones in the country. In section 3.1, the topic of whether the 
import of foreign media companies is intended to create more overall diversity in the media 
landscape and to encourage interaction will be discussed. It will show how media zones 
benefit the country’s profile as a media nation, and how local television broadcasting tries 
to express global outreach in their brands. Both emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, compete to 
establish TV industries which attract local audiences and comply with latest media trends (in 
terms of style, content, and programming). However, what is promoted as an ideal 
cooperation of global media companies remains under government control. In fact the 
government concentrates all media development under its companies. The result is a 
mainstream media sphere which is closed to alternative voices and eyed suspiciously by 
Emiratis, as examples will show. 
The government’s outreach to global media companies and import of expatriate 
staff potentially change the nationalist character of the local media. With more access to 
international satellite media, new audiences can evolve whose expectations will reflect back 
on the local media. How the UAE government navigates change and control over media is 
the topic of section 3.2. Direct and indirect censorship are the immediate mechanisms of 
control. Both can, however, jeopardise the media’s aim to become an internationally 
recognised media hub. Al Jazeera and other satellite broadcasts (such as the Middle East 
Broadcasting Center Group, mbc) had demonstrated just how relevant and informative 
media could be. At the same time Al Jazeera demonstrated to the governments that it was 
possible to remain in control of the media yet make it more attractive and even 
commercially profitable.  
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Although the UAE media did not go as far as giving media control to the population 
via public broadcast, the structure of the industry moved more towards the ideal of 
commercialised media. The focus of this section will be on Abu Dhabi TV where the media 
transformation was more turbulent than in Dubai. While Dubai, had always followed a more 
commercial line, the media in Abu Dhabi had been was focused on the nation-building 
project. In the phase of problematising the role of media, government, and audiences, the 
Abu Dhabi media initially followed the example of Al Jazeera as a news channel for Arabic-
speaking audiences. Soon, the policy was changed towards entertainment which entailed a 
less obvious political agenda and fewer diplomatic pitfalls. But the dilemma of 
entertainment as a main pillar of the national media lies with the reconciliation of a 
mainstream entertainment or the catering of diverse audiences. The national media has to 
position itself, negotiate priorities, and reconcile aims in a dialogue with global media, 
audiences, producers in order to attract, sell, and control. The final remarks of this chapter 
will discuss the difficulties of such endeavour. 
 
 
3.1 Negotiating global and local media as host or co-operator 
 
The review of the first UAE media zone in Dubai, the Dubai Media City, will show 
how commercial interest can be of mutual benefit to foreign media companies and the 
government. While it contributes to Dubai’s international profile, the foreign companies are 
provided with ideal facilities. Over time the media city brought companies closer together, 
but whether this was intended by the government is disputed and will be discussed in this 
context.  
Abu Dhabi’s newly established media zone focuses on the latest addition to the UAE 
media landscape: film production. The second part of this section will show that Abu Dhabi 
is determined to be more than a mere host to foreign media producers. The Media Zone 
Authority tries to use foreign film productions to market its own version of Emirati culture 
around the globe. If successful this step could reinforce the official national identity 
narrative on a trans-national level. Yet, proclaiming to boost the national identity and 
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support Emirati media talents does not convince the local media professionals, as the third 
part of this section will show. Their reactions to the new film production boom shows that 
they not only reject being held to an official narrative, but mistrust the business integrity of 
the whole project.  
In order to understand how the media in Dubai and Abu Dhabi implement their 
global ambitions the last part of the following section will review the main characteristics of 
television in both emirates. The range of channels reflects how they try to follow the 
example of satellite channels yet represent a specific local culture at the same time. The 
review will show that especially the media in Abu Dhabi faces difficulties to establish a 
strong TV identity. 
 
 
3.1.1 Dubai Media City: an attempt for global cooperation or branding tool? 
 
With the establishment of Dubai Media City (DMC) in 2001, the emirate has 
attempted since 2001 to create an image of an open Arab country: it has certainly 
communicated its eagerness to be at the centre of modern media developments. According 
to its marketing description Dubai Media City is not only host to over 1,400 companies,231 
but “has evolved as a thriving media community catering to businesses in segments such as 
Publishing and Printing, Music, New Media, Leisure and Entertainment, Broadcasting, Film, 
Information Agencies and Media and Marketing Services.”232 By concentrating media outlets 
and production companies in one media free-zone, Dubai Media City, the emirate has 
attempted since 2001 to create an image of an open Arab country: it has certainly 
communicated its eagerness to be at the centre of modern media developments. The idea 
of a free zone for global media within a campus-like space can facilitate both international 
business collaborations and the exchange of ideas. Dubai Media City therefore stands for a 
space of media diversification, a nucleus of global trends. In the past the UAE government 
has striven to develop its own media industry by importing foreign experts as well as 
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sending local personnel abroad for training: but how helpful have these experts been in 
developing a local media? The aim of Dubai Media City is to reach beyond the regional 
market by attracting global media production companies such as Reuters, CNN, mbc and the 
BBC to set up office within it premises.233 Qatar-based media analyst Joseph Khalil takes the 
view that despite its international outreach DMC was not initially intended to facilitate 
interaction between global and local media.234 In fact, Khalil argues that it was conceived as 
an incubated space in which foreign media outlets would be segregated from local ones and 
could, therefore, be contained.  
Khalil claims the establishment of DMC is directly linked to the overall aim of 
distinguishing a local identity in view of Arab states with already established images. 
According to Khalil, one strong motivation was the chance to position the UAE as knowledge 
and based society. Furthermore, the offer of advantageous business conditions led to a 
“repatriation of media operations”235, such as the London-based mbc which moved to DMC 
in 2002.236 Another consideration was to strengthen the image of Dubai itself, as a distinct 
city-state rather than just one of the emirates of the UAE. Although the “Brand Dubai” was 
not officially established before 2009, the project of profiling the emirate internationally 
had already become a priority after the inauguration of the Burj Al Arab Hotel in 1999.237 
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Khalil even asserts that with DMC Dubai wanted to distance itself from the more powerful 
Abu Dhabi.238 Competition between the richer and more influential emirate and Dubai is 
indeed a feature of local politics which dates back to the Trucial States era. 
Thus set up as a showcase project of a media-friendly and globally open Dubai, DMC 
remained loyal to the main characteristics of media in the UAE: DMC is government-owned 
and remains under government surveillance despite its ‘free zone’ label. The foreign 
producers needed and therefore invited to set up a base in the Emirates must still conform 
to local rules. The UAE media is presently regulated by Federal Law No 15 (1980) 
“concerning publications and publishing” executed by The National Media Council (NMC). 
The latter promotes itself as regulator of all UAE media activities in terms of licensing, 
content monitoring, and journalist accreditation.239 Far from being specific, the media law 
prohibits any publications which could damage the reputation of the country or its allies.240 
Its vague wording leaves the NMC to decide which content is to be banned from publication 
and it can impose penalties which may range from fines and impounding of the publications, 
to closure of the publication or imprisonment.241  
According to NMC consultant Muhammad Ayish, the media zones are considered 
self-regulatory and therefore free to report on any UAE-related subject.242 He elaborates 
that the NMC acknowledges the media zones as an economic asset for the country, which is 
why the NMC would not generally interfere with them.243 Although major global players 
such as Reuters and CNN have not yet clashed with the law (at least not publicly), DMC is 
still no stranger to international scandal. Although the foreign channels and news agencies 
are supposed to be free from government intervention, the independent Pakistani channels 
Geo News TV and ARY One World were shut down in 2007 at Pervez Musharraf’s demand. Ayish 
commented on the incident by pointing out that channels aiming to harm UAE relations with their 
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countries of origin were not wanted in the UAE. The channels in question, however, were exceptions 
and usually the NMC would “regulate” content rather than companies.244 Generally, the foreign 
media branches seem to adopt the Al Jazeera policy and avoid challenging the government that 
provides their Middle East location. 
In view of the spatial and legal conditions under which DMC was set up, it seems that 
the import of international media companies has not been laid out to promote cooperation 
but to enhance the assets of the country. What appears to be a diverse and vibrant media 
landscape is actually a parallel existence of media zones and local media. However, five 
years into the establishment of DMC developments could be recognised which nourish 
interaction between international and local media. One notable example of these is the 
News and Training Centres of Dubai TV, which both relocated there in 2005. 245 Does this 
development prove Khalil’s theory of separated media space wrong, and was DMC intended 
to function as a meeting space between local and international media? He explains the 
development as a reaction by the government to developments which took place on a 
grassroots level. According to Khalil the original plan to keep the media outlets separate was 
destined to fail in the long run: moving the most famous global media companies into a 
central location merely incited local media companies to follow them there.246 Employees 
from the local media were eager to find employment with the more renowned and 
professional media companies in DMC, which ultimately led to a brain drain to the 
disadvantage of the local media. Khalil’s argument is essentially that the Dubai authorities 
made a massive miscalculation with deeply ironic ramifications: in trying to prevent the local 
media professionals from becoming too close to the foreign ones, they unwittingly pushed 
the two together. If he is correct, the City’s autonomous development into an intercultural 
centre demonstrates that spheres of interaction simply cannot be divided, even by keeping 
them physically separate. 
                                                          
244
 Ayish, 2011. Media Investment and the Search for Regulatory Models in the UAE, [Conference proceeding].  
245
 See: Staff-Reporter, 2009. Media Training Center. There are also plans to move the remaining offices of the 
local TV Broadcast, Dubai Media Incorporated, to the City in their wake. See: Al-Abed, 2005. United Arab 
Emirates Yearbook 2005, p.25. 
246
 See: Khalil. 2011. Un-Settled Media and Nomadic Labour: The Next Decade of Media Cities, [Conference 
proceeding]. 
109 
 
While Khalil’s conclusion is based on his inside knowledge of the Arab media 
industry, it is difficult to prove and other aspects may just as well have contributed to the 
development. The theory that DMC was built far away from the local media location in 
order to separate both is not convincing. The premises of the Dubai broadcast channels are 
in the heart of the old centre of the city, close to the creek in Bur Dubai. But by 2001 the 
centre had already shifted North-West along the coast towards Jebel Ali. DMC was not 
erected away from the urban centre but in close proximity to a new vibrant centre for 
businesses, hotels, and residential district. Whereas the old centre of Dubai would have 
been too crowded, DMC seems ideally located opposite the famous Palm Jumeirah, the 
Emirates Golf Course, Dubai Marina and other prime developments. While it is possible that 
the intent was to create a spatial separation does not withstand closer observation, it might 
have nevertheless served the government to neglect any interaction until necessary. While 
it is difficult to ascertain why a closer cooperation was delayed, another consideration 
should be mentioned: in order to remain the first choice for foreign media companies DMC 
had to constantly enhance its incentives. Accordingly the International Production Zone was 
announced in 2003, followed by Dubai Studio City in 2005.  
But DMC could not merely rely on offering convenient and cheap facilities. Following 
the role model of EMPC by adding training services and platforms for exchange seems a 
likely step to make the location even more attractive. Accordingly DMC is host and co-
organiser of workshops, networking communities, and event around media production, 
such as the Dubai International Film Festival (launched in 2004), and the Dubai version of 
TED conferences (TEDxDubai, in 2009).247 It is possible that the Dubai government did not 
anticipate which direction the DMC project would take, but it seems exaggerated to suggest 
a plan from the upstart to separate media cooperation. It is more likely that the government 
will tolerate unforeseen developments under the condition that they do not challenge the 
government’s overall control over media. But while Dubai seems to be open for unforeseen 
business opportunities the media zone in Abu Dhabi followed a different approach with 
more direct government involvement. 
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3.1.2 Imagine an image-nation, but within limits 
 
An international media presence both creates more jobs for locals and increases 
media production, and Abu Dhabi certainly seem to have recognised the Media City’s 
potential in this respect. The establishment of the Abu Dhabi Media Zone Authority in 2007 
(better known by its brand name of TwoFour54) had presented foreign media producers 
with an unprecedented opportunity: to open offices in the Emirate in their own names.248 In 
2008, the governmental media conglomerate Abu Dhabi Media Company (ADMC) founded a 
media production subsidiary, Imagenation.249 Its aim is to develop the Emirate’s media 
industry in two ways: by training and funding local ingénues and through co-productions 
with international media producers.250 Imagenation has already collaborated with 
Bollywood251 on feature films, and has formed corporations with international film 
production companies such as Participant Media, National Geographic Films, Warner Bros., 
and others. The aim of these efforts is not simply to develop their own local media culture, 
but to market the UAE on an international scale by producing, in their own words, 
“commercial films and content that opens a unique window to the Middle East, Africa and 
Asia”.252  
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This ideological aim sets the Abu Dhabi media zone apart from its predecessor in 
Dubai, which at least initially focused on the economic advantages of a media zone. Surely 
DMC was also a means to enhance the global image of Dubai, but even this aim was in line 
with an economic focus. Dubai as a media hub contributed to the overall image of Dubai as 
an economic centre of the Middle East. Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, had historically 
assumed the role of capital of the UAE as a nation. Less dependent on foreign investors, the 
oil-rich emirate could focus on the mission Sheikh Zayed had initiated, and act as the 
promoter of a UAE national identity. Abu Dhabi was in no hurry to establish a centre for 
international media production but could observe the benefits and challenges of such an 
institution through the experiences of Dubai.253  
The Abu Dhabi media zone was launched as part of a comprehensive project to 
boost local talents via media and promote the nation on an international scale. From the 
start think tanks and conferences were part of this project, prominent amongst which was 
the annual “Circle Conference”,254 where current media trends and challenges were 
discussed. Since its inauguration in 2007, a recurring topic has been the potential of the 
emerging Emirati media infrastructure and how best to develop the local film industry. 
Speakers representing Arab and Western media often suggest directions for the UAE to 
pursue using other nations’ industries as examples, and discuss which country could serve 
as a role-model.255  
In 2010, for example, several European film producers were invited to discuss the 
development of local film culture in their native countries. Various possibilities for co-
production were discussed, most notably with the French-German channel Arte, which is 
often viewed as a pioneer of intercultural production.256 In 2010, the conference’s keynote 
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speech was delivered by the French-Tunisian movie producer and distributor Tarak Ben 
Ammar, who has played a significant role in Tunisia’s metamorphosis into a global media 
production centre.257 During this event, he mused that the goal of a fledgling film industry 
must be to provide a cultivating environment, both officially and logistically258, and to create 
jobs for the local population. Its development enables a country’s ‘media intelligentsia’ to 
recruit and train their own local professionals and, in the long run, to offer them an 
infrastructure for local production. Ben Ammar reflected on what the establishment of an 
infrastructure for international film producers in Tunisia had achieved, more than merely 
importing Hollywood vehicles. By creating work in various fields of production, it has 
created a community of media professionals.259 With his speech Ben Ammar made himself a 
role model for TwoFour54, which follows precisely this aim. Even more in line with the 
cultural policies of the emirate was his claim that once the infrastructure is in place, nations 
will inevitably begin to capitalise on their culture as a brand.260  
Since 2007, Abu Dhabi has been implementing a cultural brand for the emirate which 
aims to go beyond mere tourism marketing for the emirate. The Office of the Brand of Abu 
Dhabi (OBAD) developed a visual brand (including logo, images and editorial guidelines) 
which all local government entities have to integrate into their public activities.261 The main 
component is the logo with the slogan “Travellers Welcome”, as well as an image database 
with various attractive photos of Abu Dhabi. These visualisations are “built on the legacy of 
His Highness the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan” and accordingly utilise the 
romanticising symbols around which his official image is constructed: desert landscapes, 
falcon-hunting Bedouins etc.262 Important to note is that the Office of the Brand does not 
clearly distinguish between ‘Abu Dhabi’ and ‘the nation’ but states that the brand was 
created to “protect our national identity and to develop our global reputation.”263 
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Compared to Dubai the emirate of Abu Dhabi thus still follows its established strategy to act 
on behalf of the whole nation.264  
As part of the branding project the Abu Dhabi media zone is clearly intended to go 
beyond the idea of hosting media spaces. Instead, it aims to promote the emirate’s brand as 
part of a creative collaboration with global media producers. Noura Al Kaabi, board member 
of TwoFour54 and ADMC, expressed this aim clearly in an interview, saying that the 
incentives the UAE could offer foreign film makers are: “stories! You want something 
different, we have it.”265 Her statement sums up the plan to capitalise on culture rather than 
business opportunities and include foreign media producers into the Abu Dhabi brand 
strategy.  
 
 
3.1.3 “Collective dialogue” orchestrated by the government  
 
Trying to utilise media producers to act as public relations agents of the country 
seems problematic due to its ideological mission which foreign media producers might not 
be willing to comply with. The brand tries to protect “the authentic sense of place and 
national identity which is so important to Emiratis”266 but media producers looking for 
shooting locations are not likely to take an interest in this. Hence the framework pre-selects 
the range of foreign movies featuring the UAE. The Hollywood production “The Kingdom”, 
for example, merely used the UAE as a mock-up Saudi Arabia, thus leaving the country’s 
image untarnished from the storyline of Islamist terrorists being hunted down by US Special 
Forces. The only Hollywood production which actually features Emirati culture (to date) 
faced so many restrictions from the National Media Council that the location had to be 
changed. “Sex and the City 2”, which sees the famous New York girls on a trip to Abu Dhabi, 
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had to be shot in Morocco and was banned in UAE cinemas for inappropriate content.267 
The next Hollywood Blockbuster featuring Dubai as a city adhered to local rules and was 
therefore enthusiastically welcomed to the UAE. With Tom Cruise visibly shooting scenes in 
the city for “Mission: Impossible- Ghost Protocol” in 2010, Dubai made an ideal marketing 
deal with a producer who agreed to feature Dubai as full of action and high buildings, fast 
cars and sand storms as well as being able to attract the Hollywood ‘A list’ In December 
2011, “Mission: Impossible- Ghost Protocol” showed the world that post-recession Dubai is 
just as “hot” as ever.  
 
[This image has been removed by the author of this thesis/dissertation for copyright reasons.] 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But while Tom Cruise was a willing agent, all the legal restrictions mean the UAE is 
unlikely to be able to compete with Tunisia or Morocco, both of which are currently 
considered role models for fledgling Arab film industries. Their governments do not, 
attempt to restrict or manipulate foreign producers’ material, which in turn makes them 
more attractive than the UAE. The politics of using film-makers to market the UAE and a 
positive image of Arab culture also poses difficulties on a local scale. In Dubai, which has 
private production companies (also providing filming equipment), film-makers can limit 
government involvement in their films to script approval and shooting permission. In Abu 
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Dhabi, on the other hand, while the media zone has become increasingly well-equipped, the 
studios and technology are almost always owned by TwoFour54.  
These regulations make film-makers’ processes even more complicated than film 
production already is. The Emirati film maker Ali F. Mostafa recalled that he had difficulties 
obtaining script approval for his feature film “City of Life”, but had he received government 
funding, the entire film would have been radically changed. As it was, the feature was 
financed by private sponsors and the council’s refusal to grant approval was overturned by 
the ruler of Dubai (to whom Ali was connected).269 Another film maker, Nayla Al Khaja, also 
had problems with the Media Council and so she now produces her films in collaboration 
with private production companies.270 This way, she bypasses government appointed 
editors who could try to dictate the content of her film scripts. But while several private 
production companies are operating in Dubai, Abu Dhabi has capitalized on the 
government’s version of culture: they have initiated an infrastructure which ensures that 
the media is at least partly government owned and develops in the government’s favour. 
This development adds a new aspect to the monopolization of the media industry discussed 
in chapter 2. While the Dubai government holds the monopoly over the local media industry 
it has encouraged private media companies to use the location in DMC and ultimately 
interact with the government media. Even Emirati media companies can produce in DMC 
and sell them to the local media, as long as they comply with the demands of the NMC.  
In Abu Dhabi private media producers, foreign or local, are forced into a co-
production with TwoFour54 that will try to influence content towards the official narrative 
of Emirati culture and identity. This set up institutionalises Fraser’s point about the 
possibility of a diversified public sphere. She remarks that a majority ideology has 
preferential access to the public sphere and accordingly becomes strengthened. Her 
concept of counterpublics highlights the imbalance of power to access the public sphere and 
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express identity, otherness and diversity (counter-publics).271 Even in a media landscape 
which is not monopolised by the government the problem of access to the public domain 
poses a dilemma. Curran observes that it can only be solved via public institutions, which 
ensure a fair share of accessibility to all. In his opinion public service broadcasting is the 
ideal form of community-controlled media, which can stage a “collective dialogue.”272 
In practice, the ideal of a community-controlled media is always difficult to 
implement fairly. In addition, various aspects, such as airing time, programme format etc. 
can marginalise some interest groups. To implement equal accessibility of the public media 
sphere is further complicated, because of different definitions of what accessibility should 
mean. Curran points out for example that the BBC statutes define accessibility as a form of 
delivery. Rather than understanding it as framework which enables any member of a 
community to enter the public dialogue, the media producers focus on the necessity to 
cater for all interest groups with their media.273 If audiences and producers of media 
disagree on such vital definitions as accessibility and diversification in cases such as the 
public broadcast BBC, the UAE case seems even more frustrating.  
Attempts to cater different audiences, such as Western and Arab expatriates, and 
Emiratis, may be made within the local media but it lies with the sole media institution to 
identify existing interest groups and determine their media demands. Under these 
conditions the “unity through diversity” ideal remains a top-down policy from a government 
regulated body and, as a result the endeavour can hardly produce attractive media which 
acts as a platform for diverse and perhaps controversial communities. In the case of Abu 
Dhabi the government considers itself as the mouthpiece of the interest group of Emiratis 
and since its aim is to strengthen the Emirati community various attempts are made to give 
Emiratis privileged access to the media discourse. Emirati media students and professionals 
are favoured with scholarships and training opportunities. But as self-appointed 
representative of the Emirati’s interests the government only supports one version of 
Emiratiness, as the following example shows. 
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During a discussion with a group of five scholarship students from the Abu Dhabi 
Film Commission in March and May 2010,274 several pointed out that the school had 
demanded content that portrayed Abu Dhabi in a positive light. The conversation took place 
after they had just submitted their final video projects for the course. Reflecting on what 
had been two intense weeks of shooting and editing their short film projects, two students 
from Dubai complained that they had been discouraged by the course leaders from pursuing 
local stories. Instead the demand had been to choose topics specifically related to Abu 
Dhabi and perhaps be recruited by one of the local TV channels. One student in particular 
had faced restrictions in her choice for the film project. She had intended to present a short 
documentary about a female Emirati rapper from Al Ain city (in Abu Dhabi Emirate). After 
having interviewed the artist and having shot the short documentary, the school told her to 
cut out the soundtrack for the film, arguing that it showed an Emirati woman in a 
problematic light. Rola protested that: “the film was about a rapper, there has to be some of 
her music”. As a result, the film was produced without a soundtrack, leaving the young film- 
maker frustrated about what she considered a grave implication to her creative work. As the 
discussion evolved, some of Rola’s students mused that this was an isolated incident. 
However, the example of the following section will illustrate on a larger scope that the 
example of Rola is not an isolated case but symptomatic for the mainstreaming practices of 
the government. 
 
 
3.1.4 The Baynounah failure 
 
In 2007 Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, initiated a new TV 
channel called Baynounah, independent from the main government-owned media 
company. Owned by a leading member of the government this independence from the 
established ADMC promised innovation and the channel was feted as the first to be entirely 
produced by Emiratis. For this reason, many hoped that it would provide original content 
and receive strong local support. Since the project’s inception in 2007, Baynounah’s 
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employees eagerly set about producing everything from documentaries to short films in 
anticipation of the launch. In 2009, the Abu Dhabi Film Commission (ADFC) even invited 
their students to contribute content to the new channel.275  
The appearance of Baynounah personnel at the 2010 Abu Dhabi Film Festival, 
conducting interviews with the cast alongside both local and international journalists, 
suggested to Emiratis that its launch was imminent: rumours began circulating that 
Baynounah would be on air by the end of the year.276 A mere month later, in November 
2010, the channel was incorporated into the Abu Dhabi Media Company, which made the 
chance of any future diversification of the local industry seem far more remote. Four 
months later, in March 2011, the channel was dissolved and its employees were advised to 
seek work with the ADMC.277 The production facilities were, of course, taken over by the 
Abu Dhabi media zone (TwoFour54),278 and the ADMC (with its 1800 employees) relocated 
to the media zone shortly thereafter.279 
Baynounah is a strong example of how local events have solidified the reputation of 
Abu Dhabi’s media landscape. It was the emirate’s first attempt to launch a channel 
specifically for Emiratis, produced by Emiratis. As such it was envisioned as a direct 
competitor to Dubai’s most ‘local’ channel Sama Dubai (Dubai Sky), which specifically 
targets Emiratis. It seems astonishing that Sheikh Mohammed initiated the channel as a 
separate venture given that he owns the ADMC. After all, the English daily newspaper The 
National, a direct competitor to Dubai’s Gulf News, was launched under the roof of the 
ADMC. Perhaps he did not trust the ADMC to be innovative enough to develop a new media 
style; or he intended to establish his public profile as a leading media tycoon of the UAE. In 
his role as crown prince of Abu Dhabi and leader of the armed forces, Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Zayed has established a reputation of being more visible in the public sphere than his 
brother, the president of the UAE. He initiated various programmes and business ventures 
throughout the emirate of Abu Dhabi, thus enjoying a reputation of being particularly 
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active.280 Establishing a new TV channel could be seen as more than a statement of 
entrepreneurship and public image. A channel exclusively for Emiratis could become the 
fostering ground for a new elite of Emirati media professionals who, thankful to have been 
made part of a pioneer project, be particularly willing to translate Sheikh Mohammed’s 
version of ‘good media’. Whatever the motives, the announcement of a new media 
company was perceived by Emiratis as a sign of Abu Dhabi’s media landscape gaining 
dynamism.  
By establishing a specifically Emirati channel, Sheikh Mohammed demonstrated that 
he is not only aware of the need for a media catering the country’s minority of UAE citizens, 
but that he also sees himself as a figurehead for this community. Even the name of the 
channel suggests Emirati identity: the name Baynounah can be associated with a poem by 
Sheikh Zayed praising an area in the Western Region of the emirate for its beautiful 
landscape.281 Overall Baynounah can be understood as the attempt to launch a channel 
which represented the government’s version of Emirati identity, but what it represented 
was TwoFour54’s true purpose: to centralise media production. The reactions of research 
participants to the latest developments of the Abu Dhabi media landscape and the case of 
Baynounah demonstrate the problems associated with government’s monopolisation of 
media.  
Aliya, a young film maker from Dubai, has founded her own media production 
company in Dubai and taken advantage of the new opportunities for media professionals in 
Abu Dhabi. In 2009, she applied for one of the scholarships at the ADFC and was recruited 
during her course to join Baynounah until its closure. Over time she became more and more 
frustrated with working for government institutions. She reported that when the channel 
was prematurely closed in spring 2011, the staff was told that financial reasons had led to 
the closure. However, none of the ex-employees believed that money had been the 
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problem. Aliya was incredulous about this obviously false pretence, saying that “we saw the 
director every day, not working and having so much money… This is Abu Dhabi, how come 
there is no money?”282 Aliya viewed the closure was the failure of a political project. She 
explained: “I thought they wanted to make something different, but now it’s same-old 
same-old.”283 She did not directly criticize the channel owner, Sheikh Mohammed, as the 
one ultimately responsible, although ‘they’ can only mean the decision makers behind the 
project. For Aliya, the main source of frustration was the channel management she dealt 
with directly and who had deprived her of an opportunity to develop her skills.284  
In the following weeks the ex-employees from Baynounah had interviews with 
different sections of the government media company, but no further information was given, 
nor was the closure reported in any of the local newspapers. In a personal interview Noura 
Al Kaabi, a member of the board of TwoFour54, evaded the question of the channel’s 
closure by merely referring to higher powers.285 The lack of media transparency nourishes 
rumours amongst the communities affected by such changes. Baynounah exemplifies how 
unofficial sources of information quickly become the only ones available. It also 
demonstrates how mistrust of government entities characterises the media landscape, as 
this was not an isolated incident. Since the bureaucratic decisions are never officially 
explained (in the news for example), those on the lower levels revert to their own 
conclusions. In 2010, the news reported that the chairman of ADMC, Mohamed Khalaf Al 
Mazrouei, had resigned from his post to become a cultural consultant for the Abu Dhabi 
Authority of Culture and Heritage (which he is also a chairman of).286 Though he was 
replaced by another member of his extended family, ADMC staff and freelancers wondered 
as to the reason behind such a decision. 
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While some staff members declared that “he didn’t care about the channel”, and 
that “it was his decision”, other media professionals saw the act as a clear downsizing 
combined with a political move to appease the influential Mazrouei family.287 In lieu of any 
explanations, employees tend to see a management reorganization as a political move by a 
member of an influential Emirati family. A similar change involving expatriate managers 
however is most likely to be attributed to corruption. In a discussion with two film 
producers from Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the two women (who had just met) quickly came to 
talk about the board reshuffles underway in Abu Dhabi media companies. Both accused the 
film festivals and TwoFour54 of having corrupt directors. “They are just here for their 
pensions”, one stated, “They just want to show-off.”288 Another local film producer stated 
during a different meeting that she was not at all confident that films could be freely 
produced with Imagenation, saying that “no filmmaker would want to work with them, they 
are so corrupt.”289  
Shortly afterwards an article was published that exposed the corruption of 
Imagenation, the subsidiary film production company of ADMC. The writer, a Dubai-based 
British journalist, verbalised what many film-makers had already feared and suspected was 
the case with the company’s latest production: “Djinn”. The film is the second Emirati 
feature film and was hailed as a milestone on the road towards a local film infrastructure. 
Imagenation had already recruited the Emirati director Nawaf Janahi for their first local 
production “Sheashadow” (released 2011) in 2010. The film was promoted as a show case 
of Imagenation’s vision to promote and nourish young local talents. Nawaf Janahi had won 
the “Emirates Short Film Competition” at the Abu Dhabi Film Festival in 2009 and 
Imagenation consequently offered to produce his first feature film.290 The film “Djinn” 
followed shortly after, showing the determination and swiftness with which Imagenation 
was implementing its goals. While the film was advertised as a local production with local 
staff and a local story, the journalist claimed that this was a farce. The crew had only limited 
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local staff and actors;291 speaking parts had been unfairly given to relatives of staff 
members. Instead of opening doors for local talent, Imagenation created jobs for its own 
staff.292 While the mere existence of such an article was a novelty, the content did not 
surprise media professionals but instead confirmed what they had already believed, known, 
or suspected. The case shows how the atmosphere of rumours cannot be broken by singular 
attempts to publicly discuss what is going on behind the self-marketing and dispel the 
rumours. On the contrary, singular scandals only make unconfirmed rumours the more 
trustworthy.293 
As a result the one-stop-shop plan of the Abu Dhabi media zone is already suspect. 
The outlined corporation with global media producers and training programmes of local 
talents can lead to unintended consequences in the long run. The company may foster 
young talents from UAE universities who will have a different perspective on the company’s 
politics and eventually push for change. As for the present what seems like a big step 
towards the development of local media production is struggling to reconcile its interests in 
opening but at the same time controlling media production. While in Dubai the 
exclusiveness of the media zones over time influenced the local media towards more 
exchange with the global media, the pre-conditions in Abu Dhabi already have the image of 
de-diversifying the media landscape and going backwards from pseudo-privatisation to 
government monopolisation of the media. How this monopoly creates its image as globally 
up-to-date local TV is illustrated by a review of the channels in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
 
 
3.1.5 Local TV with global profile: a comparison between Abu Dhabi’s and Dubai’s 
channels 
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The difficulty of being both globally significant and locally relevant is exemplified by 
the development of the Abu Dhabi TV Channel (ADTV). After the Iraq invasion of 2003, the 
channel changed direction and transformed into an entertainment channel. It was no longer 
in the role of cutting edge news-provider, but focused on national news while steering clear 
of any politically sensitive issues. After its brief but spectacular career as a global news 
channel in 2003, Abu Dhabi TV abandoned its name and political character and became Abu 
Dhabi Al Oula (“Abu Dhabi 1”, although still referred to as Abu Dhabi TV or ADTV by many). 
If the aim was to simply focus on a national media identity, the near-constant reinvention of 
ADTV ever since is a testament of the challenges Abu Dhabi has faced in creating one. 
Once again Dubai’s different strategy has been the more successful of the two: all 
seven channels of Dubai’s broadcasting company, Dubai Media Incorporated (DMI),294 are 
broadcast to the wider Gulf Region and cater to a multilingual and multiethnic audience. 
The Arabic news and programme channel Dubai TV targeting a transnational Arab audience, 
is complemented by the entertainment channel Sama Dubai, focussing especially the Gulf 
Region. It features the heritage programmes sponsored by the crown prince of Dubai, 
dramas in the local dialect, as well as new media content featuring Emiratis. The English 
language channel Dubai One combines both programmes and news for English speaking 
expatriates in the UAE, while the other four channels cater specific interests such as sport 
(Dubai Sports, Dubai Racing, Dubai Sports 2) and religion (Nour Dubai).295 While this array of 
specialised channels, on the one hand, pushed DMI’s more local aspect into a niche (Sama 
Dubai), it has also allowed them to promote the city across all its channels. DMI is itself 
outspoken about this intention: the website’s homepage proclaims that the corporation’s 
mission is to promote “the UAE and Dubai in particular, reflecting its success on all levels to 
the world.” 296  
DMI have also utilised what are perhaps the most obvious promotion tools: channel-
specific advertisements often called ‘stings’. Compressed into maximal thirty seconds, such 
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‘stings’ gain their power from their briefness and rapidity.297 In the case of DMI channels, 
the ‘stings’ often present Dubai as a modern urban society completely reconciled with its 
Arab Bedouin culture. But although the narrative presented in the ‘stings’ corresponds to 
that of the narrative presented in other forms of media, the ‘stings’ have not all been 
received well by management – or viewers.  
The revamped version of Dubai TV (premiered in 2004) featured a high-tech urban 
metropolis peopled by pearl fishers and horse-mounted Bedouins. In one such sting, a 
Bedouin and his steed are shown jumping over some of the city’s tallest buildings. According 
to the head of design, audiences’ reactions were mixed, and those who complained often 
did not offer any specific reasons for their dissatisfaction. Yet their omissions are important 
in themselves: the fact that viewers complained at all demonstrates how representative 
they deemed such advertisements to be of their culture and people. Their complaints 
against this new style show a sense of protectiveness towards the official identity ideology, 
which should remain unaltered as a cherished heritage. Despite this, DMI decided to go 
ahead with the sting because they were less preoccupied with their responsibility of 
representation than with remaining commercially in vogue. The designer recalled that 
executives had approved the project with the words “Yes, this is TV, it’s fine to do this.”298 
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Image No. 3. 1: Screenshots from the Sama Dubai ‘sting’ featuring Bedouins riding from the desert into the 
city of Dubai
299
 
 
 
While the Dubai media was more focused on the commercial aspect from the very 
start, leading to a more diversified range of programmes, Abu Dhabi TV, as the channel of 
the capital, has struggled to find its media identity as the mouthpiece of the nation. Shortly 
after the Emirati Media Incorporated (EMI) became the pseudo-private Abu Dhabi Media 
Company (ADMC) in 2007, the company revamped its existing channels and introduced new 
ones in an effort to emerge from their neighbour’s shadow. The family-oriented channel 
Abu Dhabi Al Oula, re-launched in 2008,300 features locally-produced American style talk and 
game shows. Its sister channel, Abu Dhabi Al Emarat (launched in 2000), was re-launched in 
2009 with new programmes targeted at younger audiences.301 The youngest of Abu Dhabi’s 
channels is Abu Dhabi Drama (launched in 2010), a 24/7 broadcasting service for Arabic 
series, as well as dubbed dramas without commercial breaks.302 Yet ADMC’s biggest 
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successes are both one of the oldest Abu Dhabi channels and a latest addition. The sports 
channel Abu Dhabi Al Riyadiya (launched in 1996) has established itself on a regional basis 
by acquiring exclusive rights for sporting events from the Gulf and detailed coverage of the 
Saudi football Professional League.303 The latest asset for ADMC was the company’s joint 
venture with the National Geographic Society (launched in 2009), which has finally given 
Middle Eastern viewers an Arabic language version of an incredibly popular and much-loved 
channel.304 These developments are telling for Abu Dhabi’s attempt to join the arena of 
popular media. Especially the newly found assets in sports and entertainment are 
procedures to attract mass audiences in a transnational level. In this context, the heritage 
TV channel acts as a reminiscence of the original local ideology of the channel. 
Securing business with such major global players established Abu Dhabi as a worthy 
competitor to Dubai, but while the former built an impressive infrastructure, the latter was 
busy building a global image. On the level of urban identity, Dubai was especially eager to 
develop its global image as a modern metropolis, distinguishable from others by having 
everything they had, but bigger, quicker, and with more modern versions: the largest 
racetracks, tallest buildings, largest shopping malls all can be found in this emirate and are 
all collectively part of this aim to distinguish its self. Abu Dhabi has often been described 
retrospectively as more conservative and cautious of globalising itself than Dubai.305 
Whereas the capital had frequently betrayed concern that locals would ‘misrepresent’ their 
culture to the outside world, Dubai had (despite a number of complaints) no qualms about 
marketing their own character. Abu Dhabi on the other hand is still in the process of finding 
its media image. The constant changes and re-launches have jeopardised its branding 
potential, recognisability.  
The problem has never been more apparent than when ADTV changed its logo in 
2009 as part of yet another re-launch of the ADMC. Whereas every DMI channel has its own 
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logo in order to demonstrate the distinctiveness of each, the ADMC decided that theirs 
would all share a common symbol, but each in its own colour. Not long before the re-
launch, ADTV had updated its falcon logo, but when the new version of the channel made its 
debut in 2009, the falcon had completely disappeared: ADTV’s utterly unique emblem (a 
falcon) had been replaced by a uniform diamond. The unification of design across the 
channels aptly reflects the politics of the Abu Dhabi media landscape, which is developing a 
centralised media under the umbrella of TwoFour54. Feedback however confirms that 
brands draw their strength from established stereotypes as interpretive material, such as 
the symbols of a Bedouin heritage. While even a pearl would have symbolised the official 
national ideology and thus the local industry, a diamond is just a generic icon in the 
Emirates. The new logo is as disconnected to the region as its predecessor was deemed 
characteristic of it.306 The abandonment of such an Emirate-specific symbol is significant for 
the experimental and unstable policies of Abu Dhabi’s TV industry. With several re-launches 
the channel tries to be neutral, but loses in character. 
It is inadvisable for a brand’s logo to be tampered with too much since doing that 
often leads it not to be instantly recognisable.307 This applies even more to a logo under 
which a company (or in this case the TV channel) has gained a reputation. Accordingly both 
students and media professionals disapproved of the new logo, stating that the falcon had 
been more representative of their culture. Their reactions show how naturalised symbols of 
the official identity are among Emiratis. Deducing, however, that Emiratis are hence in tune 
with everything the government ideology wishes Emirati identity to be would be hasty. DMI 
has maintained a stronger brand by avoiding alterations of their existing brands throughout 
their re-launch in 2008. This is evidenced by their retention of Sama Dubai logo: despite 
modernising the channel in various other ways, the corporation did not want to dispose of 
so distinctive an image.308 Its calligraphic typography and stylised desert horizon make it the 
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most picturesque amongst all the Emirati channels. It also serves to visually connect the 
channel to the region.309  
On the whole Abu Dhabi television channels are still struggling to compete with 
Dubai. Both DMI and ADMC promote their media productions as distinguishably Emirati yet 
globally compatible and competitive. They deliver “the national story”310 while at the same 
time being “committed to create a new Emirati media generation.”311 But while DMI has 
always been focussed on the emirate of Dubai, ADMC currently struggles to be both: the 
voice of the unified UAE and the promoter of the new brand of Abu Dhabi. Dubai Sports for 
example aims to be “a monument media in line with the title of the city of Dubai, the capital 
of the sport in the Middle East, [...] always working to promote the good reputation of Dubai 
and the United Arab Emirates as a country which can host perfect international sporting 
events due to its sophisticated equipment and qualified administrative staff and stable 
security.”312 Since its re-launch in 2008 Abu Dhabi sports channel (Abu Dhabi Al Riyadiya) 
goes one step further, proclaiming its aim to position “Abu Dhabi as the world capital of 
sports”,313 which is in line with recent endeavours of the Abu Dhabi government to profile 
the emirate as a stage for international sporting events such as the Formula One. Similar to 
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the establishment of the media zones in both emirates the pattern in media development 
seems to be that Dubai is more on the cutting edge of developments with Abu Dhabi trying 
to benefit and learn from its experiences. Overall, creating new channels and re-launching 
their brands does not suffice to establish a media identity. The production of convincing 
content however poses a problem due to restrictions imposed by the UAE media law. The 
dimensions of its influence will be discussed in the following section.  
 
 
3.2 Modifying forms of censorship 
 
The last valid version of the law on publications and publishing goes back to 1980.314 
After an expansion in 1982, another proposed amendment was made in 2009, but has not 
been ratified as to date. How the media law practically controls the UAE media is the subject 
of the first part of this section. As per the law, the government does not allow any criticism 
of the ruling elite, including grievances of people living in the Emirates, which might lead to 
a public dialogue which could question or criticise the government. The National Media 
Council (NMC), as the government institution which enforces the media law, induces 
journalists and media producers to exercise self censorship, a practice strongly relying on 
individual agents and their understandings of what should be in the media. But with internet 
access and international satellite TV, banning imported media and censoring local content 
cannot prevent unpleasant topics from emerging in public discussion. Furthermore, a 
restrictive media does not support the country’s image as a modern media hub. How the 
local media tries to avoid losing credibility as a provider of information is discussed in the 
second part of the current section. 
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While the daily news tries to modify information in favour of the UAE government, 
the national TV shifts attention away from political topics altogether. The last part of this 
section will thus show how Al Jazeera as a global role model for a local channel was 
abandoned and made way for pure entertainment programmes. The more commercialised 
image of the UAE media (achieved by privatisation) seemingly justifies the entertainment 
channels, which import and copy best-selling shows from other countries and neglect more 
serious socio-political topics.315 
 
 
3.2.1 A media law to ‘protect’ the country’s integrity 
 
The media law’s list of banned content ranges from general journalistic ethical 
guidelines (such as libel, slander, violation of privacy, unbalanced coverage, etc.316) to 
matters of state security (publication of military communications, etc.317) and country-
specific taboos. The latter includes slander; criticism of or “blemishing” the image of the 
local rulers. This rule extends to the presidents of any Arab, Islamic or friendly countries318. 
Anything deemed insulting to Islam, as well as any news which could cause “harm to the 
national currency”,319 are also forbidden. Particularly interesting for media dealing with 
cultural and social topics are articles 72 and 77. The former states that “no opinions shall be 
published if they violate public discipline and order, or involve insult to teenagers, or call for 
or circulate subversive ideas.” This leaves a lot of room for interpretation. The latter is 
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formulated in the same broad-brush way stating that “no article defaming Arabs and their 
civilisation and heritage shall be published”. 
While the publishing law is mostly open to interpretation, every case automatically 
goes to court, and the penalties range from fines and publication ‘impoundment’320 to its 
closure and/or imprisonment of the offending employee for a minimum of a month.321 In 
the majority of cases imprisonment is avoided by the payment of a fine, but editors and 
journalists are aware that should a complaint be made, legal proceedings will swiftly be 
initiated against them. Given that a foreigner’s stay in the UAE is dependent on his/her 
employment, expatriates could potentially endanger their residency in the country even if 
they were to win such a case.322 The first recourse in cases of false information, slander, and 
related offences is to demand that the newspaper print a correction or a retraction. If the 
paper declines to do so, the editor or editor-in-chief faces imprisonment for a minimum of 
six months and/ or a fine of 1000-10,000 AED.323 The potential prosecution of journalists is 
the most frequently criticised aspect of the media law, but strangely (and fortunately) this is 
not all that regular an occurrence. 
A recent legal fracas was sparked by the Dubai daily Al-ʿImārāt al-Yawm’s 2006 
allegations of horse doping at the Warsan Stables, whose owners promptly sued. 
Unfortunately for the defendant, this meant that the paper was taken to court in 2007 by 
the rulers of Abu Dhabi; regrettably for the petitioners, the publication belongs to Dubai’s 
ruler Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashed Al Maktoum. The protraction of the proceedings 
suggests that they may have been accompanied by a diplomatic quarrel: although the 
court’s verdict had already been reported by Reporters Sans Frontières in 2008, the 
sentence was not executed until 2009.324 The editor-in-chief, Sami Al Riyami, and the CEO of 
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the Arab Media Group, Abdul Latif Al Sayegh, were each fined 20,000 AED (almost 3,500 
GBP) and the paper was closed for twenty days, after which it continued as normal.325 
Despite international indignation the CEO of Al-ʿImārāt al-Yawm did not challenge the court 
ruling, but the incident promoted the topic of journalistic freedom in Emirati public 
discourse. The revised media law draft of 2008, which revokes the incarceration of 
journalists as a potential punishment, has to date not been passed.326 Whether the 
government intends to pass the law at all is doubtful. The public proclamation of the draft is 
a political move to demonstrate the government’s readiness to promote freedom of speech. 
The fact that media control remains in place is thus obscured by publicising and discussing 
the law in the local news and with the local Journalist Association. 
As the regulatory body of the media, The National Media Council (NMC) deals with 
consumer complaints and distribution requests from producers: every professional has to 
obtain a licence before they may publish original content or even distribute imported 
material.327 What specific content the publisher or distributor then decides to circulate is 
left his decision. . When, for example, the Sunday Times published a picture of Sheikh 
Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum sinking into the Gulf in 2010 (as a satirical take on Dubai’s 
financial misery), the paper’s distributor decided not to circulate the issue. Foreign 
cinematic films have to be approved by the NMC before they can be shown in any local 
cinema, which allows members of the council to edit them before screening. Films to be 
shown on television are, however, censored by the broadcasting editors themselves, 
generally by cutting any scenes of a sexual nature. 
A spokesman from the NMC remarked that there is a striking misconception 
amongst media producers and journalists about how much protection their rights for 
personal expression afford them.328 According to him, these professionals “don’t explore all 
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of their possibilities” and instead stick to what they consider ‘safe’ material.329 The 
representative also suggested that there may have been another misunderstanding 
regarding the role of the Council itself: provided that they do not flagrantly flout the law, 
professionals could be assured that the Media Council are there to assist them should 
complaints arise. He gave the example of an Al Khaleej Times article in which the writer 
criticised the management of Al Ain Zoo:330 a member of the ruling family with a managerial 
position at the zoo swiftly called the NMC and demanded action. The Council, however, 
informed the complainant that the article’s claims were well-supported and therefore could 
not amount to libel. Consequently, no further action was taken against the writer or the 
publication.  
The NMC is eager to promote itself as an institution that champions Emirati values 
and protects locals from material that would surely offend them. During our interview, the 
spokesman suggested there was content local citizens do not want to see on television, just 
as they consider certain behaviour and clothing unacceptable in public. He held 
“multicultural differences” responsible for the majority of NMC-imposed bans and 
repeatedly identified Western journalists as a cause of friction.331 According to the NMS 
spokesman many journalists from the new daily newspaper The National were ignorant of 
the local culture and unwilling to respectfully adapt to Emirati sentiments. He mentioned 
the example of a publication that had advertised a holiday in Israel, which the UAE deems 
an illegitimate state. The NMC considered it outrageous for a local newspaper to promote 
travel there when Emirati citizens are forbidden from doing so: the Emirates even prohibit 
foreigners from entering the country if they have visited this state previously. Regardless of 
whether or not the advert was aimed at expatriates, the promotion was clearly at odds with 
the nation’s political stance and, as far as the spokesman was concerned, with public ethos. 
The examples show how much the cultural backgrounds of the journalists can challenge the 
media content the government wishes to provide. As controlling body the NMC envisions 
itself as an educative institution which protects local culture. The spokesman of the NMC 
did not see himself as an agent of government ideology but a protector of ‘the public’. His 
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statements show his conviction that government and Emirati nationals shared one notion of 
‘good media’, while foreign journalists could disrupt the social peace and had to be 
reprimanded accordingly. 
  
 
3.2.2 An atmosphere of uncertainty and anticipatory compliance 
 
There remains a considerable discrepancy between what is officially sanctioned and 
what is actually undertaken in the Emirates, which can both confuse and incense writers 
unfamiliar with local journalistic customs. The UAE’s stance on Israel has proven particularly 
difficult to maintain in recent years thanks to Emirati eagerness to play host to international 
conventions and sporting events. Accordingly a considerable degree of lenience to act in 
conformity with the government’s official stand towards Israel has been exercised: in 2003, 
Israeli representatives came to Dubai for the International Monetary Fund’s annual 
meeting; in 2004, Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum declared that a school for 
Middle Eastern athletes would also accept Israeli students;332 in October 2009, the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)’s meeting in Abu Dhabi was attended by 
Israeli cabinet minister Uzi Landau (the first ever visit to the Emirates by an Israeli official). 
While even Landau made it quite clear that the UAE were contractually obliged to allow all 
the agency’s members to participate,333 allowing an Israeli into the country was an obvious 
concession on the nation’s part. The Israeli flag had even made a very visible début 
appearance in Abu Dhabi at the convention ‒ a fact which attracted international attention, 
but was not reported in any local news.  
It is not difficult to understand why journalists may have thought better of reporting 
the IRENA incident. The law after all prohibits any new which would set a negative light on 
the government. Emirati leaders welcoming representatives of a nation they do not 
acknowledge would hardly have been received well by locals, make the government appear 
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inconsistent, and hence would likely render the reporters liable for prosecution. The mere 
threat of legal action is therefore sufficient to limit the roles of news reporters to 
spokespeople of an official narrative. An excellent example of this is provided by the case of 
Shahar Peer, who was prevented from entering the Emirates when she tried to attend the 
Women’s Tennis Association (WTA)’s Dubai Championships in 2009. The stunt was a clear 
violation of WTA rules and had great potential to ruin the Emirate’s sporting aspirations. It 
was also incredibly hypocritical given the events of recent years: Sheikh Mohamed’s 
announcement in 2004 had indicated that athletes were not the intended target of any 
political hostility. Despite the incoherence of the measure (not to mention the international 
outrage that accompanied it), local news reported the debacle, albeit in a fairly neutral 
manner.334 The tone of the report however showed that that the news must, to some 
extent, have anticipated nationals to be supportive of the state’s stern stance towards the 
Israeli sportswoman. To ensure this, the report was framed by a reference to recent events 
in Gaza.335 Such so-called ‘anticipatory compliance’ demonstrates how the regime is able to 
steer both the media and public opinion in any direction they so desire.  
The strategy has occasionally backfired: when this happens, the local rulers find 
themselves in an even more difficult predicament than the one that journalists face on a 
nearly daily basis. The most striking (and famous) example of this is the much disputed and 
torture case of Sheikh Issa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, whose violent attack on a Pakistani was 
filmed and leaked on the internet in 2010. While all the papers in the land claim to be 
committed to open reporting, they are almost all officially government-owned. Often by the 
ruling families themselves, as in the case of Al-ʿImārāt al-Yawm owned by the ruler of 
Dubai, or in the case of The National owned by Abu Dhabi’s crown prince. Although criticism 
or defamation of the local rulers is illegal under Chapter 7 of the media law,336 failing to 
mention an event which the nation was already well aware of would have made the entire 
ruling family seem at best hypocritical and at worst, supportive of Sheikh Issa’s actions. The 
local media was thus able to exercise an unusual degree of journalistic freedom and report 
the atrocity, as not doing so would have been even more damaging. So, international 
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attention can act as a bargaining chip in journalists’ negotiations of existing censorship. 
Overall, the media law and its application create an atmosphere of uncertainty as to what is 
permitted. Accordingly, it is the personal interpretation and interests of the media makers 
themselves which function as flexible regulators of media. It is this reliance on how 
individuals evaluate and negotiate potential conflicts that ultimately constitutes self-
censorship. As these interpretations vary on both a cultural and an individual basis, the 
proportionately large number of foreign journalists has the potential to both create conflict 
and prompt pre-emptive obedience depending on what they have experienced of 
censorship in their own countries. The NMC member quoted previously remarked that the 
first generation of journalists who came to the UAE were from Egypt and Sudan and 
therefore had a far more established framework of self-censorship. He reiterated that his Al 
Ain Zoo article was permitted because the facts were correct and that in his opinion, these 
journalists had been too cautious to even research certain stories. According to the 
spokesman The National has quite the opposite problem: while its largely Western staff 
introduced a more commentary style of journalism, the new reporters had to be ‘made 
aware’ of what is acceptable to write as an employee of a UAE newspaper.337 The NMC has 
worked closely with The National to date and even provides training for the paper’s staff in 
order to ‘sensitise’ them to local customs – in other words, to give them lessons in self-
censorship. 
 
 
3.2.3 Deflecting public scandals 
 
Practices of self-censorship in the UAE demonstrate the strength of what Bourdieu 
called a people's "sense of limits", or their naturalisation of social boundaries to the extent 
that these are perceived almost as physical divides: making the possibility of transgression 
seem almost fantastical.338 The theorist observed that over time the arbitrary nature of 
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social orders is obscured, so that the categories once established for specific purposes 
seem, in hindsight, 'real'. Bourdieu also differentiated between 'objective' and 'internalised' 
orders: while the former may be empirically demonstrated, the latter will always be 
experienced as 'real' no matter what the evidence to the contrary. Such a theory supports 
the belief of the NMC spokesman (whose interview was detailed in the previous section) 
that Arab journalists have in the past been unwilling to publish material that the Council 
would not censor anyway. 
There are many professionals who, despite having what Bourdieu would call an 
'objective' take on censorship, have unwittingly become its agents. An example of this was 
provided by the English editor-in-chief of Gulf News, a popular English-language newspaper. 
He described how the paper negotiated with official censorship on a daily basis by ringing 
up the NMC whenever news involved official people or topics related to the economy. 
Especially during the financial crisis, involving Dubai World in 2010,339 Gulf News editors 
would insist on reporting, and therefore had to follow a diplomatic route in close 
negotiation with the NMC.340 His decision makes perfect practical sense: rather than risk 
publishing an article which could unexpectedly earn him a lawsuit, the editor gives the NMC 
full disclosure before the stories even go to press. By allowing the Council to detect 
potentially incendiary material, he has removed his own legal responsibility to do so and has 
therefore limited his professional (and personal) liability. He has simultaneously empowered 
the NMC by making them directly responsible for content featured and, in doing so, 
invalidated his position as editor-in-chief. While he has clearly refused to internalise the 
framework of censorship, he has also sacrificed his autonomy – and made his own role 
redundant. 
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Bourdieu believed that societies naturalise their own orders and so struggle to 
identify certain cultural attitudes as anything other than natural. Similarly, Foucault's theory 
of 'problematisation' suggests that in order to effect social change, this process must 
essentially be reversed. By scrutinising phenomena that have never previously been a 
subject of analysis ('problematising' them), public discourse can affect change by merely 
promoting the notion that change is possible.341 The ever shifting media landscape of the 
UAE presents the ideal conditions in this respect. 
Banning imported media is not always possible and can lead to discussions of topics 
censored in the local media. In the UAE a major incident which attracted so much 
international attention that the government had to deal with it in the public media sphere 
was the aforementioned torture video case of Sheikh Issa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. When, in 
April 2009, ABC news published a video showing the half-brother of the ruler and a police 
officer in uniform torturing a former business partner, the UAE’s censorship authority TRA 
blocked all websites showing the video. The image-damaging dispute between the US 
government and the government of the UAE which followed was not reported in the local 
news until the international pressure and attention had become so strong that any further 
attempts to censor the information became counterproductive. Despite the blocking of all 
You Tube videos including the names or keywords describing the people involved, the 
torture video was repeatedly uploaded under misleading names. The trial against Sheikh 
Issa, which the US state department had demanded from the UAE government, was mainly 
ignored in the local media, until its final phase between December 2009 and end of January 
2010. The daily news repeated the evidence leading to the verdict, which was that the 
Sheikh had unknowingly been drugged by his accuser, Bassam Nabulsi, and tricked into 
committing the taped torture.342 Sheikh Issa was released due to “diminished liability” and his 
former accuser accused in turn. As an answer to the expected international protests against the 
show trial, the UAE Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed made the pythonesque statement 
                                                          
341
 In order for this evolution to occur, Foucault explained that people must firstly be sufficiently distanced 
from the phenomenon: “For a domain of action, a behaviour, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a 
certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity.” (Foucault, 1984. 
Polemic, Politics, and Problematizations, p.388.) 
342
 See: Morris, 2009. Issa Abuse Trial Draws to a Close. And: Youssef, 2009. Trial of Sheikh Issa Adjourns for 
Expert Testimony. 
139 
 
that the “government will not interfere in any court ruling”.343As ridiculous and scandalous as the 
affair seemed from an international perspective, the government’s strategy was a classical 
public relations move: dealing with a wider known fact which cannot be ignored and trying 
to turn a damaged image around, making a point of the UAE government not yielding to US 
demands. If the overall aim is to promote an image of uncensored media, the strategy is 
certainly more likely to succeed than the banning and jamming tactic. The former UAE 
Minister of Information, Sheikh Abdullah, stated in 2001 that “governments can no longer 
control the dissemination of information to their citizens.”344 Aware of neither having direct 
force over public opinion, nor the means to ban and jam all information from global media, 
an article from January 2011 went further to the “attack is the best defence”-strategy. The 
article accused the American human rights organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) of 
being inaccurate and exaggerating in its attacks against human rights, especially of migrant 
workers and journalists, in the UAE.345 
While HRW had attacked the UAE’s violation of international human rights at least 
since 2006, more attention has been given to the situation of UAE migrant workers since 
2009. The Abu Dhabi Saadiyat Island project for a cultural district in collaboration with the 
Louvre Paris and the Guggenheim New York put the labour situation under a spotlight and 
added pressure on the UAE government as well as the involved museums agencies, not to 
allow the project to develop at costs of humane working conditions.346 Whereas before 
HRW reports were only mentioned in the UAE when accusing other countries of violations, 
the international attention on the UAE case changed the coverage of HRW in the local news. 
After reporting HRW’s concerns for the labourers in May 2009347 and the UAE government’s 
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rejection of the report on the same day,348 more and more articles appeared questioning 
directly or indirectly HRW’s integrity and highlighting local concerns for human rights. An 
article entitled “Does HRW have a hidden agenda?”349 was published alongside the 
accusations and rejections in May 2009. The following year HRW admitting that the UAE had 
undergone efforts to improve their human rights situation was published under the 
headline “UAE scores better on human rights issues”,350 along with an article entitled “HRW 
reports are subjective and selective”. The articles, often written in a polemic defensive style, 
repeatedly make the UAE appear to be a victim of a smear campaign, with sentences such as 
“Yet again, Human Rights Watch goes after the UAE continuing its sweeping generalisations”.
351  
 
 
3.2.4 A new style of journalism: reporting ‘with an angle’ 
 
The examples above show how the government channels the process of 
problematising the status quo, which could ultimately challenge it, by controlling small 
changes in UAE journalism. This enables the government to promote the image of 
supporting open media while in reality keeping a firm grip over its main postulate: no 
criticism of the ruling elite or challenge of the legitimacy of the government. The example of 
The National newspaper demonstrates how this strategy is implemented ‒ not only in cases 
of international scandals. In 2006 Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed announced the launch of 
Abu Dhabi's first locally published English newspaper, The National. A shift towards a more 
controversial media could be expected. Just as Al Jazeera had taken its crew from the BBC, 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed hired professionals from such esteemed publications as The 
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. These hiring choices encouraged the belief that 
The National would be run differently from its main competitor, Gulf News, whose content 
(as aforementioned) was practically chosen by the government directly. Following in the 
footsteps of the most successful Arab media institution in the world invites comparisons: as 
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the recently-established media zones demonstrated, the rulers are serious about expanding 
the industry, and compete with the Qatari media empire. The most important appointment 
was the editor-in-chief position, for which Sheikh Mohammed hired former Daily Telegraph 
editor Martin Newland, who was described by British colleagues as “press freedom 
pioneer."352 The choice was a signal that this paper would not be just another government 
exercise in self-flattery. Foreign media praised the decision as “Making Waves in the Desert” 
by initiating a "cultural revolution."353 An Emirati TV presenter described how he kept a 
watchful eye on The National: 
 
“I want to see how they see our issues, because they don’t have many red 
lines – but we, as locals, we have them. We have to watch out too much. 
They [The National] can reach more people than us and more important 
people than us. Because -, I don't know - that's what I notice." 354 
 
The National indeed deviated from the existing style of 'mouthpiece reporting' and 
featured stories that would never have been included in other publications, particularly 
ones involving infant deaths. The paper frequently reports on cases of children who have 
died as a result of unwitting parental neglect355 and, more shockingly, on newborn babies 
found abandoned in public places. It was the first time some of the more sordid aspects of 
Emirati society had made it into print. Nevertheless, what the quoted presenter called “red 
lines”, meaning taboo topics, also exist for The National. The paper only seemingly reports 
on ‘everything’ by using the same journalistic style observed in the Sheikh Issa case. Its 
portrayal of the country aims to distract readers from its state-enforced omissions. 
This practice towards government officials and general criticism of the government 
from the outside reaches to all executive parts of the government administration. The most 
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demonstrable example of this was the case of British tourist Lee Bradley Brown, who 
mysteriously died while detained in Dubai police custody.356 His example illustrates how the 
UAE media has moved away from its policy of “just the good news, please”357 towards a 
media style which is equally unchallenging for any governmental institutions. The ‘bad news’ 
of a tourist dying in UAE police custody is not excluded but presented in a way which does 
not point a finger at the police. Instead the report highlights the immoral actions of the 
tourist, who violated public decency and religious values thus insinuating that he himself 
was the initiator of his predicament. The British press reported that an anonymous inmate 
claimed he had been beaten to death, and maintained that he had not been drinking. The 
National (like every other local media outlets) stuck to the official line that the drunken 
Brown had choked on his own vomit, thus turning the story into a warning to where a 
wanton life leads to.358 A similar strategy is applied in other cases of negative stories. Even 
if, for example the daily newspapers report on such shocking incidents as the abandonment 
of newborn infants, the articles never attempt to examine why this was so common in the 
Emirates. The fact that hospitals will refuse to treat women in labour unless they are 
married is never even alluded to.359 
The confluence of direct censorship, self-censorship and a specific journalistic style 
makes the observation of the NMC spokesman that journalists do not explore the 
possibilities the media law permits them appear cynical. Despite any perceived limitations 
the fear of unemployment or worse is very real. How dangerous it can be to voice an 
unwanted opinion has become eminent in 2010 when the Dubai blogger Ahmed Mansoor 
was arrested and detained for calling for election boycotts.360 
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3.2.5 Distraction from socio-political topics through mass-entertainment 
 
Looking at local UAE television, a de-politicising strategy can clearly be observed in the case 
of the nation’s capital television, Abu Dhabi TV (ADTV). Established in 1969 as a news channel for 
the nation, it was revamped in 2001. Media researcher Jihad Fakhreddine argued that with 
the re-launch Abu Dhabi TV aimed to follow the profile of the Saudi-owned satellite channel 
which combined both political programmes and entertainment.361 Whether this was the 
goal or not, the change is significant: Abu Dhabi TV with its characteristic Falcon Logo had 
become famous during the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, when even Al Jazeera quoted 
its live reports. The channel caused global excitement when it aired alleged tapes of a 
fugitive Saddam Hussein for example362 or an interview with the Iraqi Minister of 
Information.363 This profiling of ADTV was not only approved by the government but under 
direct supervision of then Minister of Information, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, who as head 
of the channel was working closely together with the reporters in the newsroom.364 
However, after the Iraq war the channel disappeared from international attention (unlike Al 
Arabiya and of course Al Jazeera) and focussed on entertainment programmes. 
Fakhreddine argues that in order to compete, ADTV had to choose between news 
and entertainment. He explains that “experiences of the main US news networks 
demonstrate to us that one premium-quality main news programme could be an anchor 
programme in a premium-quality general entertainment TV channel.“365 The argument that 
ADTV saw itself forced to decide towards one or the other priority is not convincing. Even if 
ADTV had a phase of experimenting, the success of the news programme encouraged the 
continuation of this priority. Reporters who are still working for ADTV’s newsroom looked 
back nostalgically to the time when their channel was a vanguard of live journalism and not 
having been given any explanation for the shift of priority, they assumed that diplomatic 
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reasons were behind the decision.366 It is likely that the US foreign office did not approve of 
yet another Arab news channel (next to Al Jazeera) damaging the image of the US troops in 
Iraq and the UAE government would have complied with the wishes of its powerful ally. 
Whatever the explanation, the channel changed its focus, inexplicably to the 
reporters. The move confirms the remark Hafez makes about Arab satellite channels: “They 
are allowed to be populist and market-oriented as long as they do not go too far and 
become a real danger for existing regimes. A channel like Al Jazeera, which is at the centre 
of many debates about Arab democracy, can still be closed down at the whim of its patron 
government.”367 Looking at the development of the UAE media landscape, the observation 
Hafez makes can be extended: the media is not only ‘allowed’ to be populist and market-
oriented, but encouraged to do so. Since 2007 (the official re-launch being in 2008) the 
focus has been on family programmes, series, in-house produced talk shows and game 
shows in the style of American reality shows.368 The pseudo-privatisation of the 
government-owned Emirates Media Incorporated (EMI) into the shareholding Abu Dhabi 
Media Company (ADMC) in 2007 sealed the image change from trying to be a global news 
provider to a global entertainment provider. On a business level the channel has reached 
out to global media players such as National Geographic, Walt Disney, and CNN to establish 
Arabic language channels in the emirate. All provide entertainment for trans-national 
audiences. 
This opening of the media to international companies does not challenge the 
established patterns of control and censorship, but distracts from their existence. It is the 
proactive counterpart to restrictions, ensuring that media remains worthwhile, even though 
they are deprived of information-value. Making media a successful entertainment business 
leaves the government’s image untarnished: after all, the government supports the local 
media to become an internationally-recognised entity. The media zones support this overall 
                                                          
366
 One presenter for example said: “Everybody was watching Abu Dhabi TV. That time I was working there: I 
proudly say ‘Yes, I used to work there! I was working there at that time!’” (Al Zaabi, 2009. Being a Presenter in 
Abu Dhabi TV, [Recorded interview].) 
367
 Hafez, 2004. Arab Satellite Broadcasting: An Alternative to Political Parties? 
368
 The image change to a programme-oriented channel already started in 2007 with the introduction of new 
reality shows and programmes, a new brand and a new executive director appointed in 2008 to execute the 
updated image. Being the main television channel of Abu Dhabi, the re-launch has deeply influenced the image 
of the whole Abu Dhabi television landscape. (See: Staff-Reporter, 2008. About the Channel.) 
145 
 
image of the UAE being aware of, and open to, its own ‘globality’. Simultaneously, the 
localisation of popular media formats adds to a distinct Emirati identity. ADTV for example 
copied the game show “Who wants to become a millionaire” and launched two poetry 
competition shows (“Prince of poets” and “Poet of the million”). Especially the latter, which 
promotes poems in Bedouin dialects, directly refers to a local identity. Together with the 
channels’ brands (stings), they ensure that the media does not dissolve in a mainstream of 
transnational entertainment businesses. 
The strategy conceals the government’s unwillingness to make the local media a 
platform for the national community. Instead, audiences become consumers of narratives 
produced for them by the media companies. This strategy is linked to a shift of audience 
notion, which the head of the programming department of ADMC marked by stating that 
“we don’t speak of audience anymore, we are talking about viewers.” As ‘viewers’ the UAE 
nationals become receivers of the government’s notion of nationhood, culture, and what 
should be screened on TV. Which role the people acting on this screen play in this scenario 
will be examined in the following chapter through the experiences of Emirati media 
professionals. Their accounts demonstrate the scope of a controlling structure which goes 
beyond restriction to modelling individuals into agents of the government’s idea of national 
media. 
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4. A screen for representation: Emirati TV presenters as symbols of 
national identity 
 
 
In order to reconcile commercial and ideological interests, the government media 
cannot merely follow the examples of transnational satellite channels such as mbc or Al 
Jazeera. Within the national ideology, the media has to remain representative of the local 
identity. The need to provide local content was described by the head of the design 
department of DMI, who stated, “as local channels we are stuck in the identity issue, 
whereas the global satellite channels want to get out of it.”369 From the perspective of the 
content developers, this problem is tackled through the stings and visual branding of the 
channels, which draw from symbols of the collection of Bedouin identity images and 
symbols. But the strategy of the media goes beyond such images by trying to provide 
programmes of local interest with news and topics from within the country. Of equal 
importance to having the necessary design-teams capable of creating representations of the 
UAE, the channels rely on media professionals to function as agents of the national identity. 
These media professionals have to be fostered to ensure their loyalty to the government’s 
media policy. The following chapter will explore how the national television is set up as a 
space for national identity and which roles the people interacting on screen take in this 
scenario. The perspective of Emiratis working for the local TV will illustrate how presenters 
and scriptwriters experience the media domain and their possibilities to develop within it. 
Their views on the industry they are working in confirm that the structures of control are 
more complex than mere censorship and de-politicisation would suggest. Behind the scenes 
of the local TV the constellation of people contributing to the media mirrors on a small scale 
how individual Emiratis can act in the public domain. The restrictions develop into patterns 
of interaction and perceptions on the community of media professionals they feel 
themselves belonging to. The interviewed people may reflect on mishaps, or find roles 
which give them a sense of personal achievement, but fail to overcome the roles they are 
forced into. Why they are unable to form sub-communities to challenge the existing 
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structure from below is due to several factors. Part 4.1 will investigate how presenters 
envision their own roles in an industry which restricts individual expression to an elite 
entitled by the government. Their experiences indicate possible frictions between 
government control and the ambitions of media professionals. The working atmosphere in 
the channels deflects rising criticism mainly by disparaging the validity of individual opinions 
whilst simultaneously offering incentives for employees. The roles designed for media 
professionals can be perceived as attractive, especially for Emirati women, as the interviews 
will show. Becoming a reporter or presenter offers them an alternative role and level of 
visibility which can be perceived as a way of evading other social roles.  
While, in some cases, the framework provided by the media industry delivers 
inspirations and opportunities, the restrictive structures have developed into a media 
industry that goes beyond a mere discouragement of individuals from developing their 
individual potentials. Part 4.2 will explore how in an attempt to make the media 
recognisably Emirati while still restricting content the TV channels have developed a 
structure which focuses merely on public visibility. In other words, the images use Emirati 
content while topics from Emirati society are oppressed. This does not only reduce 
individual presenters to mere tokens of local identity, but makes them representations of 
the official identity narrative. Especially the public visibility of women is central for the 
image of the nation as ‘modern’ and ‘developed.’ Thus the women have to contest 
juxtaposed notions of forms of public expression acceptable for them. The section will also 
argue that the representations of publics on the screen ultimately enforce a certain way of 
seeing and interpreting other forms of public social action. By entering the public domain, 
the individual inevitably will be perceived as representative and evaluated on the grounds of 
entitlement and plausibility of such representation. As a result the structure discourages 
people to appear and re-enact their personal opinions of identities on the platform of the 
media – a phenomenon which is at the same time criticised.  
 
 
4.1 The role of ‘Emirati presenter’: sticking to the script 
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The following sections are based on interviews with presenters and reporters, mainly 
working for ADTV. They took place as one-to-one interviews as well as two focus groups. 
The presenters were freelancers who I met while monitoring their respective shows. The 
reporters were part of the news department of ADMC. While the presenters did not have a 
close connection to their fellow presenters, the reporters were a close-knit team who 
shared their office space and due to irregular working hours had developed close working 
relationships and sometimes friendships. Several reporters had been part of the team 
before the re-launch of ADTV towards entertainment. They remembered the time when the 
news department had been the centre of the channel’s campus and activity with some 
nostalgia. The participants of the focus groups were six Emirati female scriptwriters, film 
editors and researchers of different age groups. Some had been employed by the channel 
for over a decade, whilst others were newcomers. During the focus groups we discussed 
their ambitions as media professionals. Taken together, the perspectives of the thirteen 
interviewees on the media industry illustrate from a micro level how the government 
implements its strategy of control and with what results.  
Three aspects will be examined in this context. The first section will show how the 
existing media setup is justified through a set of values. These can function as ideological 
gatekeepers which prevent employees from challenging the limits of the media sphere. The 
previous chapter has demonstrated the strategy of de-politicising the local media. 
Accordingly, the TV channels are obliged to show the government and its representatives in 
the best possible light. Media professionals can experience this rule as being forced into a 
role of submission. Therefore it is important for the channels to circulate narratives which 
relate these limitations to accepted notions, thus deflecting possible criticism of the 
government. The lack of accountability of public figures towards the media will lead to the 
second aspect of this section. The ruling elite dictate the setting, style, and content of the 
media, thus dictating their ‘public visibility’. To ensure this, media professionals are 
moulded into the role of mere supernumeraries. The training programmes for TV presenters 
foster this role and preserve the media space as a stage for people entitled to speak 
publicly. While many employees interpreted the lack of skills as an overall backwardness of 
the local media, the review will indicate that here is another form of indirect censorship: the 
denial of know-how and content. With all these restrictions the question arises what 
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attractions the media industry can hold for Emirati media professionals. The last section will 
show why female Emirati presenters found the roles they are forced to play in the media an 
attractive career option. Finding alternatives to genderised spaces is only one incentive 
offered to them. The examples will show that they feel part of the official national narrative 
of distinction and pioneer spirit. 
 
 
4.1.1 A hierarchy of values legitimising the lack of media power 
 
The following experience of an ADTV reporter exemplifies just how the channels lose 
in significance in this scenario and how this is perceived by reporters working for it. The 
reporter recalled CNN’s live interview with the UAE’s Minister of Economic Affairs, Sheikha 
Lubna Al Qasimi. As the interview was to be aired from the premises of ADTV, the news 
section inquired whether she could use the occasion to grant them an interview too: their 
request was declined.370 Although her refusal may have had purely practical reasons, such 
as a full schedule, the reporter perceived it as a sign of disinterest in being interviewed by 
the channel of her country and even of disrespect towards the local presenters. For the 
reporter the incident showed that the local media had no power, even over their own public 
figures. This seemed even more ironic since, in his own words, ADTV would be more than 
willing to edit the interview to Sheikha Lubna’s advantage, unlike channels like CNN which 
would utilise even the silence of political figures to tarnish their reputation. He said that: 
 
“The other channels, Reuters, BBC, whatever, they will say the idea [of the 
event], and they will talk about everything and they will cover the event and 
say at last, ‘We tried to [ask for] any comment, but the minister did not give 
us an answer.’ –This is the difference [to our local channels]!”371 
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The story told by the reporter illustrates that he is aware of the fact that the Emirati 
media has no public power and is not deemed a relevant public space even to local 
personalities. The media has no power to hold them accountable or induce any public figure 
to answer questions they do not wish. Officially this lack of accountability is justified and 
thus legitimised as culturally specific. A renowned Egyptian presenter and producer who 
works closely with the UAE government, describes the relationship between the local media 
and public figures rather differently: 
 
“Here in the Gulf we are very respectful of public personalities. Any 
public personality must embrace their audiences [sic] and the public, 
otherwise they shouldn't be on screen! However it is always difficult 
to find a balance, and sometimes sacrifices, whether in career or 
family, have to be made. I try to find a compromise. As a result of 
our Islamic culture we are not subject to as much invasion of privacy 
as many personalities in the West.”372 
 
The local opinion of media expressed here is that it does not have the right to 
demand information, and has to ‘respect’ public figures. Even those individuals (such as the 
ADMC employee discussed above) who think politicians should be compelled to address 
their public still believe that their privacy is paramount. While this may seem admirable in 
the wake of certain tabloids’ recent missteps, it also means that lack of accountability of 
public figures can be thinly disguised as ‘respect’, especially when it is argued to be 
‘culturally-specific.’ The presenter justified the lack of investigative journalism in the 
Emirates by distinguishing it from the sensationalist reporting of ‘the West’, implying that 
local media merely has higher ethical standards than those of Western paparazzi culture. In 
this way, people who act for an imagined public are legitimately de-publicised, which serves 
to obscure the origins of certain policies and set Emirati media’s ‘cultural’ practices at the 
top of an imagined hierarchy.  
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This hierarchy of values (cultural, religious, and hybrid) is not unchallenged. The 
aforementioned reporter, whose request for the interview was declined, did not perceive 
the limitations of the local media as cultural respect for public figures. For him it is 
important that media is relevant and popular with audiences. He describes how this can be 
achieved as follows: 
 
“Before, the media was just [here] to say what the government wanted to 
say, now the media is not: it’s about real media, it’s about what really 
happens in the street. People can see it in the street and on the screen, 
really, really, without doing any changes (editing).”373 
 
For the reporter “real” means an unedited transmission of happenings and people. 
This is contradicted by a supposedly respectful polishing of somebody’s image on screen. 
For the channels we have seen that ‘cultural acceptance’ prevails over such opinions. 
‘Culturally-sanctioned’ is what is sanctioned directly or indirectly by the government or 
whatever complies with the structures of media practice established over years and 
considered as safe. These vague notions are challenged by comparison to other media 
practices experienced by media employees in other channels, such as CNN in the case of the 
Emirati reporter. The argument of the Egyptian producer is designed to close any dispute on 
the subject by referring to the equally indistinct but unchallengeable notion of religious 
sentiments. Effectively the hierarchy of values prevents the phenomenon of 
problematisation from taking place: criticising the absence of a public discourse on 
accountability would mean to criticise an ‘Islamic’ identity. 
To safeguard the legitimacy of censorship on a daily basis an ideological justification 
by agents of the government media does not suffice. Media employees could contest the 
restrictions and try to change ways of making media. From the perspective of media 
executives it is therefore important to ensure compliance to the government’s ideal of 
national media: a stage for an elite of people who are officially entitled to speak. The 
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following examples illustrate how this exclusivity is complemented by a working 
environment which prevents media employees from becoming media personalities in their 
own right. 
 
 
4.1.2 Presenters in a state of immaturity and dependence 
 
To develop a public profile, a presenter not only needs professional qualifications 
but also relies on the cooperation of people she or he interviews or ‘presents’. Both 
requirements are difficult to meet for a presenter in the UAE TV industry, where presenters 
agreed that the internal training courses were insufficient: A senior presenter in Abu Dhabi 
summarised the predicament with the remark: “we still don’t have experience.” He went on 
to explain that the two weeks training he was offered by the ADMC could not even prepare 
a graduate to read the news in standard Arabic.374 Another presenter observed that there 
was no system in place to develop presenters’ skills after this initial induction, and feedback 
was rarely – if ever – offered:  
 
 “You don’t watch the programmes of your colleagues, for example now 
my colleague is on screen and nobody watches her. How is one to know 
whether one made a mistake or not? How is my colleague now on screen 
to know whether for example this colour suits her? There is just no follow-
up on these things, so with no follow up you just cannot know what you 
are doing right or wrong.”375 
 
The news presenter’s observation implies that professionals experience the 
atmosphere on set as disinterested, which cannot possibly inspire either professional pride 
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or what is colloquially known as a ‘team spirit’. His comment suggests that in lieu of training 
from the channel’s side the colleagues should support each other to enhance their shows. 
It is difficult to determine why this does not seem to happen. One reason could be that the 
reporters are simply too busy researching their own material to monitor others’ 
performances.376 Busy work schedules make sufficient training curricula even more 
important. Several presenters pointed out that the training centres in Dubai had promising 
curricula and Abu Dhabi already showed signs of following suit.377 Yet neither emirate 
actively promoted strong media personalities who could attract a sizable fan base.378 
Rather than merely reporting or reading from a script such presenters would have to be 
charismatic and independent enough to become a brand in their own right (famous for 
their specific attire, style of speech, or the topics they address for example). One news 
presenter described the need for strong media personalities in the UAE by comparing the 
local landscape to that of Lebanon: 
 
 “We don’t have the idea of an industry to develop local 
presenters… We don’t train them to become personalities, not 
like in Lebanon where they have real media personalities who are 
promoted by the TV industry, advertised etc…” 379 
 
This aspect is correlated with the lack of professional training: without capable staff 
it seems the local TV industry cannot boost them to become celebrities. A senior presenter 
in Abu Dhabi summarised the predicament with the remark: “we [the UAE media industry] 
still don’t have experience.”380 Although he referred to the UAE media industry as whole, 
the argument can support a structure which disparages those working in TV, as the 
following example shows.  
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The young Emirati presenter Fatima described how she had begun working on a 
weekly show with a team of four excluding herself, with equal responsibility for writing and 
organising the content. Yet she was not involved in production team meetings where the 
content of the next episode was decided. Additionally, though the last fifteen minutes of the 
show were originally supposed to be the audience’s time to comment on what they had 
watched; this format was abandoned after only the second episode. From the third show 
onwards, the audience was no longer allowed to participate, and the discussion was left up 
to the expert teams alone. Fatima complained that her protests were not taken seriously. 
Instead, she was simply informed that the experts had more interesting things to say.381 
The experiences show that presenters are more than subjected to a principle of so-
called respect towards public figures. They are prevented from developing profiles as 
independent media personalities. Whether this marginalisation is intended or not, it 
effectively enforces the media status quo as a stage for a select group of people who are 
officially entitled to speak, or ‘have something to say.’ When a weekly society talk show 
from Abu Dhabi for example aired an episode on Sheikh Zayed, on the anniversary of his 
death, the only participants who were invited were members of the Executive Council and 
selected elders who had known Sheikh Zayed. These, it was supposed, would say positive 
things, and be authorised to give their opinions. Similar to self-censorship the exclusion of 
subjugated voices does not rely on fixed rules but perpetuates by praxis.  
Through repetition the audience becomes accustomed to seeing presenters as mere 
visible frames of those ‘people of significance’ who are the only ones worthy of being heard 
in public. As such Fatima’s experience is symptomatic of a top-down enforcement of 
entitlement and representation which prevents other individual expressions of self. One of 
the scholars who analyses forms of community representations in mass media is Ella Shohat, 
who understands the media as a symbolic battleground for delegations of representation.382 
She bases her observations on the semiotic principle of representation ‘standing for’ 
something or somebody else. In order to understand the complexity of the term it is 
necessary to highlight that the term ‘representation’ can describe different forms of public 
action. In one instance representation describes a person publicly speaking and acting on 
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behalf of a community, thus being delegated to re-enact their ideas, interests and even 
characteristics.383  
Conflict arises with the power over delegating tools of mass communication and the 
entitlement of the media producers to appoint such representatives on behalf of others. In 
the case of Fatima’s show, the script writers and producers of the programme delegated the 
role of ‘speaking for’ the audience present in the studio to the experts, thus silencing those 
studio guests who symbolically stand for the wider community of viewers. Fatima’s 
indignation over this procedure shows the rejection of such an assumed authority as well as 
the inability to change it. The presenter, instead of representing the audience of a certain 
show, is thus utilised to represent a dominant elite and act as their mediator. More than 
anything else, this delegation of roles demonstrates that the function of such a media is not 
to stage public debates but represent and empower said elites of authorities. 
 
 
4.1.3 Feeling part of the nation’s pioneer-spirit 
 
Despite such unattractive prospects, the reporters unanimously said they felt their 
jobs worthwhile and were confident that obstacles could be surpassed with enough 
personal engagement. A reporter from Abu Dhabi Sports describes her situation as follows: 
 
“I feel myself here, I love my job, I love Abu Dhabi Sports, this is my 
channel, you see, I chose it: I wanted to be the first lady in Abu Dhabi 
Sports. [..] I want to make a programme about ladies, local ladies in the 
UAE: ladies in sports. I planned to get it and I told my boss. Insha-Allah I 
will do that [programme] soon.”384 
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Her description says as much about her personal initiative in terms of content 
development as it does about the distinction she wants to make. As one of many reporters 
and presenters she sees a chance to distinguish herself by ‘being the first. ‘Significantly her 
description draws from the discourse of Emiratisation. The policy was launched in 2004 with 
the aim to raise the employment rate of UAE nationals. By 2008 the unemployment rate 
among UAE nationals was 13.8%.385 To counter unemployment and raise the proportion of 
UAE nationals employed in the private sector, the government developed a variety of career 
programmes facilitated by the National Human Resource Development and Employment 
Authority (TANMIA).386 
The Emiratisation campaign comes along with a notion of an Emirati generation who 
will have “top jobs”, or as the popular slogan goes, becomes “future leaders”.387 The 
urgency with which the government tries to implement the Emiratisation campaign has led 
to various programmes for human resource development.388 Their advertisement uses 
success stories of Emiratis who have become pioneers in their fields, and who are presented 
(on the government websites) as role models. On a micro-level the discourse is mirrored by 
the brands of the UAE, especially the Dubai brand, which boasts the tallest building, the 
biggest mall, the first metro in the Gulf etc. The rhetoric of motivation and success draws 
from superlatives and make Emirati locals the first, the best etc. Arguably in a young nation-
state, there are more chances for members of the national community to be the first ever to 
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achieve something. The narrative using this topos to create a pioneer spirit interprets 
individual achievements as achievements on behalf of the national community. In this 
context, the ambition of the quoted reporter is to become a role model and pioneer for the 
imagined community of Emirati women. 
 
Image No. 4. 1: Female news presenters on Abu Dhabi TV
389
 
 
 
Whereas this particular presenter was confident she would become a role model, a 
group of long-serving staff looked back on their own careers and noticed they had in fact 
been pioneers. Among the six female employees there was a sense of pride of having been 
among the first Emirati women to start working in the media despite all obstacles.390 
According to them, it was Sheikh Zayed’s support for women that broke the ideal of a ‘mere 
housewife’ and over time made any occupation, including the media, had become 
acceptable for women. Therefore more and more women chose to work in the media. For 
the participants of the focus group the obstacles they had to overcome in order to pursue 
their careers heightened their sense of pride in their achievements. One of the elder focus 
group participants was Muna, who had worked as a radio presenter, scriptwriter and editor 
for over ten years. She described how, for the duration of her first year working for the Abu 
Dhabi radio, her father asked her where she was going every day as she left the house to 
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signify his disapproval.391 At the time (during the 1980s) her family had hoped she would 
become an engineer or doctor, which was considered a more prestigious choice than media. 
Muna describes how her father over time changed his mind: 
 
“When people heard me [on the radio], and heard how educated I was 
and how I talked to [people who called into the show], they started to 
ask my father: ‘Oh, we heard Muna, she said this,’ or ‘Muna said that.’ All 
the people were saying ‘she said this and it was not good’, or ‘she said 
this and it was good.’ Over time, they started to believe in me. So my 
father changed his mind. He said: ‘People are meeting me in the fish 
market and asking me about what you said,’ and he started to listen to 
my programme. Slowly slowly [he change and] said: ‘Why are you calling 
yourself Muna Al-D?’ – My family name is Al-J, you see, Al-D is my middle 
name; so he said ‘why don’t you call yourself Al-J?’ I said ‘no, I won’t, I 
took this name, end of the discussion: I’m Muna Al-D.’ You see, he even 
wanted me to make the family name famous! That was around 1989. It 
was early for people to be so open-minded.”392 
 
Muna’s story bears several significant aspects. It is a story of breaking boundaries 
through self-confidence and enthusiasm for her passion (media). She challenged the 
established belief that media is not a prestigious career and women especially should 
pursue other goals.393 The dramaturgy of her narrative is telling for the construction of role 
models in this context. Her personal performance, according to her and her colleagues, has 
not only achieved self-fulfilment, but contributed to wider changes within her imagined 
community. Muna’s story revisits the style the presenter from Abu Dhabi Sports, although 
retrospectively. What her young colleague was aspiring for has already been achieved by 
Muna. She convinced society and her father that she was not shaming but on the contrary 
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contributing to the ‘good family name’. As such, her narrative exemplifies how the 
aforementioned ‘pioneer spirit’ is incorporated into the personal life stories. The 
government’s narrative “From Rags to Riches” (see chapter 2) is used as interpretive 
material to create a personal profile. The rhetoric of the Emiratisation discourse invites such 
self-categorisations as role models and several presenters told similar stories of ‘success 
despite all obstacles.’394 While TV channels do not encourage individual representations of 
self, the individual presenters provide an array of ‘faces’ of the modern Emirati society. The 
following section will explore how this form of representation not only supports the 
government’s national identity discourse in the media but also interacts with other spaces. 
It will show how the public visibility on screen influences the way visibility is perceived in 
other public spaces. Mediated images of people contextualise public action in a complex 
interpretive relation. 
 
 
4.2 Just an image: The presenters as symbols of Emirati national identity 
 
It is not surprising that in a media lacking meaningful content for the consumers, 
images and visual effects take on disproportionately large importance. Not only are the 
identity stings of the channels produced at a high level of technical finesse (see chapter 3) 
but the image of the people acting on screen is a central aspect of the programmes. A senior 
presenter lamented that most young Emirati presenters were pursuing fame rather than a 
serious career in journalism, saying that “they care about their beards, they care about their 
eyes: I don’t care about these things, I care about what I have to present [content].”395 The 
question is, what he has to present, or what he is allowed to say. The previous section has 
illustrated how presenters are utilised to represent the dominant elite and act as their 
mediators. More than anything this delegation of roles demonstrates that the function of 
such a media is not to stage public debates but represent and empower said elites of 
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authorities. As another Emirati presenter resignedly observed about the Abu Dhabi TV, 
“they only train you [in] what they want you to be…”396  
The following sections will argue that what the channels ‘want’ the presenters to be 
deals with visual impersonations of the ruling elite who appear in public as brands and role 
models for the nationals. Therefore the interest in appearance on screen is more than an 
aesthetic consideration: Emirati presenters are sought after to symbolise nationhood to the 
nationals. The channels have to show cast the successful Emiratisation of the media sector. 
Accordingly, how many locals are working behind the scenes is not as important as the 
visual marketing of Emiratisation. Although employees may see TV broadcast as an 
opportunity to become role models, the ‘roles’ they can play are pre-prepared and pre-
approved. The rulers’ public images function as blueprints for the Emiratis who appear on 
screen. Accordingly, as the first two parts of this section will explore, becoming a presenter 
means to become a representation of national identity.  
This role transforms individualistic expressions of self into one ‘national self’ but ‒ as 
the first section will show ‒ creates distinctions between different groups within Emirati 
publics. Simultaneously the unwritten guidelines of how to appear on screen allow different 
levels of self-expression depending on gender. The second section will show that the role 
can be perceived by women as a gateway to wider ranges of action. The Emirati employees 
quoted in the previous section already touched on the topic of ‘empowering women’. Their 
experiences will show that becoming icons of the ‘national self’ leads to a problematisation 
of female public visibility, which they perceive as liberation. The third section will elaborate 
on the aspect of problematisation of public visibility. The dialogical relationship between 
mediated and real life experience will exemplify the potentials of media to influence 
genderised categories.  
 
 
4.2.1 Women’s visibility as nexus for class-distinctions 
 
                                                          
396
 Ibid.  
162 
 
The current media notion of appearing presentable requires presenters to visually 
represent the culture, primarily by wearing Emirati national dress. The Emirati presenters all 
remarked that the sheela (Emirati hijab) and abaya (women’s gown) were essential for their 
self images.397 Yet unlike their male colleagues, they were free to choose different styles of 
the abaya and variations of the Emirati sheela. While they could wear a typical Bahraini 
abaya design, the male presenters were actively encouraged to feature the particular 
Emirati kandora (male attire) and not, for instance, the Saudi style one. The media 
personality Marwan explained:  
 
“If it’s an Emirati show obviously they want someone who’s gonna be 
dressed up in Emirati attire and showing people like, ‘look this is what we 
wear and this is what we do’ [...] It’s a cultural identity thing and even in 
our Dubai TV they’re asking us all to wear [it], when we dress up to 
represent our identity [...] They always tell us like ‘Sheikh Mohammed is 
your role model of how you represent yourself when you dress up’, and 
that’s how they encourage us to wear [the kandora] as much as 
possible.”398 
 
Whereas young Emirati males like Marwan could privately choose to wear a 
baseball-cap with the kandoora, they felt obliged to follow the visual example of the rulers 
for their professional appearances. The wives of the rulers cannot become role models for 
appearance or style, since they are usually not visible in public. This lack of female fashion 
role models allows female presenters more flexibility to express individuality through attire. 
Simultaneously the gendered visibility of the ruling elite establishes differences, not only 
between men and women but the ruling elite and the majority of Emiratis. The only women 
of the ruling elite who are displayed in public are from the Al Maktoum family. The 
daughters of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid participate in international sporting events, 
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such as the Olympics.399 The wife of Sheikh Mohammed, Princess Haya, is the other 
exception. She continues her pre-marriage public life - in particular for the International 
Equestrian Federation. The other female members of the ruling elite do not appear in 
public. Significantly, they can have a ‘public image’, representing their role for the nation. 
The mother of the president, Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak, has her own logo, similar to 
Sheikh Hamdan from Dubai, but without the element of personal display.  
 
Image No. 4. 2: Sheikh Fatima’s logo, “Mother of the Nation”
400
 
 
 
As “Mother of the Emirates,” her logo campaigns for women’s causes such as higher 
education. While she is thus part of the public national discourse, she does not appear in 
public media. Whenever Sheikha Fatima attends public events, participants even have to 
switch off mobile phones to prevent them from taking pictures.401 Her public activites, 
together with the invisibility of other sheikhas, establishes a class distinction: women from 
the ruling elite are only visible to select communities. Her husband, Sheikh Zayed, was 
famous for promoting women in all sectors, yet his wife does not assume the function of a 
visible role model. In the eyes of the interviewed students and presenters, this distinction 
was linked to her Bedouin background. Bedouin families were deemed more conservative 
and restrictive towards women. Several female students pointed out that their families 
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would not allow them to work in front of a camera because they were ‘Bedouin’.402 
Especially in Abu Dhabi, presenters considered the label ‘Bedouin’ with being more 
‘authentically local’ than so-called ‘mixed’ families.403 The ADMC presenter Fatima Al Ketbi 
described the different mindsets and gender restrictions through her own experience: 
 
“It’s not easy for ladies to be on TV. For all families in the UAE it is not 
allowed [...] If you come to university, more and more ladies there want to 
become a presenter, but there are conditions [...] It [wasn’t] easy for me 
[either], but because I’m the only daughter of my mother (just me, you 
know) it was easier for me. My mother is a little free, her family is a little 
bit like ‘it’s okay.’ But my father, no! His family is Bedouin, so it’s difficult. 
Until now for my family it’s not allowed that they see me on TV, it’s like 
they feel shy, or not proud. […] In Dubai this all is easier, because in Dubai 
[people are] more mixed, not pure local. It’s like this: Bedouins can’t 
change, because they’re pure local – end of discussion: no change!”404 
 
Fatima’s story is significant in several ways: one aspect highlights that different tribes 
and families have different ways and views. These variations lead to frictions that children 
can use to their advantage. She is backed up by her mother who helps her convince her 
father to allow her to pursue her media career. Later in the interview Fatima described that 
several among her family members did not talk to her for some time when she became a 
presenter.405 But apart from her personal achievement of having overcome the restrictions 
imposed by her father’s family, Fatima’s narrative is telling for the way different social 
categories are constructed in the UAE. Being a “pure local” is associated with distinct 
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genderised notions of public behaviour - a behaviour for which the Sheikhas’ absence from 
the public eye sets the example. 
Notably, Sheikh Mohamed’s wife, Princess Haya, is not an ethnically ‘pure local’, nor 
is his daughter Sheikha Maitha, who partook in the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Sheikha Hind, the 
first wife of Sheikh Mohamed, is from the ruling Al Maktoum family, and neither she nor her 
daughters have public images or appearances. Since the rulers’ legitimacy is linked to their 
Bedouin identities (discussed in chapter 1.3), an association with a Bedouin origin in turn 
translates to a higher status in society. In the context of an ethnicity-based notion of 
nationhood, being a Bedouin means, according to Fatima, to be a “pure” local. Based on this 
notion the invisibility of Sheikha Fatima is not a statement of hypocrisy on the side of Sheikh 
Zayed, the supporter of women, but a factor which strengthens the notion of ‘otherness’ 
between the ruling elite and the majority of UAE citizens. From the Abu Dhabi perspective 
this hierarchical distinction is also applied to the relationship of the emirate as a collective 
towards the emirate of Dubai. The latter is considered less ‘pure’, therefore less 
representative of the nation’s idealised history of a Bedouin heritage.406  
Dubai media employees in turn mentioned the ‘Bedouin mindset’ of Abu Dhabians 
as a barrier for progress. Aware that their televised representations of ‘Emiratiness’ were 
different, they appear on screen wearing variations of the traditional dress. The female 
presenters in particular felt free to experiment with personal taste and seasonal fashion. 
They thus contribute to what Shohat calls a “process of definition of the represented 
community and the individual self, which is inevitably part of the act of representation.”407 
The presenters from Dubai have thus earned a reputation for their fashionable style.408 
Conscious that they must represent a certain image of Emirati women, especially younger 
presenters would reflect their own notion of contemporary Emirati women and team the 
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abaya with skinny jeans and stilettos. These experiences show that contrary to the narrative 
of a homogenous Emirati society there are different notions of Emirati identity among 
different urban communities of the UAE. These are linked to ethnicity, which again is part of 
the constructed government narrative of a nation of Bedouin tribes.409 The values 
associated with a Bedouin identity are enforced through genderised forms of 
representation. Interestingly, the support of women in public positions is upheld parallel to 
a system of values in which women do not appear in public. Effectively the coexistence of 
both frameworks enforces class-distinctions and different categories of an authentic Emirati 
national: the more ‘Bedouin’ and thus authentic, a family is believed to be, the less visible 
will female members of this family be in public. Fostering this hierarchical system of public 
visibility of women ensures that the government can appear as traditionally Bedouin and 
modern at the same time. The following section will explore how women are used as 
symbols of such a developed modern nation. 
 
 
4.2.2 Female visibility as symbol of a ‘developed’ nation 
 
As the government supports Emirati women in public positions, leading roles in the 
national media are occupied by women, like Nayla al Awadi, head of the channel Dubai One 
and member of the FNC, or Noura Al Kaabi, chairperson of TwoFour54. Not only do they 
appear on screen, but they even represent the media on an international management 
level. Although media employees attributed this feature to Sheikh Zayed’s ideal, they are 
made part of the branding attributes of the channels (and as such the government narrative 
of identity): The support of women was a crucial part of constructing a national identity. 
Researchers such as Andrew Parker and Mary Russo have pointed out the general 
significance of the female body as a symbol for the nation, as the incorporation of domestic 
values the male political elite has to cherish and protect.410 Alev Çinar analyses in her work 
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on nation-building in modern Turkey how the nation-state framed “the female body and 
women’s public visibility as a strategic means [for the] project of modernization,” thus using 
the role of women as a distinguishable symbol of the development of society.411 Although 
Çinar’s research admittedly evolved out of a different context, parallels to the UAE nation-
building project are clear. She points out for example that the symbolic significance of 
female visibility in society is ultimately addressed towards a global community of (Western) 
nations.  
The UAE government, eager to be accepted in the international arena of ‘developed’ 
nations, equally identified the role of women as an important factor by which the 
‘modernisation’ of the nation can be measured. Government overviews of UAE society, 
tending to highlight the most developed aspects of the country, such as social welfare, 
education and health systems, and media, never fail to emphasise the importance of Emirati 
women.412 Considering that international institutions like the UN assume the role of women 
in a society to be indicative for a country’s development, such an assumption seems well 
founded.413 For an image-conscious nation such as the UAE, a high Human Development 
Index is a further achievement. When the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
ranked the UAE 30th among 187 countries in 2011 Human Development Report, the crown 
prince of Abu Dhabi could proudly proclaim that “the UAE, through its wise policies, gave 
priority for consolidating the principle of people’s participation, activating the relationship 
between citizens and authorities.”414 And just as the ADMC female employees attributed 
the improvement of women’s status in society to the founding “father of the nation,” the 
UAE Minister of Economy traced the nation’s general human development back to Sheikh 
Zayed: “The UAE’s wise leadership adopted an ambitious vision established by the late 
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Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, God bless his soul, who said, ‘human kind is the base of 
any civilisation.’”415 
In this scenario women play the role of symbolising the new spaces and identities 
constructed by the nation-state.416 The disapproval shown by some Emirati families towards 
female presenters, the public domain as a sphere of action and visibility of women is 
problematised, thus contested. It is important for the nation-state to normalise this 
gendered notion in order to define and secure the spaces of action the government ideology 
ascribes to its citizens. Accordingly, the national media, aspiring to re-educate the nationals, 
promotes women in highly representative public roles. In the defined public domain of the 
national media the visibility and actions of the presenters can be ideally orchestrated in 
order to showcase what it means to be a UAE national. The presenters are sent to the 
spaces the government envisions the citizens to act in, hence preferably spaces of 
significance to the national identity: they are seen reporting from historical sites and 
heritage events, as well as at business functions, exhibitions, even in malls, as the new 
‘marketplace’ for public interaction. And wherever they go, these symbols of the ‘national 
self’ are dressed in the official Emirati attire, thus explaining and teaching the viewers what 
an Emirati looks like and does. In this role, attire, habitus and language of the presenters 
acquire symbolic significance, as one student pointed out: “Wearing abaya comes with 
certain behaviour, because you are representing something.”417 Whilst Emiratis of either 
gender act out the national identity, the public visibility of men does not clash with any 
other framework defining social interaction. The female presenters however become the 
signifier of a contest between notions of self which are connected to gendered spaces and 
spheres. It is important to acknowledge in this context the constructed nature of multiple 
‘selves’, which are embedded in different moral frameworks. They are enacted in the form 
of different, equally constructed, roles such as the role of a TV presenter or media 
personality. 
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Depending on situation, space, and time, different concepts of self are prioritised 
and encouraged. Çinar points out that the ideological framework of nationalism “divides the 
world into the national self and its others.”418 Following this observation the 
problematisation of female visibility on screen can be understood as a conflict of ‘selves.’ 
The father, brother, or husband who disapproves of his female family members’ wish to 
become a presenter does not have to reject the constructed national ‘self’ per se. When it 
comes to close family members, other ‘selves’ (such as the ‘Bedouin self’), take priority – 
along with the gendered notion of a male public sphere. They equate female public visibility 
with a rejected aspiration for individual re-presentation or re-enactment of self. A number 
of female ADMC employees described how their fathers, initially disapproving, came to 
accept their daughters’ decisions. Several described how they had navigated through family 
objections by obscuring their true career aspirations. One ADMC employee remembered 
that in order to study media and communications she had had to pretend that this was the 
only available course at the university as all the others were full.419 Another recalled how 
she made her family believe she was merely taking a training course at ADMC and kept her 
first time on screen a secret. One described how she presented her family with the fait 
accompli:  
 
“I told them I was just taking a training course [in the channel] – what else 
could I do, I have to go step-by-step [...] Slowly slowly I got more freedom, 
and when I was on screen for the first time, nobody of my family knew: 
nobody saw me.”420 
 
They said that over time their families came to accept their careers, one even stating 
that her father meanwhile took pride in his daughter’s skills in classical Arabic, the language 
of the media.421 What these fathers just as well may have realised was that rather than 
attracting attention as an individual female, their daughters acted as representations of the 
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nation. Because their images are circulated within the protective framework of nationhood, 
the scandal of their public visibility is defused.422 In such cases the role as symbolic 
representation (rather than individual re-presentation) can help the process of 
normalisation and open possibilities to women who do not perform according to the moral 
frameworks imposed on them by their families.  
One of the ADMC male employees was confident that female presenters were soon 
to be perceived not only as acceptable, but a normality: “It’s part of the people: they are 
starting to observe this new thing, a woman, a local Emirati on TV. That’s a good thing 
[because] I want to see my identity on TV.”423 His statement shows appreciation of the role 
constructed especially for women on screen as representation of the collective national 
identity. Although presenters merely act as the visual frame for an expert opinion, seeing 
them on screen is perceived by him as an important advance. Not only foreigners are visible 
in the media, but also Emirati locals of both gender. The following section will explore how 
these media representations correlate with other spaces in which female visibility becomes 
representative of an imagined collective.  
 
 
4.2.3 The burden of representation and how it creates ‘ways of seeing’ 
 
From the presenters’ perspective many feel deprived from individual displays of 
their ideas towards their audience. The urge to be the master of their own shows, as 
expressed by presenters such as Fatima, reflects the other dimension of representation 
Shohat defines: the individual re-enactment or re-presentation of self.424 In this meaning of 
representation the entitlement to perform has to be based on a mutual acceptance by the 
imagined community that as a society they are not homogenous, and furthermore that 
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displays of individuality are worth circulation. While the delegated representative is 
assumed to speak for the community, the individual re-presenter steps out on the stage 
with a message of individuality which is appreciated. In contrast to this, on the screens of 
the UAE media, the combination of expert voices and choreographed representatives of 
Emirati identity creates a pattern of public visibility in which whatever happens on screen is 
representative of an imagined community.  
The presenters are forced under what Shohat refers to as the burden of 
representation. Whoever appears on screen will be assessed on the basis of an ‘ideal 
national’, the prototypes of which are the rulers. This burden of representation is directly 
linked to both their direct physical visibility and enforced by their lack of individual 
expression. In contrast, a film maker or artist will stand behind his media product and be in 
the first instance scrutinised through his work. While the latter may feel the burden of re-
presentation of Emirati identity and culture, the presenters on UAE TV are judged by their 
ability to enact the ideal. Yet this ideal only has male role models, the sheikhs, while female 
presenters have to impersonate a more abstract definition of Emirati womanhood. While 
male presenters can be evaluated by their ability to copy their male role models, the 
yardstick for the correct impersonation of female Emiratiness is negotiable. As seen in the 
previous section, this gives them a wider range of individuality in terms of dress style. In a 
way Emirati women with public profiles take the vacant places of public visibility left by the 
sheikhas. Yet unlike the rulers, they become role models who are not exempt from criticism.  
Significantly, the topic of misrepresentation of the Emirati women was raised by 
women (female students as well as media employees), whereas their male peers displayed a 
more indifferent attitude towards the phenomenon. Several women highlighted the 
importance of wearing the abaya “in the right way.”425 This scrutiny of women by other 
women is indicative of what art critic John Berger coined as “ways of seeing.”426  
Berger analysed the ways art and advertisements visualise gender relations and 
enforce their acceptance as normalised social constellations through their mass circulation. 
Especially in advertisements, according to Berger, men take an active role and are ‘seen’ and 
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judged by the viewers through their ‘acting’.427 Women however are ‘looked at’ by the men 
and evaluated by them through their physical appearance. As a result, the viewers of the 
advertisements learn a certain ‘way of seeing’ women and men, which Berger phrases as 
“men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at.”428 Transferring Berger’s 
observation to other media, it is necessary to remember that every genre features its own 
specific forms of consumption, which is furthermore connected to time and social sphere of 
circulation. The review (in chapter 3) of how television has lost credibility with Arab 
audiences demonstrates how ‘ways of seeing’ are subjected to contestation and change. In 
the case of the contemporary UAE, the style of the national television encourages a specific 
‘way of seeing’ TV images and people as representations.  
Why women are subjected to particular scrutiny by other women can be understood 
in the context of problematisation of female visibility. Berger’s observations on European 
art signify a similar social discourse, which ascribes the public sphere of activity and 
consumption to men. Images visualise the attribution of activity to men by making the 
female body an object of their consumption: a person sees a picture in which men are 
scrutinising women.429 This visualisation of gender roles educates viewers, both male and 
female, to scrutinise the female body. In the case of the UAE, female viewers are 
additionally accustomed to TV images being representative, not individualistic. Their way of 
seeing women’s images on screen is therefore ‘educated’ in two ways: they scrutinise 
women as representations of female Emiratis and as objects of male consumption. Both 
perspectives are imagined but the assumption of how the ‘other’ will interpret and judge 
influences their own evaluation. Every imperfection of the representation affects the 
collective public image of Emirati women. Aware of the problematisation of female visibility, 
Emirati women have to guard the ways in which ‘they’ are consumed.  
The fact that these ways of seeing are constantly problematised and related to 
different sub-communities has been illustrated earlier by the different ways fathers see 
their daughter on screen. Another example shows not only generational but genderised 
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ways of seeing can change. A reporter described his difficulty finding volunteers for street 
interviews as follows: 
 
“If I say to people of my age ‘okay, guys, I need people to interview’ – and 
they are free by the ways, we are just hanging out in a coffee shop: they 
just run away. The older [generation] are ready to talk. Those who are 
more than 40 or 45 years old are like, ‘go ahead, ask me anything.’ I was so 
surprised how they are really ready [to make a statement in front of the 
camera], but young men: ‘no way, gosh, we’ll be on TV! Girls will see me 
on TV!”430 
 
Different notions of public scrutiny are expressed in this example. The older men 
could draw their confidence from disinterest in TV publicness or in reverse see themselves 
as representative for the so esteemed generation of elders. It may be suggestive to remark 
that many oral history projects interview people from the Trucial States generation, so the 
aspect of normalisation of public attention is probable. Most significantly is their description 
in comparison to the younger men. The latter problematised their public visibility towards 
an imagined female audience. They have internalised women as ‘active’ media consumers 
who ‘see’ men. This reverse process reminds of Lacan’s infamous mirror stage, which can be 
encapsulated as the realisation of somebody looking back whenever I look at somebody. 
How this shift in awareness of the ‘other’ as consumer of the own body developed is 
connected to changing image worlds not only in the UAE. Images objectifying male bodies 
have become a global trend, which has led observers of popular culture to remark that in 
our age “men are also succumbing to the traditionally female preoccupation of looking good 
on the outside, too.”431 Phenomena like bulimia, plastic surgery previously gendered as 
‘typical female’ have more and more become aspects of masculinity as well.  
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In the context of changing ways of seeing, another significant aspect of the quoted 
anecdote is the notion of representativeness. The men in the reporter’s story do not see 
themselves as representative for ‘Emirati men’, but objectified masculinity. Unlike TV 
presenters who make a career of public visibility, they do not feel subjected to the 
framework of national representation. They reject mass consumption of their visibility and 
evade the camera. For presenters the notions of representation on screen on the other 
hand can merge with other spaces, such as the possibility to be recognised by viewers in 
public places. A young presenter from ADMC stated that despite being compelled to stick to 
a prescribed text, she appreciated the public visibility she had gained through her talk 
shows.432 
Nevertheless she was anxious to restrict her public image to the official media 
discourse and explained: “I like it if I go to the mall and people recognise me and say they 
liked my show; the channel takes care that my picture is not on You Tube, because that 
would be bad.“433 Her statement illustrates that she is aware of different contexts of being 
‘looked at.’ It also demonstrates what the aforementioned ‘right way’ of wearing abaya and 
sheela means for women: not only does the representation have to be ‘right’ but the image 
of the female has to be consumed in the ‘right way.’ For women it is particularly important 
to remain guarded by the interpretive framework provided by the channels.434 Embedded in 
the orchestrated and defined discourse of TV production her image is legitimised. However 
within the realm of an alternative public domain, such as You Tube, her femininity might be 
consumed differently ‒ by a different audience, for different purposes.435 Being a TV 
presenter can therefore satisfy her desire for public performance, but “within limits,” as 
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another female presenter said.436 The ‘national self’, connected to specific spaces and 
mannerisms for all Emirati citizens, is enacted as a role, which does not eliminate other 
selves. The female presenter is consequently aware that she is also consumed as a gendered 
object. If in the public domain of national media female visibility, framed as representation, 
becomes normalised, other spaces can be reversely affected. 
The burden of representation has repercussions for all who enter the media stage, 
not only the professionals. Any person who appears on screen is likely to be interpreted as 
representing or being representative for an imagined community. The religious expert for 
example obviously assumes the role of speaking for an imagined community of Muslims. 
Even a lay person, who might talk about a mundane issue will be ‘seen’ as representative for 
an imagined community of people with similar disorders. The interpretive framework of the 
TV has created a genre specific way of consuming the people entering it, which is different 
than for other media. On television, an individual’s body inevitably becomes a 
representation. Whether the audience really sees it this way is neither here nor there, but 
internalising this notion is certainly intimidating for anybody, who considers herself or 
himself ‘just a normal person’ – with an opinion, but nothing representative to say or show. 
The wish to contribute, to be seen and heard gets into direct conflict with a notion of 
publicness, which can only be surpassed by anonymity or at least non-visibility. 
People will, for example call into radio shows and television shows to complain or 
talk about personal issues. A weekly counselling show from Dubai for example thrives off 
people calling in to the presenter on screen and talking about their psychological 
problems.437 However, it seems that the anonymity albeit the imagined audience mitigates 
the reluctance to enter the public sphere. Whilst callers into a radio or television show act 
on the basis that their identity is known to the producers of the programmes, their 
identities are unknown to the audience, their faces blacked out on screen and their voices 
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equipped with voice changers.438 Such reluctance to visibly state opinions in public could 
ultimately be ascribed to a fear of rejection as an individual by an imagined audience. After 
all, as long as no visible image is connected to an opinion, it merely remains one statement 
among a discourse of comments. But if people appear on screen, they at least on a small 
level represent not only their individuality but a community, be it family, tribe, nationality or 
others. A purely individual opinion would be considered irrelevant and therefore 
inappropriate.  
In the interpretative discourse of TV, the studio guests symbolically represent the 
larger community of viewers, ultimately imagined as ‘the Emirati society’. On the UAE 
television this miniature image of society is mainly mute, leaving the talking and acting to 
people who are entitled to represent an opinion. It thus contextualises ways of seeing which 
are interrelated to other public spaces in which people are ‘seen’, ‘watched’ and ‘looked at’. 
It would go too far to state that television educates people to assume a certain way of 
public behaviour but it can certainly enforce a notion which already exists. The case of 
women not being allowed to appear on screen illustrates that they were perceived as acting 
representative for ‘the women’ of their family. One male presenter even stated that families 
would fear their daughters’ public visibility could shed a bad light on the image of the whole 
family.439 This fear is in line with Middle Eastern social norms of representation and public 
behaviour which goes beyond the realm of media. Several presenters labelled the rules of 
representation which govern public spaces as typically Bedouin.440 By entering public spaces 
‘private’ individuals do not only become publicly visible and scrutinised, but assume the role 
of representing the communities they are supposed to belong to, such as their families.  
These observations confirm the remarks made by Barbie Zelizer discussed in chapter 
1 on the correlation between media and culture. She asserts that media creates categories 
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which reflect the ‘real’ world and define categories. These media representations become in 
turn categories by which ‘real’ world phenomena are labelled. Thus the “image world” of 
media establishes and validates ways of perceiving and evaluating phenomena.441 Rather 
than merely suggesting different roles of individuals, their mediated performances are 
confirmed as normative behaviour in public. In the case of the UAE media, the roles enacted 
by people appearing on screen are set up by the government as part of the national identity 
discourse it seeks to control. Especially the support and framing of female visibility in the 
public domain has demonstrated that presenters become agents of the government’s brand 
of an open and modern nation (without entitlement to determine the content of their 
shows). This strategy is designed to distract from the lack of politically-critical information 
and leave national ideology untarnished: nationhood is not a topic of dispute or negotiation 
on screen, but becomes part of the brands of various entertainment channels.  
The perspectives of Emirati presenters have illustrated how this strategy perpetuates 
and enforces itself from a micro-level through incorporation of employees into a media 
structure. By creating a media elite of UAE nationals who homogenously enact a defined 
role, the media tries to enforce its norm for leading a public dialogue. It is this normalised 
structure that poses the main challenge to media professionals who want to challenge the 
existing media sphere. Their endeavours rely on the approval of audiences which are 
influenced by certain ways of seeing – not only those of the local media. Whether the set up 
allocation of roles is accepted however remains to be examined. The following chapters will 
explore which aspects of the media strategy are criticised and how they are challenged by 
Emirati who both consume and produce media. 
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5. The disrupted dialogue between the national media and Emirati 
audiences 
 
 
In the present media landscape of satellite channels and internet access, the UAE 
media is juxtaposed between an educative media and a commercial entertainment provider. 
Through its media strategy the government tries to open the media domain to popular 
trends, make it commercially successful, and yet remain in control of its overall message. 
Obviously, this set up needs audience acceptance to succeed. UAE nationals are targeted as 
consumers of media – not partakers in a media discourse. By joining the trend of global 
entertainment channels the local media is subjected to a comparison between other 
commercialised formats. These provide mainstream entertainment for different fan groups 
without specifically targeting local communities and national sub-communities.442 The UAE 
media tries to follow this trend through specialised sports channels, drama channels, or a 
newly launched Bollywood channel on ADTV.  
The question whether national media can cater to the conglomerate of communities 
within one nation-state poses a general problem of how various sub-communities can 
contribute to a media sphere which is produced by an elite of media professionals. In lieu of 
organised interest groups, communities have to either adapt to the offer or find media 
catering for their needs elsewhere. This chapter examines the needs of Emirati nationals 
and shows that they have a different idea about what national media ‘should’ try to achieve 
in an age of seemingly unlimited choice: a domain to experience locality. It will show that 
people do not see local television as particularly local.  
The first part (5.1) is mainly based on focus group discussions with Emirati students 
of media and communication. Their criticism of the local TV channels will show that their 
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brands are not enough to qualify as ‘national media’ in the eyes of Emiratis who demand 
more in-depth relatable content. While the former is considered to be implemented more 
or less successfully, the latter is missing. By not succeeding in representing experience and 
stories from the daily lives of Emiratis, the local media merely becomes an unsuccessful 
copy of other channels. The criticism of the students revisits the question of relevance of 
national television in an age of commercialised mainstream entertainment. The lack of 
attraction of the UAE media is in dialogical relation to media usage and expectations of 
media, which are formed through the consumption of transnational programmes. Since the 
local media does not permit a creative dialogue between sub-communities (of the Emirati 
national community) and the government’s media, the national television loses its potential 
to act as a symbolic focus point for the nationals. 
The disappointment Emirati students feel towards their local media is often 
explained by Emiratis as a result of the high proportion of foreign media experts. The second 
part of this chapter (5.2) will explore how the media students explain their estrangement 
from the local media as a ‘foreign conspiracy.’ Their perspective on the media industry is 
that of a parallel discourse to their Emirati communities. Accordingly they are juxtaposed 
between an acceptance and a criticism of the official media. The usage of alternative media 
domains will show how these can be used to challenge the official media. 
 
 
5.1 “Who watches TV anyway?” The loss of relevance for a national 
community 
 
The first part of this section will illustrate what happens when local TV is not relevant 
or interesting to students. Their experience with and assessment of the role local TV given a 
seemingly unlimited choice will be discussed. The popular belief that ‘TV is dead’ will be 
tested through the opinions of the students. A recurring topic in the focus group discussions 
with students of media and communication was the identity of the channels and their 
programmes. The participants, mainly undergraduate students, were in discussion groups of 
10 to 15. They were bound together by their shared interest in the media industry and 
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similar age, gender and nationality. By their mutual interest in and study of media they form 
what Appadurai calls a “community of sentiment”.443 His term describes a specific aspect of 
imagined communities, which form around the visual images of media. Individuals can 
identify with the image-worlds constructed on screen and form both intimacy and a feeling 
of belonging to the thus imagined community.444 He writes that: 
 
“[The] greatest force [of sentiments] is in their ability to ignite intimacy 
into political state and turn locality into a staging ground for identity, have 
become spread over vast and irregular spaces as groups move yet stay 
linked to one another through sophisticated media capabilities.”445 
 
For Appadurai the communities formed around concrete images beyond local 
restrictions and their dynamics are specific to the global media age. Communities of 
sentiment evolve around centralised constructed representations of people and 
individuals.446 Hence, for members of audiences the encounters with such media images are 
a form of social interaction and reassurance of their personal sentiments. Communities of 
sentiment are conscious individual choices which are detached from the belonging to a 
national community.447 Appadurai’s concept is useful to describe the imagined media 
community of the interviewed students, since it distinguishes them from organised interest 
groups of fan bases. Though not yet fully-fledged media professionals, the students are 
more than mere media consumers: they create their own films, shows and designs for their 
class projects, thus interacting with media as a source of inspiration to relay and articulate 
their world view and opinions and share them among each other. Appadurai stipulates with 
regards to migratory audiences that: 
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“The work of the imagination is neither purely emancipatory nor entirely 
disciplined, but is a space of contestation in which individuals and groups 
seek to annex the global into their own practices of the modern.”448  
 
For the media producers and students this is applicable in a similar way. They feel 
part of a community of media makers which draws from the image-worlds of de-
territorialised media to create their own versions of locality – and enter the mediated 
contest between those versions. With their specific perspective on the media, the research 
participants question the relevance of the local UAE media for the national community. In 
the second part of this section their practices of media consumption and criticism will 
challenge the homogeneity of a national audience aspired by the media set-up. 
 
 
5.1.1 Local TV losing control over audiences of global media 
 
Despite their specific shared interest in media the students did not consider 
themselves regular television viewers. The most used medium in their daily lives was the 
internet and BlackBerry, which they mainly attributed to their out-of-the-house routines.449 
Most students said they did not watch television on a regular basis, but rather watch 
selected programmes, or merely zapped through the channels for background 
entertainment. One student remarked: “I don’t watch TV, or on holidays only. That is, 
because we study and come from ‘uni’ late, so I don’t have time.”450 This style of media 
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consumption is symptomatic of the internet and smart phone era, which has challenged TV 
broadcasting just as mobile phones have the traditional land line.451 
Nevertheless, there are certain occasions when citizens voluntarily submit to the 
structure TV imposes on their daily routines. These occasions are most obviously live events 
and reports, but in the case of the UAE students, it most significantly happens during the 
Islamic fasting month of Ramadan. When the rituals of media consumers change in 
compliance with the religious fasting schedule watching television becomes an integral part 
of social gatherings.452 During that time students watch popular dramas and other family 
programmes, and while during the rest of the year most students would prefer the Arab 
satellite channels (such as mbc or Showtime TV),453 local channels enjoyed a surge of 
popularity during Ramadan. In 2009 for instance all students appreciated the Emirati 
cartoons aired on Sama Dubai and appreciated the Kuwait series “Umm al-Banāt” (“Mother 
of the Girls”) on Abu Dhabi Al Oula.454 Although completely different genres the students 
could relate to both, saying about the cartoons: “They represent our society.”455 They mirror 
character and situations viewers identify with strongly enough to exclaim: “this is us!”456  
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This form of media consumption illustrates the challenge for a local media which 
aspires to be a point of reference for a national community. With people who can choose 
from an array of media and are free to choose when to consume media, the national media 
loses its power to structure nationals’ daily lives through their national media and thus to 
create a uniformity of actions or, on a bigger scale, a world view or simultaneity. According 
to Anderson, simultaneity of shared experiences forms a strong link between members of 
an imagined community. His notion of Simultaneity is “steady”, “anonymous”, and 
structured by the homogeneous “clock-time” of the nation.457 As a mechanical view on time, 
Anderson introduces the concept of a homogeneous “empty” time, which is the “temporal 
coincidence, measured by clock and calendar”.458 The imaginary and uniform nation-time is 
articulated, textualised, and represented via media. Using the example of the ritualised 
action of reading a daily newspaper, Anderson points out that such action creates the 
illusion of a “mass-ceremony” shared by members of the imagined community of 
newspaper readers.459  
Anderson’s idea of a homogeneous time of a nation has been criticised by scholars 
such as Homi Bhabha and Partha Chatterjee as not considering that real spaces of modern 
life consist of many temporalities, which makes time heterogeneous and “unevenly 
dense”.460 Certainly, a completely homogenous “clock-time” was never possible even before 
the satellite and internet era. Nevertheless the programme schedule of TV or radio could 
structure daily lives of nationals and induce imagined simultaneous actions according to a 
national hegemony of images. Nation’s news, prayer times, programme structure into 
prime-time, family television, etc. are constructed to homogenise the actions of the national 
community and provide the viewers with a common basis for identification.461  
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Even if the citizens do not adhere to the national ‘time’ they can appreciate its 
existence as a point of reference and structure of time which they imagine they share with 
their fellow citizens. Some students deemed it important to have breaks for prayer times on 
their local television. While criticising Abu Dhabi TV for their absence they appreciated that 
Dubai One, the DMI’s English language channel, displayed the prayer breaks. Presuming 
most English-speaking audiences to be non-Muslim, they interpreted this as a symbolic 
statement that in the locality of UAE, a pulse of Emirati identity permeates other non-local 
spheres. 462 Since citizens are no longer dependant on the time schedule of the national TV 
in order to be informed and entertained, the hegemony of time and space which the nation-
state is eager to construct loses its power. However, as the prayer time example shows a 
homogenising ‘clock time’ can be seen as a characteristic of the imagined community of 
nationals. This leaves the media no choice but to explore alternative means to attract the 
viewers. 
The Abu Dhabi channel tries to attract its audiences by importing successful show 
formats, such as game shows and reality TV. Abu Dhabi Al Oula even tried to capitalise on 
the popularity of Turkish series, which when first aired were a big success in the Emirates. 
Accordingly, the channel bought all the airing rights only to discover that viewers lost 
interest. A marketing employee from ADMC marketing division describes how user feedback 
was acquired in focus groups, and how different age groups were asked to give criticism. 
She summarises the overall impression: 
 
“Most of [the participants] said: ‘We don’t believe in the Abu Dhabi TV 
anymore because they underestimated us, they don’t treat us well, they 
don’t respect our mentalities.’ [...] About Turkish series [the participants] 
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said: ‘We can see one romantic stories from one time to another but it 
doesn’t mean that we need to see the romantic stories for more than six 
months.’ [...] They [rather] like to watch real show[s], talk show[s] where it’s 
more close to the real world, their world.”463 
 
Her evaluation is confirmed by the criticism expressed by the students. Although 
they eagerly watched shows with stories they could relate to yet did not find these on local 
channels outside Ramadan, the range of programmes on the local channels did not entice 
them. One student explains that she usually watches English television only: “I only watch 
Arabic channels in Ramadan, because they are not interesting normally.”464 Female students 
in particular state they prefer the “Oprah Winfrey Show” on mbc4 over local talk shows.465 
The idea of importing and ‘localising’ successful foreign programmes seems to be a 
foolproof way to make the local channels more attractive. However, although the students 
liked watching the “Oprah Winfrey Show” (females more than males), they ridiculed the 
UAE version “Nashwa.”466  
Overall the local channels were discarded as “boring”467 and not “real.”468 These 
keywords can be interpreted as ‘not professional in style’ and ‘not relevant to the lives of 
the viewers.’ The question posed by such feedback then is whether the channels are merely 
‘unprofessional’ or whether audience preferences have changed. Abu Dhabi TV especially, 
which is aiming to be the television of the nation, was mainly discarded as old-fashioned, 
one students saying for instance: “My grandma watches the Emirates channel, we don’t 
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watch it [...] Even if I’m scrolling through [the local channels,] I never saw anything 
interesting.”469  
The detachment students expressed towards the local media indicates that the 
government’s media strategy to control yet remain relevant for the nationals is flawed. The 
students’ preferences towards imported television shows confirm what media scholar 
James Curran states about countries with weak local TV economies. He remarks that 
American and Hollywood productions would fill the gap left by the local media and become 
the main consumed media.470 Similarly, in the UAE TV series from Egypt and Lebanon fill the 
gap of missing local content during Ramadan. The question is whether this has already 
becomes a cultural habitus which make pan-Arabic media the nexus for communities of 
sentiment, and thus a national media obsolete. The feedback of the students does not 
confirm this though. The willingness to turn towards local media on certain occasions (such 
as Ramadan) signifies a willingness to form a local media community. The following 
discussion will argue that in the UAE global media providers and local media can co-exist if it 
was not for the lack of convincing content in the UAE media. 
 
 
5.1.2 The co-existence of sub-communities and mass audiences under the 
umbrella of a ‘national’ audience 
 
In his analysis of Arab satellite broadcastings, Hafez raises the important aspect of 
the customisation of audiences to mass entertainment. He remarks that “the market 
orientation of Arab television, in contrast [to public broadcasting], reinforces the trend of 
perpetuating audiences’ cultural preferences (and biases) in order to receive large 
transmission rating and advertising.”471 While in the case of the UAE media the previous 
review of media policies confirm this observation, it has to be differentiated when it comes 
to audiences. The pursuit of a commercial policy of mass entertainment has led to a 
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perpetuation of a certain media style. The perpetuation of symbols, narratives, show 
formats and other elements of mainstream media can therefore lead to viewers getting 
accustomed to certain media forms. Hafez’s statement presumes that audiences over time 
appreciate this homogenising media style. Yet media has to change constantly to attract 
attention and reach sub-audiences which re-form continually. And a media which tries to 
reach the largest possible mass audience can also create a hostile reaction for just that 
homogeneity. An example: commercial mass media in the USA led to protests by various 
interest groups during the 1960s who felt that the interests of minority publics were 
neglected. They demanded a “public service network that shall broadcast what is good, not 
what is popular.”472 The result was the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and the foundation 
of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).473  
In the case of PBS, communities opposed the trend of a homogenising best-selling 
media style rather than accepting it. Media scholar James Curran argues that only a 
diversification of the media can induce local audiences to remain focused on their local 
media industry. This diversity however does not mean a mere specialisation into fan-
channels (sports, drama, etc.) as is the case in the UAE, but making the media accessible to 
the different communities of the nation. The example of Baynounah channel illustrated that 
the government media assumes to ‘know’ what kind of media the national viewers want. It 
solely appoints itself to provide such media and carefully safeguards its integrity. Despite 
seeming diversified the representation of the nation remains homogenised across all 
channels. Curran uses the example of public broadcast in the UK to argue that global media 
alone does not necessarily sever ties between nation, television, and audiences, but that on 
the contrary a different form of unity can be provided by the national media, a “unity 
through diversity, a sense of togetherness informed by an awareness of regional 
difference.”474 In a scenario such as the UAE the government media strategy does not 
permit a form of public broadcast in which various sub-communities could feel represented 
in one national media. Since other media offers are accessible, these in turn compensate for 
the lack of diversity. 
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A national media which can no longer attract local audiences is a challenge for any 
nation-state with wide access to transnational media. Scholars such as Morley and Robins, 
Elihu Katz, Gitlin and others agree that national media and consequently national identity is 
threatened by globalised media.475 Elihu Katz remarked that interest groups evolve around 
niche media and form new specialised identities. As a consequence they grow more and 
more apart from the nation-state and re-form into de-nationalised communities.476 Yet the 
feedback of the Emirati students has shown that there is still an interest in the national 
media and a willingness to consume it. What Katz pessimistically calls splintering and 
fractured mass publics does not necessarily mean that national media becomes obsolete by 
principle.477 Although students interviewed mainly watched foreign TV shows and movies, 
they were eager to find programmes which represented their regional communities and 
social phenomena. Their appreciation of the Emirati cartoons during Ramadan illustrates 
that they chose programmes close to their daily experience. The need to see stories 
depicted on TV they can relate to could also be observed in the discussions about the other 
blockbuster of Ramadan 2009, “Umm al-Banāt”. Both male and female students agreed that 
the story of the Kuwaiti mother, her daughters, and her selfish unloving husband was the 
most popular of the season.  
The storyline of the series led to heated discussions about its plausibility and 
applicability to Emirati society. Some students dismissed the main characters as irritatingly 
unrealistic, while others acknowledged that, though it was obviously exaggerated for the 
television, similar cases of neglect and humiliation of wives and daughters could also occur 
in Emirati society. Other students identified the family troubles of the series as a typical 
Kuwaiti phenomenon. One girl even commented that such a situation was unlikely to occur 
in the UAE because the long-suffering wife would have been supported by her family: when 
asked why the depicted situation could happen in Kuwait, she responded that family bonds 
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were not as tight or as meaningful as they are in the Emirates.478 A male student in another 
focus group remarked that Emirati men were far too fond of their daughters to neglect 
them as the man did in the series.479 Although the majority of their peers dismissed these 
notions as overly idealistic, the discussion itself demonstrates that if on-screen content is 
deemed unconvincing, it can propagate a belief that the depicted phenomena simply do not 
happen in real life.  
In the case of “Umm al-Banāt” those viewers refusing to use the impulse of the 
series to reflect on mishaps in their own society could comfortably refer to the foreign origin 
of the series in order not to openly discuss problems. Yet as a Kuwaiti production, the series 
was deemed more relevant to the daily lives of the students than, for example, Egyptian or 
Syrian dramas. In lieu of an equivalent Emirati series, the students resorted to “Umm al-
Banāt” as the one they could identify with more. These observations show that contrary to 
Hafez’s evaluation of the Arab satellite broadcasts the supposedly ‘perpetuated 
preferences’ of Arab audiences are much more complex: the media can reproduce a popular 
style (such as Hollywood) which attracts audiences while alienating them at the same time. 
The feedback of the Emirati students has demonstrated that a shared interest in a media 
format or programme (i.e. Ramadan series) does not annihilate the other imagined 
communities individuals attribute themselves to. Their consumption of, and their interest in, 
the mass media can bring people together as a mass public (i.e. a fan group or political 
party) - yet it is crucial to bear in mind this is topical and situational.  
Remembering Fraser’s notion of multiple publics and the concept of situational 
identities discussed in Chapter 1, this means that media audiences are diverse and shifting. 
A remark made by a media professional shows how belonging to one community does not 
eliminate the other. About the game show “Tons of Cash” aired on Abu Dhabi 1, she stated:  
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“I will tell you something: the programme, it’s not bad, it’s nice. But if I see 
it in LBC channel I will like it more. If I see these programmes in Abu Dhabi 
channel, I feel that it’s not showing me or my country, this is different.”480  
 
Her comment suggests that foreign media do not fill the need for national media, but 
that both are evaluated differently by the audience. The situational identification with a 
media genre, topic etc. does not annihilate the association with other communities. Katz’ 
criticism is based on a definition of ‘mass-publics’ (as dichotomy to ‘splintering’, minority 
publics) which does not consider their situational character. Although mass media is 
considered to conceptualise viewers as one audience or ‘mass’, a different notion is more 
adequate: mass media can be understood as entertainment for the largest possible group 
consisting of various sub-communities or the lowest common denominator. Accordingly, it 
has to be encoded with specifics which are understood and appreciated by a wide range of 
communities in terms of their tastes and expectations. Since these are raised by the genre 
‘blockbuster’, ‘independent’, ‘family film’ etc. the product will be judged accordingly.  
The quoted Emirati said that she is looking for “me or my country” when she 
switches to a local channel. She is looking for confirmation or what Homi Bhabha described 
as a feeling of ‘homecoming’ which the channels, in their eagerness to produce mass media, 
do not provide.481 As another students remarked with regards to the local channels,  
 
“Local channels don’t represent local culture. They show what most 
viewers would watch and most viewers are foreigners, so that’s why they 
don’t really portray our culture; they just give you something.”482 
 
This statement expresses the core of the discrepancy between a one-sided media 
and audiences in the UAE. It has become clear that the lack of diversity represented through 
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sub-communities of the nationals is not a specific UAE phenomenon. Other national media 
struggle to remain relevant in their localities albeit global commercial media. However, in 
the UAE those who oppose mainstream media interpret the problem according to the 
conditions of their media landscape. A look at how media students and professionals explain 
the discrepancy between audiences and media will show how the notions of ‘local’ and 
‘global’ are translated into an interpretive framework of ‘otherness.’ 
 
 
5.2 Beyond detachment: media as a ‘foreign’ parallel discourse 
 
Building on the notion of mass media meaning ‘accessible to the widest possible 
conglomerate of audiences,’ a similar notion can be applied to ‘global media.’ Global 
satellite channels and cinema films can be ‘local media’ at the same time. Their globality 
means that they use code systems which are understandable to a wide range of local 
audiences and appreciated by them. As an example, though Hollywood or BBC are produced 
in specific localities, their complex funding strategies and their content are not bound to a 
specific locality.483 The previously discussed media usage of the interviewed students 
showed how the belonging to both global and local territorialised communities of sentiment 
can co-exist. In the framework of Appadurai’s communities of sentiment the power of 
imagination translates de-localised images into local practices.484 Yet paradoxically Stuart 
Hall and Homi Bhaba have observed that locality can simultaneously be experienced as 
juxtaposed to globality. The latter can be experienced as opposed to Bhabha’s notion of 
“home-coming”, which is a notion semantically connected to ‘local’ and ‘authentic.485’ 
The UAE national media enforces these dichotomies by its inability to convince 
Emirati audiences of its relevance to their daily experiences. Since its establishment the UAE 
media landscape has strongly relied on foreign expertise. Since they are involved in all 
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aspects of its production, the expatriate media professionals are intrinsically linked to the 
media’s image. The first part of this section will observe how this connection manifests itself 
by making foreign media professionals responsible for the media’s lack of local authenticity. 
The ways in which these notions are experienced are unique characteristics of the UAE 
media landscape: global media is not only consumed in the UAE but located within its 
territorial borders. Equally, media producers are not only influenced by global media styles 
but are foreigners themselves. Although the foreign media professionals are recruited by a 
government-owned company, the Emirati students interviewed for this chapter thought of 
them as invaders who deprive Emirati nationals from job opportunities. They labelled the 
mainly Levantine media professionals as ‘Lebanese Media Mafia’. As a generalising 
argument the discourse of a ‘Lebanese Media Mafia’ conceals the actual role foreigners play 
in the media industry and glosses over other reasons for an unattractive media. The opinion 
that only local media professionals are able to translate Emirati identity into a plausible 
national media is telling in itself. It reveals a basic assumption that ‘localness’ is a value to be 
extracted and protected from an imagined ‘outside’.  
Theoretically Emiratisation of the media should dissolve this obstacle and create an 
Emirati media elite. But for the government the merits of the campaign are in its marketing 
value.486 Therefore the opinions of media employees will be considered in the discussion. 
Their working relationship with foreigners will lead to a different conclusion on the role 
played by foreigners.  
As the second part of the section will show, complex structures are established 
within the TV industry, based on agents willing or forced to perpetuate variations of 
censorship. These structures cannot be considered as shrewdly designed but evolving 
through human interaction in the work space. The initial set-up of the national media had 
allocated the role of ‘apprentices’ to the Emiratis – a role which the newer generations have 
outgrown. The ‘experts’ were positioned under the ideological framework of the 
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government. This framework however can only be challenged by UAE nationals, while the 
expatriates have a personal material interest in complying with restriction and maintain 
their position as ‘teachers’ of the Emiratis. Rather than feeling patronised by a one-sided 
media structure, the conflict between Emirati sub-communities and an authoritarian 
mainstream is deflected into a conflict between ‘us’ and ‘others’, or ‘local’ versus ‘foreign.’ 
As a result the diversity of Emirati locality becomes a subjugated discourse. The last 
part of this section will exemplify how being Emirati can become an alternative discourse, 
which even erupts into the official media. The dispute will illustrate how the Emirati 
audiences have not lost interest in their national media, but consume and appreciate it if 
controversies are depicted. The interaction between official and unofficial media in the 
discussed case will be indicative of the possibilities for grassroots changes in the UAE media. 
 
 
5.2.1 How the ‘Lebanese Media Mafia’ is held responsible for the insufficiencies of 
the local media 
 
The perception of media students that their national media is not relevant to their 
daily life experiences can be traced back to both weak content (not ‘real’, ‘boring’ etc.) and 
lack of visual representation of Emirati identity. The shortage of engaging content was only 
in exceptional cases attributed to government censorship but more often explained in 
general phrases such as “The things you can say here are very limited. Even if you open 
social topics, they won’t like what you are saying.”487 Many students were convinced that 
‘they’ represented the TV management and executives who, incidentally, were Arab 
expatriates. Similarly the detachment from what and whom the students see on screen was 
explained by the fact that a majority of foreigners present shows, are news reporters, or are 
interviewed.488 The large number of Egyptian or Moroccan TV presenters is not attributed to 
a lack of Emirati presenters per se but a domination of foreigners. The popular opinion is 
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that since the staff behind the scenes is not Emirati, the media output naturally cannot 
mirror Emirati identity and culture.489  
The argument that a UAE national media should be produced and presented by 
insiders of the community can be convincing and even DMI’s head of design acknowledged 
that his Lebanese team initially had difficulties targeting the Emirati TV audience. Invited 
from Lebanon to the UAE in 2006 specifically to re-brand Dubai channels, he explains that 
most of his team’s difficulties in producing a convincing local brand stem from insufficient 
local knowledge:  
 
“It’s very hard to work for people you don’t know. There was a period of 
four years of work: down the drain. All my understanding of the culture 
was totally wrong. We [the Lebanese designers] had a vision that the area 
is decadent, people are not moving on, it’s a closed culture; then you come 
here and it takes some time. So you discover the differences, then you 
start to understand the nuances. We were just thrown into it [...] and we 
made a lot of mistakes.”490 
  
On the long run his expatriate team succeeded with an admittedly foolproof strategy 
which did not require any ‘inside knowledge’ of the Emirati society: they interpret and 
project the official narrative in a way young audiences could relate to, by mixing symbols of 
the UAE past with contemporary landmarks. Accordingly one student remarked that the 
layout “represents the traditional way. Even [though] they are creative, you feel that it’s 
something related to our culture.”491 This statement expresses the internalisation and 
acceptance of the ideology of national identity – yet only on the surface of symbolic 
representation: the programme content was discarded as irrelevant. None of the students 
watched programmes which ‘modernise’ local traditions or ‘modern’ achievements such as 
the poetry competitions. While in terms of branding, the high percentage of foreigners does 
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not necessarily lead to a less ‘Emirati’ media the involvement of foreigners in media 
production has become a ready-made justification for numerous grievances locals have with 
the media landscape. Blaming the expatriates for all aspects in which the media does not 
meet the demands of the UAE nationals has developed into a self-supporting discourse 
which in turn dictates how insufficiencies in the media are interpreted. The high proportion 
of Levantine Arabs in the industry has inspired the conspiratorial notion that they are the 
ones running the show, succinctly conveyed by the widely-used expression: ‘Lebanese 
Media Mafia’. 
While it is impossible to verify exactly how many foreign experts are employed by 
the local channels,492 several visits to different departments have empirically demonstrated 
that the design, production and administration teams are predominately staffed by non-GCC 
Arab expatriates. Emiratisation policies that have been continuously implemented since 
2005 have done little to counteract these demographics. Without going into the details of 
these policies (and their shortcomings), it is worth noting that although the government has 
tried to enforce employment quotas, Emiratis and expatriates both remain reluctant to 
recruit locals. The practice to import experts into the country has resulted in an abundance 
of international talent for local employers to choose from.493 Despite these difficulties, the 
government is eager to impress the public with stories of their success: Sama Dubai was 
swiftly identified as a leader in Emiratisation and ceremoniously for meeting Ministry of 
Labour targets.494 However, the quotas of Emirati employees may be easily manipulated, at 
least on paper, so that government entities may appear to employ more locals than they 
actually do. Many government sectors (and state-run companies) are employing 
development consultancy teams on a freelance or project-related basis. Therefore, these 
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sectors may be largely reliant on an imported workforce without ever having to disclose the 
fact.495 
Regardless how many DMI and ADMC employees are actually Levantine, the idea of 
the ‘Lebanese Media Mafia’ is rather indicative of a common feeling among Emiratis of 
marginalisation from foreign experts in general. Emirati actor and producer Ali Al Jabri 
explored the experience of young Emirati job seekers in his three-minute film “The 
Consultant”, which debuted at the 2011 Dubai Film Festival. The short film shows a young 
Emirati going to a job interview, where he presents his idea to a board of only mildly 
attentive Emirati businessmen. When he leaves the room, however, a European-looking 
applicant walks straight in after him, flips over the intricate structure chart his predecessor 
had left behind, and fluently begins his own presentation without even a second’s pause. 
The board members immediately sit up straight and follow his elaborations with great 
interest. At this point, one of Al Jabri’s colleagues at the Film Festival explained: “You see, 
they always listen to the English”.496 The short film expresses a general feeling of 
discrimination towards competent Emiratis who by default will be disadvantaged despite 
equal or even greater competence. In ADMC several local employees expressed their 
confidence of having outgrown the phase of learning from and depending on expatriates, 
yet being prevented from proving their capabilities. An employee from ADMC described a 
typical situation as follows:  
 
“What happens is: they ask us ‘what is the meaning of this? What’s the 
meaning of that, what’s the meaning?’ I tell him, ‘why?’ He said ‘I want to 
make a local programme.’ I told him, ‘Give it to me. I will do it the right 
way.’ [...] If you have the experience [as an expatriate], if you are 
graduated, if you know what you do, I will respect you: you will add [value] 
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for me, right? But if you don’t know anything, you will spoil everything and 
you will damage everything.”497 
 
The employee made it quite clear in this interview that he felt foreign expertise 
could be a valuable asset, but that the locals are more than capable to produce their own 
media. Especially with regards to ‘local’ programmes, the views of the students were 
confirmed by the employees: local people should produce the local media, simply because 
their being Emirati can make them produce better local content. As another ADMC 
employee ascertained: “We are the local people, we have to do everything and they [the 
foreigners] can [as well], no problem, doesn’t matter the degree, the salary... This is not the 
point. The point at the last is what you will see on this screen.”498 
The last remark is significant with regard to an ideal community of media producers: 
the aim should be the shared interest in media production. However the term ‘Lebanese 
Media Mafia’ summarises a discourse which characterises the expatriate Arab media 
experts as a closed-off community of their own.499 On a grassroots level teams with mixed 
nationalities can have a good working relationship, yet interviewees will refer to the 
Lebanese controlling everything without realising they are indirectly including their own 
colleagues.500 The discourse runs parallel to the performance and experience of the 
individuals involved yet does not seem to be perceived as contradictory. As a narrative 
reality it draws its strength and validity not from personal experience (though this can of 
course strengthen it) but by the way it meshes structures and exaggerates them in a 
plausible way. It is true that media executives are often from Lebanon, a major centre for 
Arab media, the logic along which the Lebanese media mafia then develops makes sense: ‘of 
course they will employ their friends from Lebanon.’ The consequence, ‘We Emirati’s are 
alienated from our media and jobs taken away’, appears just as logical. Given this, there 
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seems no need to examine the true scope of the phenomenon and personal experiences 
strengthen the discourse further. This form of internalisation, an interpretive process which 
intertwines experiences and their narratives enforces structures from which they originate 
and forms a strong element of their persistence. People will act upon the assumption and 
acceptance of the structure which is perceived as truth but relies on its circulation via 
narratives. At the same time Emirati media employees experience that, although a minority 
in numbers, they are supported by official Emiratisation policies as well as by their Emirati 
programme managers. One presenter stated clearly that her Emirati superior editor was 
especially eager to train and develop young Emirati presenters and Emirati news presenters 
from ADMC also confirmed the support they received from their Emirati management. 501 
The examples show that the power of a Lebanese Media Mafia is indeed a conspiratorial 
theory. Embedded in a wider discourse, in which the ‘foreign element’ is a general label for 
other phenomena as well. Emirati students could easily interpret story of “Umm al-Banāt” 
for example as a foreign case, an imported story from Kuwait, which could not happen in 
the Emirates. The exclusion of specifically Emirati stories and social issues from the media 
fosters a psychological comfort zone, in which the Emirati society appears as harmonious 
and untarnished.  
 
 
5.2.2 The ‘Media Mafia’ as scapegoat for the government’s tight grasp on the 
media sector 
 
Though employees of the broadcasting companies do not usually deal with the NMC 
directly, anticipation of editorial censorship serves as a major hindrance. Presenters and 
media professionals working for the channels perceive themselves as being subject to the 
executive decisions of the media institution. The Lebanese head of creative design 
department in DMI stressed that while he was expected to bring international mainstream 
standards to the national media (hence why foreign experts have often been recruited), his 
team had to fight for the implementation of their ideas in their daily work. Any new content 
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requires approval from a higher management level, and the designer complained that it is 
often difficult to convince the relevant bureaucrat that a certain design or image should be 
realised. He did, however, concede that novelties were sometimes permitted, provided that 
the artist was willing and able to provide good reasons for the creative decision.502 Whether 
they are Emiratis or expatriates, media professionals who are eager to ‘push boundaries’ 
and challenge established patterns of (self-)censorship will encounter uncooperative 
individuals, and must evaluate potential benefits and risks before they choose to proceed.  
Although expatriates risk losing their jobs (and therefore their residency), UAE 
nationals risk the disapproval of an (imagined) social mainstream which stand firm behind 
the government’s narrative of a homogenous UAE community. After all, the media discourse 
has established the image of ‘one nation’, hence ‘one national identity’. By voicing an 
alternative opinion, an individual might not feel backed up by a sub-community but as one 
denigrator breaking the ranks of an otherwise harmonic community. As a result the 
alternative voice may be perceived as an attempt to distort the portrayal of their own 
society and subvert the social discussion they had hoped to inspire. Whether this would 
happen or not, these are serious considerations for any individual in the course of doing or 
saying anything against the public mainstream: will I be backed up by anybody or find myself 
alone and rejected. While more self-confident individuals may be less wary of these 
outcomes, individuals who believe they are vulnerable to prosecution or public criticism are 
most likely to fall victim of self-censorship in their day-to-day lives. Famous Emirati 
journalist Sultan Al Qasimi, on the other hand, can confidently criticise the Federal National 
Council in a daily newspaper: the prestige and respect his family name (he is a member of 
the ruling family of Sharjah) legitimises and excuses his opinions, no matter how ‘subversive’ 
they might otherwise seem.503  
Some interviewees assumed that if the decision makers were expatriates then their 
personal interest in a secure job would prevail over their aim to produce interesting 
content. The presenter of local TV show “Shababna” (“Our Youth”) complained that she was 
rarely asked which topics she would like to cover. She attributed this to foreign 
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scriptwriters’ reluctance to cover socially relevant ‒ yet taboo ‒ topics such as flirting, 
homosexuality, and anything related to young people’s struggles with societal restrictions. 
In her opinion this was due not only to the maturity of the writers, which rendered them 
“out of touch” with young audiences in the UAE, but to their desire to keep it “safe”: 
sticking to re-covering previously aired topics to avoid clashing with their editors-in-chief. 
She summarised: “They are afraid, and why should they do something which might make 
them lose their job?”504  
By drawing together the demographic imbalance of the Emirati media industry with 
the content it produces, the presenter reached a popular conclusion: that expatriates 
cannot identify with the local media landscape and are therefore disinterested in their own 
productions (and perhaps even in the country). It is useful here to remember the opinion 
expressed by interviewees that expatriates do not understand the Emirati society or respect 
their values. Bringing these opinions together this would mean that the ‘Emiratiness’ of the 
UAE media was indeed a lost cause. The question is whether a detached and disinterested 
group of foreigners are producing what is supposed to be the platform, screen, and 
mouthpiece of Emirati identity. Such a generalising conclusion is not only insupportable but 
a convenient excuse not to look deeper into the real causes for an experienced detachment 
of the media from Emirati society. 
Like other discourses of discrimination, the group considered to be the cause of 
discontent can very easily become a scapegoat for other grievances. Many ADMC 
employees, dissatisfied with executive-imposed changes, perceive the large recruitment of 
foreign expertise as indicative of more than industrial instability and distrust of local 
competence. The notion of being held back by managers and editors-in-chief, who are 
mainly Arab expatriates, is obvious from statements such as “working in the media is not 
nice, because it’s the only field [in which] you will find like – like, a mafia inside it”.505 The 
notion that a ‘Lebanese Media Mafia’ is controlling the content and presentation on screen 
has gained popularity with the increasing number of Lebanese media professionals.  
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The ethnic imbalance in media production aside, Lebanese pop culture and content 
is currently in demand, and channels are obviously eager to cater to this. The industry 
therefore faces a serious dilemma: foreigners working in the media are producing content 
which is supposedly alienating locals while simultaneously meeting their expectations of 
visual media. Thus the UAE is thought by locals to have employed agents deemed capable of 
meeting global standards at the expense of locally relevant content. The regional and 
professional demographics do not, however, support this belief: media students and 
employees alike made clear in various interviews that they perceived Dubai’s channels as 
more authentic (more ‘Emirati’) than Abu Dhabi’s, yet both industries are dominated by 
Arab expatriates.506  
The notion of an industrial ‘invasion’ also presumes that local media producers 
would not face the same difficulties of self-censorship. Such naivety was perfectly illustrated 
by Al Hind’s aforementioned criticism of foreign scriptwriters for shying away from socially 
relevant topics such as sexuality, when locals are equally wary of depicting this. The idea of 
a ‘Media Mafia’ enables the Emiratis to blame someone else for their own internalised 
belief that locals will never be able to achieve true self-expression in the current climate. 
Students who had never previously worked for the local media industry proved this when 
they were questioned about their future ambitions. When asked whether they would like to 
one day participate in or even host their own talk show, one student sardonically remarked: 
“The things you can say there are very limited. Even if you open social stuff and they don’t 
like what you’re saying.”507 This statement is significant for the conspiratorial yet imprecise 
nature of a discriminatory discourse: “They” are undefined yet powerful. In the context of 
the discussion, this student most probably referred to ADTV media executives and editors-
in-chief, but resonating in the inexplicit term ‘they’ could just as well be ‘the government’ or 
the ‘policy makers.’  
Once again, Abu Dhabi suffers by comparison: when asked why they would prefer to 
work for DMI rather than for ADTV, students often cited their lack of respect for ADTV 
decisions regarding what could or should be discussed on screen. One Abu Dhabi student 
stated: “Sama Dubai encourages people to talk about things, here [people] think everything 
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is ʿayb [shameful/ not to be talked about] for example, ‘child abuse’.”508 Her peers agreed 
with her on this point, which suggests that Dubai is popularly perceived as being more 
daring than its neighbour.509 The conspiratorial notion of a Lebanese ‘Media Mafia’ does not 
withstand closer observation, but it certainly serves as a locum for other obstacles Emiratis 
face when trying to screen original content.510 It serves as an explanation and excuse for a 
structure which is based on the anticipatory compliance of agents who translate censorship 
postulates of the government. As such the reference to a ‘Media Mafia’ distracts from a 
closer observation of the government’s role in controlling freedom of expression. As a 
result, the government appears to be on the side of the complaining Emirati media 
professionals: after all the media sector is part of Emiratisation policy. Yet the campaign is 
mainly a contribution to the government’s public image. Although it has been up and 
running since 2004 it was not until early 2010 that the authorities began to talk about 
establishing a national committee for the purpose of Emiratising the media sector in 
particular.511 During the first quarter of 2010 FNC member Amal al-Qubaisi remarked that 
there was still a remarkable imbalance towards foreign experts in all sectors, elaborating 
that "Emirati broadcasters account for only 17.8 percent of the total staff of radio and TV 
(stations), while the percentage is as low as 10 percent in the press."512  
These observations indicate that it is actually in the interest of the government, 
which controls everything, to uphold the established structure in the media. Without 
replacing the conspiratorial idea of a ‘Media Mafia’ by equally conspiratorial assumption of 
a sophisticated government plan, the reliance on foreign media employees does seem 
conveniently designed to ensure the practice of self-censorship. The daily experience of an 
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Emirati media professional is that she or he is being controlled by expatriate editors. The 
government meanwhile can market itself as the supporter of Emiratis. In this scenario, 
locality is watered down to banding attributes of the government, thus the local relevance 
of media content is left behind. The Emiratis, who discard the local media as non-related to 
them resort to alternative media spheres to enter a dialogue on their national identity. How 
these alternative discourses can reflect back to the official media is illustrated by the 
following dispute. 
 
 
5.2.3 The excitement about “mixed marriages”: how sensitive issues erupt into 
the official media discourse 
 
Since topics Emirati audiences can relate to are not critically reflected in the official 
media, interviewed students resorted to other forms of media, where communities of 
sentiment can be formed, such as BlackBerry and social networks. While speaking to media 
students from the Abu Dhabi Higher College of Technology, one group, after complaining 
about the lack of interesting topics discussed on television, half jokingly requested 
somebody should organise grassroots media. Asking them why they needed somebody to 
organise this for them, given that they were more than capable to start such a project 
themselves, one student jovially remarked: “Miss, we can’t do that”, and mimicked a cut-
through throat, laughing.513  
But far from being content with dialogues in unofficial spheres, whenever hot topics 
or scoops are picked up by the official media, audience attention can be assured. When a 
local counseling show discussed female cross-gender dressing and homosexuality in the 
UAE, the episode not only made the daily news, but was immediately uploaded on YouTube 
and achieved 56,678 viewing hits within a week.514 The demand for public discussions 
makes audiences ready to become TV consumers as well as perceptive to media 
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interactivity. But it seems that participation in the media discourse is merely triggered by 
the official discourse and then retreats into the unofficial media sphere. However, since 
there is media interactivity, there is also the potential for the unofficial discourse to bounce 
back into the official media. A rather explosive example for such a case developed around 
the ongoing discourse of the preservation of Emirati identity on an ethnic level. Recurring 
topics of the discourse on mixed marriages are the high expenses of marriages for young 
Emiratis as well as the phenomenon of Emirati men marrying non-nationals, which is 
repeatedly raised from officials as a potential threat to the community identity.515  
According to newspaper reports the trend of Emirati men marrying foreign women 
that started in the 1980s caused the government to introduce policies which would support 
inter-Emirati marriages, such as a limitation on dowries, as well as setting up government 
institutions to support national couples’ wedding expenses and to help set up family 
homes.516 The UAE Marriage Foundation was founded in 1992 to implement the 
government’s plan to preserve the Emirati national population as an ethnic community.517 
The foundation campaigned for health checks on local couples to reduce genetic diseases, 
such as thalassaemia.518 Since the number of mixed marriages has risen constantly to reach 
a new high in 2010, with 30% of marriages being mixed, the institution of a Marriage 
Foundation is in danger of being perceived as a tool of racial discrimination rather than a 
preserver of local identity. During the last few years the Marriage Foundation’s public 
relations have become less openly concerned with ethnicity than being supportive of 
successful marriages.519  
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The topic of mixed marriages is embedded in the discourse on national identity, fear 
of foreign domination in the UAE, and gender inequality. Heated discussions were ongoing 
on the internet, while the government remained firm in its policy on ethnic identity and 
advertising for the cause by focusing on different aspects of the problem. The famously high 
dowries demanded by Gulf families are an important part of the debate, repeatedly brought 
up by officials and commentators as the main reason for the decline in marriages between 
Emirati nationals. Over the last few years the focus of the official discourse has been on 
supporting stable families, picking up on the phenomenon of high divorce rates in the 
Emirates and trying to imply that children from a mixed background are more likely to grow 
up in troubled family circumstances. In Ramadan 2010 the grand Mufti of Dubai caused 
controversy when he picked up an idea already voiced in 2005520, that of legally restricting 
the possibility of Emiratis marrying non-nationals. At a forum discussion he pointed out that 
mixed marriages were more likely to end in a divorce and harm the psychological well-being 
of children from such marriages. Accordingly he stated that “personal freedoms can be 
restricted for the benefit of the public interest.”521  
Another discussion participant, representing the Juvenile Care Association in Dubai, 
was even more outspoken, stating that mixed marriages could “create a generation of 
Emiratis with mixed loyalties”.522 The report caused immediate emotional disputes, being 
distributed via social networking sites. The responses from journalists quoted nationals with 
mixed parenthood, showing how the Grand Mufti’s statement had personally insulted some 
Emiratis. A more comprehensive article by the renowned commentator Sultan Saoud Al-
Qassimi was published both in Arabic and English newspapers almost a week after the 
original report523 and posted online via Twitter and Facebook with comments such as “Yeah! 
Mixed and proud!”524 Sultan Saoud Al Qassimi is a member of staff at the Dubai School of 
Governance, and an active media personality, whose controversial articles are frequently 
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posted and discussed in local internet forums.525 His article on mixed marriages followed the 
same structure as the previous one, giving examples of famous Emiratis who have become 
role-models for the new generation, and asking: “So are they Emirati enough?” 526 
While on the basis of social reality of many Emiratis the discrimination against mixed 
marriages causes discontent, the issue ultimately has further reaching consequences for the 
rulers’ legitimacy. After all, the ruling elite are defined along tribal lines, which are perceived 
as lines of origin. Based on the image of legitimate historical rulers of the nation, marriage is 
a political act for the ruling elite and throughout the classes of Emirati society, a statement 
of national identity, or even a service to the state. If the social reality develops towards 
more and more mixed marriages and even if an Emirati national may have one national and 
one foreign wife, the next generation is already discriminated against by birth. One of the 
2010 forum discussants was even quoted by newspapers to have highlighted forms such 
discriminations could take. He claimed that “he had seen figures suggesting more than 60 
per cent of Emiratis who marry outside their nationality earn less than Dh10,000 monthly.” 
The official reason was attributed to a lack of Arabic language skills, rather than diminished 
access to better jobs.527  
If the current trend continues, the government can no longer uphold the prestigious 
image of the pure Emirati family it has tried to establish. One can expect the question of 
lineage to be questioned more and more, and develop into a discussion about the 
importance of a pure lineage, with which a large percentage of the population will not 
identify anymore. At the moment the lineage of the ruling families makes them appear very 
different than the masses and symbols of an imagined shared identity of authentic and pure 
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Arabs. If a higher level of prestige based on lineage becomes problematic and perceived as 
unjust, the legitimisation of the established ruling class becomes questionable in turn. With 
the coming generation of rulers, who in many cases have foreign mothers, especially in 
Dubai, the whole notion of the UAE nation as an ethnic tribe union will become 
questionable.  
The way in which the official ideology was challenged in this case, and led to an 
interaction between official and non-official media, is telling for a generation of Emiratis 
ready to introduce new topics into the media arena. For once it seems the leap from 
unofficial media into the official media has taken place, which has in a way transformed an 
imagined community of sentiment into an interest group. Such encouraging behaviour with 
media shows that if a topic stirs enough emotions, people are indeed willing to make their 
opinions known to more than an imagined community of online friends and forum readers. 
At the same time the peculiarities of the dispute also highlight major difficulties. Although 
the internet discussions indirectly reflect back on the official discourse, they are brought 
into the official media by self-appointed agents with confidence to make their opinions 
public.528 Media personalities such as Sultan Saoud Al Qassimi are exceptions: as a member 
of the ruling family of Sharjah, he can bring up controversial topics without anything 
happening to him. But in order to develop the exceptional cases of public articulation into a 
practiced norm, Emiratis from less privileged backgrounds have to follow his example.  
Is fear of government prosecution preventing Emiratis from utilising the national 
media to represent their ideas and identities? The government’s presumes the role of 
guardian of national identity, but the media industry as an executive does not succeed. 
Hence, both media industry and national audiences have an interest ‒ economic as well as 
ideological ‒ in changing the media status quo and reconciling their control with the 
admittance of sub-communities. This explains why, despite a tight network of hindering 
factors (one of which is censorship, another is the imagined community of media 
producers), Emiratis can influence the official media. Just like the government is eager to 
appear as the legitimate representative of the people, the media wants to be recognised as 
backed and supported by the Emiratis. In the discrepancy between what Emiratis and the 
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 In the online version of the local news for example people commented on the articles, but the comments 
were either by expatriates or posted anonymously. 
209 
 
channels deem acceptable, relevant or ‘real,’ lies the potential for a change in the channels, 
given the approval of the government. In practice with such different aims and priorities, 
Emiratisation of the media sector could gradually lead to the formation of an interest group 
of Emiratis inside the media industry. 
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6 Trying to make a difference: media personalities and their ways to 
fame 
 
 
Despite Emiratisation the government will not allow journalists to cross the red lines 
of established political censorship. Enthusiastic Emirati media professionals may profit from 
Emiratisation policy when seeking employment, but they cannot rely on the government’s 
support if they want to freely explore their notions of what Emirati society should publicly 
discuss. Critics have already remarked that the focus on Emiratising the media distracts from 
the real issue of censorship.529 Taking up the term ‘authentic’ Emirati media, it has become 
clear: from the government’s perspective Emiratisation of the media sector does not equal a 
majority of Emiratis, but the creation of a dominant media discourse to promote the 
government’s notion of national identity. This results in a lack of authenticity in the eyes of 
Emiratis who long for a relatable local media.  
The Emirati media professionals who could produce the relevant content feel 
subjected to a structure which prevents them from developing their individual public 
profiles. According to their understanding this structure is enforced by their families 
(especially for women) as well as by expatriates dominating the media industry and acting 
as gatekeepers of the government’s media guidelines. The previous chapter has 
demonstrated how this scenario weakens the role of national media. Notions of 
representation are currently contested by the disapproval of both audiences and Emirati 
media professionals. The statements of the students and presenters that the media is not 
‘real’ or authentic challenges the rules of ‘seeing’ followed by the national media. Just as the 
satellite era changed the way people expected media to be, national media in the UAE has 
to reshuffle its forms of representation and set of approved topics in order to remain up to 
date. This chapter will show how individual Emirati media professionals have taken it upon 
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 Abu Dhabi-based Gulf News editor Abdullah Rasheed writes in an article published in Gulf News: “Of course, 
the issue of Emiratising the media in general and newspapers in particular should be discussed. But the media 
is faced with two major challenges. The first is the unregulated media openness, represented by the huge flow 
of information in the foreign media. The second is the inability of the national media to compete due to the 
restrictions imposed on them.” (Rasheed, 2009. The Ceiling of Press Freedom in UAE is Falling.) 
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themselves to make a difference and contribute their own ideas. These individuals follow a 
variety of different strategies to achieve their goals.  
One way is to try to affect change from within the channel by finding a ‘middle way’ 
between the channels’ expectations and personal goals. The lack of competition opens 
possibilities for Emirati presenters to attract local audience and try to offer it a public 
platform. The morning shows on Sama Dubai and the Abu Dhabi channels (such as “Sabāh 
al-ʾImārāt” (“Emirates’ Morning”) on Abu Dhabi’s Emirates Channel, or “Sabāh al-Ḫayr ya 
Baladī” (“Good Morning to my Country”) on Sama Dubai,)530 are for example keen to recruit 
local participants. These shows are not critical but create a space for local celebrities to talk 
about their projects and achievements. These might range from music and art to business 
ideas. Other shows focus on achievements of Emirati women from the established angle of 
representation.531 Emirati shows often follow government campaigns and cover state-
sponsored events.532 This opens a content gap which bears potential for presenters to cater 
audiences with different topics and to become famous.  
Part 6.1 will demonstrate how the university professor and talk show host Dr. Khalifa 
Al Suweidi achieved just this with his popular society talk show “Khutwa.” There is indeed an 
interest group among UAE media professionals who are attempting to change the current 
mainstream of the official media from within, and introduce formerly taboo topics into the 
public sphere. The diplomatic relationship with the existing practices means that they have 
to translate their ideas into a language suitable to the channels’ messages and show 
formats.  
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 These two ongoing shows are conducted in the typical style of local morning shows, inviting guests to talk 
about miscellaneous subjects, announcing events, and giving weather forecasts. Their profiles can be viewed 
on the websites of the channels: ADMC, 2011. Sabāh Al-ʾimārāt. And DMI, 2011. Sabāh Al-Ḫayr Ya Baladī. 
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 An example is “Nisaʾun Jiddan” (“Women Indeed”) on Dubai TV. The show was a 2010 re-launch of the 
show “Al-Marʾa al-Ḫalījīya” (“The Woman of the Gulf”) and featured successful, comfortable and content 
females, presenting a government-friendly image of empowered local women. 
532
 Not all of these rely on inviting officials as guests. The society talk show “Ḏull al-Kalām” on Dubai TV, for 
example, chose to broadcast various businesspeople discussing the recession that had hit the emirate’s 
economy hard. “Ḏull al-Kalām” also covered sensitive topics that were featuring heavily in public discourse at 
the time. When a child was raped and murdered by a UAE national on Eid Al Adha 2009, the topic became 
unavoidable. Newspaper reports and journalists’ comments swiftly began to document the shock experienced 
by the public. Accordingly, the host of “Ḏull al-kalām” invited a team of experts to discuss child abuse on his 
talk show. 
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While the attempt to change the media ‘from within’ is always in danger of 
assimilation, the independent path has to navigate around funding issues and direct 
censorship in order to create a media product. Another strategy is to create a public profile 
independently and to collaborate with the government media only once they have 
established enough of a ‘fan base’ to be able to dictate their own terms. The latter seems to 
be the method chosen by filmmakers and producers of genres such as cartoons and films. 
The ‘middle way’ approach might be thought of as the diplomatic method of negotiating 
internalised expectations as well as official requirements.  
The second strategy, referred to here as the ‘Maverick approach’, will be discussed 
in 6.2. It will show how producers who are working independently but in collaboration with 
the government channels deal with funding issues, censorship, and what can be summed up 
under the name of ‘publicity.’ The latter outlines the complex communication with their 
potential audiences which they have to develop into a fan base. To achieve this, a public 
resistance to or scepticism towards publicity has to be overcome. It seems difficult to 
pinpoint the source of these boundaries, since they seem to be perpetuated by individuals 
who themselves question them. It seems too easy to refer to cultural boundaries and 
perceptions of private and public in the light of media behaviour of Emirati audiences. 
 The stories of independent media producers explore how, at a certain level of 
success and publicity, the official media, though initially unsupportive, will gladly broadcast 
the popular productions. This structure mirrors what, on a personal level, the ADMC 
employees have voiced. Many of the female employees had experienced how their families 
approved their working in the media, but only in hindsight after the women had obtained a 
certain level of success. The pattern seems to be as expressed in the famous “Field of 
Dreams” quotation, “if you build it, they will come”: the media professionals cannot expect 
support and development of individuality and creativity in the first stage, but as soon as 
they gain them by other means, they have a good chance of becoming the new poster boy 
or girl for the local media. 
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6.1 The ‘middle way’ approach: changing the media from within 
 
A prominent presenter from DMI, Nashwa Al Ruwaini, described the future of the local 
media in a written interview as follows: 
 
“More social issues will start to be addressed through awareness 
campaigns and through TV content. I think we will start to see more 
discussion of the role of women in society as well as economic and 
development issues. There is a large drive and there will be more of this in 
the future to make Arabic a wider used language in the media. The quality 
of journalism will also improve, creating a new generation of thinkers and 
decision-makers too.”533 
 
Her wording follows the previously discussed language of government campaigns 
encouraging the future generation of “decision makers” and “leaders”. She accepts the 
notion of a government supporting educational media and expresses an interest in making 
Arabic media productions global players. Her optimistic view on upcoming developments 
comes from the position of a media producer driven by economic interests. For the 
individual media makers at the grassroots of the industry, the challenges for media look 
different: can a pseudo homogenous media landscape be shaken? 
Dr. Khalifa, the host of a famous Abu Dhabi counselling show, certainly sees it that 
way. As the first part of this section will show, he sees his programme as an educational tool 
to “transform thinking” and every episode is a step in a whole curriculum to lecture the 
audience on how to interpret society and what topics are important for the UAE to address. 
Like Nashwa Al Ruwaini, his experience and credentials make him eligible to join the ranks 
of those ‘entitled to speak’ in the public domain. 
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Dr. Khalifa’s show called “Khutwa” (“Step”)534 is to date the only live society show 
led by an Emirati host. Each episode includes at least two experts on the topic of the week 
and approximately two guests who talk about their personal experience or seek help with a 
problem. Between the parts when the experts are analysing the topic of the week, 
montages show glimpses of the lives of the cases discussed or other cases. Towards the end 
of the episodes Dr. Khalifa takes live phone calls and reads e-mails from viewers. The 
montages and calls, as well as the studio guests, are the basis for the discussions between 
Dr. Khalifa and the experts on the stage. 
The setting of the show is laid out to attract the viewers’ identification with 
individual life stories and Dr. Khalifa is particularly keen to address topics of a private and 
sensitive nature. The topics range from domestic violence, sexual education, ED to 
obsessions, addictions and phobic covetousness.535 Dr. Khalifa identifies such episodes as 
adult topics at the beginning of the show and studio guests are mostly kept anonymous 
behind an isolation glass. Montages of collecting opinions on the streets are sometimes 
presented during breaks. 
Although most of the interviewed Emirati students stated they barely had the time 
or interest to watch TV at all, “Khutwa” was at least considered worth watching 
occasionally, when an interesting topic was to be discussed. The latter is an exceptional 
show by Emirati television standards as it is to date the only talk show featuring live 
consultation and call-ins. By examining social phenomena, Dr. Khalifa Al Suweidi has 
managed to become famous over his three years on air for his willingness to address 
sensitive topics. 
However, as the second part of this section will discuss, Dr. Khalifa’s aim to educate 
make him an agent of the mainstream, which ‒ at least on TV ‒ homogenises Emirati society 
and alienates subjugated voices. After examining the style of the show, the last part of this 
section will focus on its contribution to the overall TV landscape. The question will be 
whether his live society show can satisfy the demand for ‘real’ media. 
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 The weekly show went on air in 2006 on Abu Dhabi Al Oula.  
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 Other topics are anger, addiction, sexual harassment at work, and relationships between partners. 
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6.1.1 Khutwa: Changing society or strengthening the image of its TV channel? 
 
Asked in an interview what induced him to host such a society show, Dr. Khalifa 
clearly stated that he saw his calling in educating ‘Arab society’. A university professor 
himself, he said his students motivated him to widen his audience from the lecture theatres 
of UAE University to the general public. Approaching Abu Dhabi TV with his idea he was 
offered an attractive salary and a support team to produce the show.536 For the channel the 
cooperation with Dr. Khalifa is ideal due to his high marketing value: he is clearly Emirati, as 
his dress and language signify, and therefore an asset to strengthen the channel’s local 
character. As a university professor, he speaks with authority and clearly reveals his 
conservative framework in his speech. A less experienced presenter might, involuntarily or 
intentionally, provoke criticism from conservative viewers or even from the government if 
allowed to host a live broadcast. Not being a government official, Dr. Khalifa’s credentials 
nevertheless sanctify him as ‘safe’ not to push too many boundaries, whilst at the same 
time promoting the image of an open and even daring media. Accordingly “Khutwa” can be 
seen as a positive way and example for other presenters to be more daring. Yet the show 
confirms and thus strengthens the rigid media style which does not permit multiple opinions 
but frames stories according to a conservative ideology. Dr. Khalifa’s strategy translates 
onto screen what has previously been observed in the daily news: negative or controversial 
stories are not longer blocked out from the public discourse but interpreted within one 
dominant framework, thus strengthening the image of a homogenous society they claim to 
question. Media personalities following such a strategy are ensured the support of the 
channels, as other examples show. 
Nashwa Al Ruwaini, an Egyptian media personality, hosts a weekly society show on 
Dubai TV advertised as the ‘Emirati Oprah Winfrey Show’. It follows the same concept as 
Oprah, by inviting experts as well as people with specific experiences to discuss. As a media 
personality and head of a media production company (Pyramedia) she works closely with 
government channels and authorities. Her most famous contribution to the local media is 
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the production of the poetry competition shows “Prince of Poets” (“Amīr al-Šuʿaraʾ”) and 
“Poet of the Million” (“Šaʿir al-millyūn”). The “Poet of the Million” is a flagship for the 
government’s project to create a distinctly Emirati media identity by publicly boosting the 
tradition of poetry in Bedouin dialect. The big prizes for the winners of the shows attract 
competitors from all over the Gulf Region (as well as Jordan and Iraq), thus raising the UAE’s 
profile as a cultural promoter with a distinct Bedouin touch. Nashwa explains her view of 
media responsibility as follows:  
 
“[The Emirati viewers] need support in developing a balance between old 
and new. As the UAE’s development is growing so fast, it is often confusing 
for people where their identities lie. Media helps to convey the basic 
concepts of modernity and upholding culture.”537 
 
This statement shows Nashwa’s notion of an audience which has to be educated via 
media. Dr. Khalifa and Nashwa Al Ruwaini see their roles in media not only as educators and 
preservers of traditions but reformers as well. This aspect is what makes them so 
compatible with the channels’ politics and enables them to solidify an already monopolised 
public discussion. Comparing the styles of Nashwa and “Khutwa”, especially Dr. Khalifa by 
being one of the few Emirati presenters, creates the illusion of being the mouthpiece of a 
homogeneous community. It would go too far to assume that he sees himself as such, but 
the problem for different opinions using his shows as a gate into the official media, is that 
there is no alternative. They have to accept being subjected to patronisation and, as such, 
they strengthen the dominant discourse. 
The set up of the stage in “Khutwa” supports a formal atmosphere which is 
contradicted by the personal and counselling aspect. Unlike other society shows like 
“Nashwa” on Dubai TV, or morning shows with different topics and celebrities, the set is not 
in a room or living room-like atmosphere but in a studio with small centre platform, where 
Dr. Khalifa and a team of experts sit at some distance from the approximately 36 silent 
guests in the auditorium, who remain in semidarkness. The light focus is on the stage and so 
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the personal level between Dr. Khalifa and the audience is merely achieved by his speech, 
which never addresses the studio audience but the viewers. 
Dr. Khalifa’s position of authority over the audience is enhanced not only by the 
repeated mention of his scientific academic background but also by the focus on the 
spotlight on the centre stage with no furniture or decor except the chairs and a small side 
table for the host. However, although the setting of the studio does not support a 
communal feeling, Dr. Khalifa addresses “everybody” as he says and feels a part of an 
imagined community beyond the circle of present people, through his use of formulas like 
“we think”, “we talk about”, “we all...” He thus establishes a community which agrees on 
not only the importance of the topic he is about to present but on the way he presents it. 
The silent audience becomes part of the Dr. Khalifa community, just as other talk show 
hosts tend to establish themselves as a centre of e.g. a “Dr. Phil” family.538 And while he 
patronises guest on the show by friendly or jovially telling them off or correcting them if it 
seems necessary 539, he still accepts them as part of his community of shared traditional 
values. Dr. Khalifa insinuates his position of traditional values which he considers so 
normalised to ‘all’ that they do not need to be discussed or questioned. Yet he claims a 
position of authority within the community due to his exceptional daring to tackle taboo 
topics, of which he takes pride in, saying in one episode:  
 
“The Arabic viewers are not used to such daring but we in the “Khutwa” 
program either talk about topics or we don’t talk about them. When we 
talk about them we do it in further detail.”540  
 
Advertisements for the show focus on Dr. Khalifa with close-ups to his face looking 
stern and concentrated, yet friendly. His Emirati dress identifies him as somebody from 
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within the UAE society and sets him apart from the majority of Arabic society shows (not 
including religious consultation shows).  
 
Image No. 6. 1: Dr. Khalifa hosting the weekly society talk show “Khutwa” on Abu Dhabi TV
541
 
 
 
6.1.2 The monologue of authority: validating a dominant discourse 
 
Dr. Khalifa’s image portrays him as one of the people he is talking to, though more 
experienced and wiser and thus able to help. Conversely, whenever somebody is not 
conform with Dr. Khalifa, he or she is not member of the community – not only the 
community of Dr. Khalifa fans but of the Arab society in general, which is symbolically 
present in the studio as “forth wall” audience. This is a symbol of the assumption that there 
is such phenomenon as a homogenised Arab society which consents on traditional values – 
the values constantly referred to by Dr. Khalifa. This consensus is embedded in a 
conservative and religious discourse and in order to maintain its claim of validity, Dr. Khalifa 
has to repeatedly position himself as member of the ‘one Arab public’ he is addressing. At 
the conclusion of each episode in which Dr. Khalifa gives a message to the audience, he 
often uses religious phrases. At the end of the episode about addiction for example, he 
looked directly into the camera and said:  
                                                          
541
 Abu Dhabi Al Oula, 2012. Khutwa. [hero-shot]. 
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“Take your last cigarette, say ‘In the name of God, most Gracious, most 
Compassionate’ and smoke it; then you say ‘All praise and thanks be to 
God, thanks are due purely to God,’ and throw it away.”542  
 
In many cases religious phrases are also used by other experts from the team, which 
leads to a fusion of scientific and religious authority, thus enhancing their claim.  
Nashwa, who does not take the advisory role directly, uses a similar structure 
supported by her selection of experts. Hence she communicates tendencies, values and 
opinions through their authority while herself siding with the audience. In one episode for 
example the topic of female students living in University accommodation away from their 
families is discussed.543 Nashwa invites a former guard from a student hall as well as a 
student who had lived in a hall and resisted all temptations to follow her roommates in 
going “the wrong way.” A former student who tells about her experience with smoking, 
parties and sexual experiences before changing her ways remains anonymous. She admits 
that one day she saw the wrong of her actions and moved out to a family lodging – an 
account which is commented by Nashwa with exclamations of relief. In fact the case of a 
talk show guest not siding with the presumed values of the show is an exception. 
The audience of such shows is presumed to be in need of education and is 
objectified from the perspective of the presenters. This top-down notion of the relationship 
between the producers and the viewers is already manifested in the titles of shows such as 
“Shababna”, (“Our Youth”). The name does not reflect the purported aim of the show to 
engage the Emirati youth in discussion, but it is phrased from the perspective of an educator 
lecturing “our” young generation. Minority voices are not necessarily blanked out of such a 
media discourse, but objectified just as all other non-experts appearing on the show. As a 
result, a mainstream opinion on minorities is identified or stated, then, reproduced and 
circulated through the media. This strategy, which does not censor or ignore whoever lies 
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outside the dominating opinion, is more likely to stabilise the existing hegemony of 
ideologies. The dramaturgy of a media event set up to strengthen an ideological 
conservative opinion is best exemplified through one episode of “Khutwa” which attracted 
particular attention. 
It was the first time on UAE television to talk about the phenomena of Boyahs (also 
called mustarjilāt), i.e. women taking appearances of men.544 In line with his image of not 
shying away from controversial topics and giving voice to people from the street, Dr. Khalifa 
invited two anonymous female guests to talk about their different experiences and views 
about their gender and homosexual tendencies. The episode was aired at an strategically 
inconvenient time, the day of the opening ceremony of Burj Khalifa in Dubai, which was 
broadcasted live on Dubai TV. Nevertheless, this particular episode provoked lively 
discussions in official as well as alternative media spheres.545 The episode was uploaded to 
You Tube a day after (with 56,678 views within only five days) and mentioned on several 
internet forums. 
The overall message of the show and the way how Dr. Khalifa presented the topic 
followed the same lines as Evangelical treatments of homosexuality. He claimed openness 
and tolerance by addressing a topic, but actually adjusted it to a set case of values and 
assumptions about the topic without giving voice to the people who he was talking about. In 
his introduction to the episode Dr. Khalifa justified his addressing the topic by taking a clear 
stand against the phenomenon, saying:  
 
“Our topic in this episode will analyse a phenomenon which in the 
beginning – thanks God – [only] appeared in universities, colleges, 
and institutes but has now invaded even preparatory school […] 
Those who do not acknowledge its existence and disagree with me 
can simply call one of the social or psychological counsellors at any 
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high school or ask student advisors in colleges or universities 
whether this phenomenon exists; the answer will certainly be ‘yes’ – 
How do we deal with it and how do we get rid of it; this is our topic 
for today’s episode of “Khutwa”.546 
 
His statement opposing the phenomenon and seeing it actually as an illness is 
repeated after every advertising break. Dr. Khalifa had to ensure to side with the values of 
the channel and that he was merely the analyser trying to help.547 The two anonymous 
Boyahs invited to the show were set against a psychologist and two female students who 
were not tomboys themselves but who talk about their perception of the mustarjilāt. 
Throughout the show, Dr.Khalifa distanced himself from his ‘case studies,’ even when 
addressing them. Normally he thanks the guests who talk about their personally experience 
with sensitive topics; in this particular episode, however, he introduced his studio guest as a 
woman who wants to marry her female friend, and the following dialogue took place 
between them:  
 
Khalifa: ‘Let’s welcome Badriyya. Badriyya, welcome to the programme.’ 
Bandar: ‘Thank you.’  
Khalifa: ’You have two names, Badriyya and Bandar, how shall I call you?’ 
Bandar: ‘Call me Bandar.’  
Khalifa: ‘Bandar?! Forgive me, I cannot call you Bandar, sister Badriyya, 
bear with us during this episode that we call you Badriyya. Why do you 
want to be called Bandar?’  
Bandar: ‘As to me, I prefer the name for me.’  
Khalifa: ‘But you say you still have a name that is longer, or better.’  
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Bandar: ‘I do.’”548 
 
Dr. Khalifa proceeded by asking Bandar since when she had chosen a male name, 
and hence addresses her as Badriyya throughout the show. The expert guest for the episode 
balanced this overruling of Bandar’s personal choice by calling her Bandar. In his 
conversations with the psychologist, Dr. Khalifa repeatedly used the phrase “normal girls” 
when describing girls who dress in a feminine way and show interest in makeup, as opposed 
to mustarjila. The psychologist and one of the present students agreed with Dr. Khalifa’s 
evaluation of the phenomenon as “wrong” and strengthened his introducing words by 
adding the theoretical view and the experience of a student who feels “scared” by these 
‘un-normal’ and “aggressive” girls.  
To give the impression of presenting different opinions, the other student invited to 
give her opinion stated that she does not feel threatened or disturbed by students who did 
not behave like “normal girls”. But her lack of conformity with the opinion dominating the 
show was explained by her being educated in the West, which Dr. Khalifa repeatedly hinted 
at during the discussion. He left it to the viewers to make the connection between foreign 
upbringing and ‘non-conformity’ with the official discourse.549 The example shows that 
although shows like “Khutwa” interact with misrepresented publics, their public visibility is 
only seemingly supported. Both Nashwa’s and Dr. Khalifa’s shows support a discourse 
designed to unify and bundle opinions rather than mirror a diversified society. Although 
their shows interact with various publics, their patronising style does not give a voice to 
alternative opinions. Minority groups and marginalised voices in the UAE resort to other 
spheres to discuss and scrutinise media productions.  
The setting in which the show “Khutwa” is presented demonstrates what Bakhtin 
labels as “monologic” style, as opposed to dialogic. He describes literary genre in which the 
author uses refutation and confirmation in a catechism style to enhance their image of 
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being knowledgeable and thus entitled to lecture the readers. Bakhtin remarks about thus 
presented opinions and counter opinions:  
 
“In dramatic dialogue or a dramaticized dialogue introduced into the 
author’s context, these relationships link together represented, objectified 
utterances and are therefore themselves objectified. This is not a clash of 
two semantic authorities, but rather an objectified (plotted) clash of two 
represented positions, subordinated wholly to the higher, ultimate 
authority of the author.”550  
 
Conceptualising Dr. Khalifa and ultimately the TV channel as ‘authors’ of the show, 
“Khutwa” is another example of how an official identity based on a top-down relationship of 
patronising and ‘guiding’ the citizens can be enforced. As in the case of print media the 
examination of local talk shows raising sensitive topics raises doubts as to whether they may 
over time lead to a more open public discussion of these. Are individuals like Dr. Khalifa first 
signs of approaching change or merely agents of a dominant discourse, strengthening it by 
making it appear more contemporary? 
 
 
6.1.3 If live shows are not ‘real’: can the local media be of real value for Emirati 
identity? 
 
Identifying “Khutwa” as an ultimately monological format raises the question of its 
value for Emirati audiences. Dr. Khalifa sees himself as a pioneer in UAE media simply by 
voicing topics publicly, which previously were unheard of – and, most importantly, unseen. 
He said that in order to make a change he had to conform to viewing patterns as not to 
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‘shock’ the audience.551 From this perspective, the introduction of a live society show like 
“Khutwa” is telling for an audience-media relationship: although the multifaceted character 
of Emirati society is homogenised in this framework, government channels cannot simply 
ignore the necessity of including various voices into the media (even if merely to bring them 
into line), without risking to lose their audience. Since Emiratis have a wide choice of media 
usage, alternative communities can – and in fact do – utilise alternative spheres to 
strengthen their imagined communities, mainly via the internet.  
As in the case of the debate on mixed marriages, the patronising monologue can be 
transformed into a dialogue in alternative spheres, which will in turn influence the official 
media. By raising the topic it becomes a product of consumption. Media analyst Dabbous 
even points out that unwillingly and indirectly programme such as the live talk show 
exposes the “non-universal, temporal nature of dominant [...] discourses” which leads to a 
problematisation of established dogmata.552  
The students and presenters interviewed for this research did not accept the 
monologic style of the show, which they perceived as ‘boring’. Only a few students watched 
“Khutwa”, but after the airing of discussed episode on mustarjilāt, several interviewees 
referred to it. When asked about social topics on local television, a presenter mentioned 
“Khutwa” and said, “I watch it by subject, like the Boyah-thing. Many people watched it.”553 
The choice of local programmes by topic not only confirms a general interest in local topics 
on television, but indicates what is perceived as entertaining and ‘real’. Audiences demands 
are not satisfied merely by being a local presenter, just as raising sensitive topics, alone, 
does not establish a regular fan-base. What the monologic style lacks is the illusion of being 
personally related to the lives of the viewers. 
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Since television ‘liveness’ is in itself orchestrated and edited, no talk show may be 
truthfully called “real”; yet the main strength of society talk shows lies in how well they can 
maintain the illusion that they are so. They are the best candidates for the task of creating 
an authentic media, i.e. a media which is based on ‘real life’, or at least one which is 
considered to accurately reflect reality. Their editing process, however, makes them 
creators of reality in their own right, from the participants they select to how they filter 
viewer call-ins. Nevertheless, as Bourdon observed, ‘liveness’ still promotes “a belief in the 
status of what we see on the screen”.554 The attractiveness of such television shows is the 
illusion that “real” people are imagined to be extracted from the audience to tell their own 
stories; the illusion is made complete when the show ends with the discussion of how the 
individual will then return to ‘normal’ life – and therefore to the viewer community. If a talk 
show succeeds in its illusion of ‘liveness’, it can function in the minds of its viewers as a 
microscopic view of society. Such a show can induce the viewer to feel concern for or 
estranged from an individual who, despite all individual differences, is still a part of the 
larger imagined community. Television guests can create a strong bond between individuals 
of a society.  
Bourdon argued that mass events and spectacles are capable of making a viewer feel 
part of a community, which is imagined as larger than the stage of the event itself (i.e. the 
cinema auditorium). A talk show guest who is identified as representative of a socially-
accepted opinion can in this way lead those individuals who share that opinion identify with, 
by allowing the individual to imagine that other viewers feel the same identification. Yet, no 
matter how focused (or one-sided) the representation of an issue is or seems to be, it is still 
interpretative and will be taken differently by different individuals. Inviting a person whose 
behaviour or preferences do not fit the professed agenda of the collective identity555 can 
reassure a similarly inclined viewer that their ‘otherness’ does not exclude them from their 
imagined community. Such is the dual nature of representation: ‘reality’ shows can 
simultaneously represent parallel publics.  
Such public discussion of social issues can reinforce the dominant discourse as it 
does not allow a plurality of perspectives. As aforementioned, even techniques such as 
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asking viewers to call in can be manipulated merely by a production team choosing to air 
people offering similar opinions only. Yet editing can ruin the appeal of such shows by 
distorting their inherent duality. A biased programme limits the spontaneity of a discussion 
and solely presenting a singular perspective is inauthentic, especially for an audience used 
to the incendiary debates often featured on similar American shows. ‘Liveness’ is therefore 
as important for the imagined societal approval of individual otherness as it is for 
entertainment purposes: making it both an important integral tool for an imagined 
community and a major attraction of such shows to viewers. Such ‘liveness’ is constituted 
not only by communicating the idea that ‘anything could happen’, but also simply by the 
liveliness of the discussions on screen. 
A show which tried to combine both expert advice and the opinions of the “audience 
on the street” was launched in 2009 on Emirates Channel. The idea of local show 
“Shababna” was to discuss topics of interest to young Emiratis and to solicit opinions of an 
audience of approximately twelve students. The show was hosted by young Emirati 
presenter Fatima Al Hind who, being a student herself, seemed ideal for the show’s target 
audience. The producers of the show faced several difficulties in realising this concept, 
mainly due to the lack of audience integration – and motivation. The students were 
reluctant to offer their opinions to the panel of experts, who were often either university 
professors or government representatives.556 Recording the show also hindered the 
spontaneity or liveliness of the discussions: often parts had to be re-recorded several times, 
so that the 45-minute show ended up taking hours to shoot. The audience participation was 
also scheduled for the end, by which time many students had lost interest in participating at 
all.557Most talk shows are neither live nor include participants who seem ‘real’ enough for 
the viewers to identify with – and who they could simultaneously be entertained by.  
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“Shababna” is in this sense completely compatible with the established method of 
producing talk shows for Arab government channels. For a talk show the combination of 
‘liveness’ and liveliness together with a presenter who is representative for an imagined 
community are certainly the key factors. Fulfilling these can make them valuable virtual 
gathering points for communities of sentiment ranging from shared experiences over sexual 
orientations to religious convictions, nationhood, etc. The “Oprah Winfrey Show” is 
convincing in its own right, which makes it the overall more appealing media product. Oprah 
even manages to symbolically merge mainstream and subaltern by visually representing the 
Black American minority while her language, body language and attire associates her with a 
stereotypical middle class white American. 
Had the UAE media any show and media personality to compete with Oprah, no 
doubt the audience would watch it, but again, the various aspects discussed hinder the 
developments of such strong television brands. Since realness is not synonym for ‘live’, 
reversely any media genre which is not live can be a nexus of a community of sentiment. 
Given the interest of students in seeing authentically Emirati and original content on screen, 
one can see that other genres have a large potential to gain the approval of the Emirati 
publics and to become interpretive materiel for the negotiation of Emirati identities. 
Producers of other media genres (film, animation, etc.) still have to navigate the channels’ 
established practices. The question is therefore similar to the case of talk shows: is it worth 
entering a tactful relationship with the official media and try to change media from within, 
or is there a third way? The following part will outline how producers of other media genres 
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have found a more independent approach to distributing their productions and gain more 
influence over their original content. 
 
 
6.2 The Maverick approach: how to become a media celebrity 
 
The interviews with female media employees have highlighted the perceived 
categories hindering women to become public figures. The unwillingness to be seen is 
almost a sujet in the visual media industry, not only for private people but, as we have seen, 
media professionals: the female local media employees mentioned the reluctance of 
families to let their female family members be on screen like the foremost mentioned 
presenter described the reluctance of Emiratis to participate in “on the street”-interviews. 
Asking why this was, the interviewees often refer to ready-made answers such as “this is 
what we do”, “for us Arabs, it’s not acceptable,”559 etc. At the same time performance of 
individuals defies the validity and strength of such categories. Women have found ways 
around the categories and their actions have retrospectively been approved by their 
families, just as Dr. Khalifa has found ways to discuss so-called taboo topics. While the latter 
becomes an agent of the authoritarian discourse, other media producers have different 
means to push boundaries. Following the approach to produce independently from the 
channels, they can navigate through channel production structures for example. Yet these 
media professionals have to navigate among other obstacles and find ways to reach 
audiences. 
The examples discussed in the following sections will show how independent media 
producers take advantage of both Emiratisation, demand for role models, and audiences 
longing for local content. The first part of this section will introduce two of the most popular 
media personalities and their different ways to fame. Not actively supported by the local TV 
channels, the latter soon noticed their ‘popularity value’ and made them Ramadan 
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blockbusters. Their examples not only boosted the popularity of cartoons and animation in 
the UAE but motivated other aspiring media producers to follow suit.  
The second part of this section will elaborate on the popularity of this particular 
genre. Several students found comical stereotypes of Emiratis closer to their experienced 
daily lives than staged ‘live’ shows. The discussion of the relationship between humorous 
genres and censorship institutions will highlight the problems and opportunities of such 
cartoons. The topic of censorship and independent media producers will lead to the third 
part of this section, which focuses on film-makers. This particular genre does not only have 
to navigate through censorship and funding but find spaces of distribution. As mentioned 
before, the national media defines media accessibility from a technological point of view. 
While satellite, telecommunication channels, and internet are well provided for, the social 
accessibility is not perceived as necessary to develop. Curran remarked on the challenge to 
provide a media infrastructure which gave minority communities a voice in the media.560 His 
observations can be expanded to an accessibility of spaces of distribution: since the 
government holds a monopoly over the media sector, it also defines where and in which 
context media can be consumed. This poses a particular problem for film-makers, who are 
restricted to film festivals. While these are public, their audience is pre-selected. Short films 
by directors who are not famous or established in the market are for example often 
screened at times when many people are at work.  
The last part of this section will bring together the discussed examples and show 
how they have managed to become role models by means of public relations techniques. By 
constructing and marketing a public image they break the pattern of restricted public 
visibility. They use ‘framed’ publicity in official media or with advertising companies to 
induce people to visit their private websites or Facebook pages, on which they create a new 
way of ‘being seen’: a celebrity culture.561 
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6.2.1 Emirati cartoons and their makers: an overview of trend setters 
 
Since independent media producers have the advantage of dealing directly with the 
NMC and potential clients (rather than being employees of the latter) they can compromise 
and modify their products for potential financiers. The first difficulty lies in finding these 
opportunities. Looking back to his early beginnings the producer of the popular animation 
series “Freej” (Emirati dialect term for ‘neighbourhood’), Mohammed Saeed Harib, recalls 
how he had to transform from designer/artist to businessman in order to produce his series 
at all.562 Retrospectively his persistence has been rewarded by immense fame and he has 
become the creator of an important part of Dubai’s media identity, accepted by both 
industry and audiences. 
After studying general arts and animation in the US, the Dubaian animator 
developed the characters which he had started as a university project while working in 
marketing in Dubai Media City. In 2003, with the support of Dubai Media City, Harib started 
developing the 3D animation further, but very quickly faced serious funding problems. As he 
stated in an interview with The Economist in 2011, “we have a problem with Emiratis who 
don’t trust Emiratis. Many CEOs don’t see an Emirati talent as worth spending money 
on.”563 After realising a small demo version of the series, he finally managed to obtain 
funding from the Mohammed bin Rashid Establishment for Young Business Leaders564 in 
2005 and founded his own production company, Lammtara. In order to complete the first 
series Mohammed Saeed Harib utilised as many support channels as he could, even 
engaging media students to volunteer for the project.565 By going the way of producing the 
project himself, Harib finally managed to produce a marketable product, which Sama Dubai 
aired in Ramadan 2006. After this difficult start the show was an immediate hit and the 
blockbuster of Ramadan. It was the first Arabic 3D-animated cartoon with the additional 
value of being perceived as authentically Emirati. The storyline of the comedy is based on 
four Emirati grandmothers who in their traditional attire (including the burqa) not only 
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represent stereotypical women of the old generation, but different characteristics 
attributed specifically to Dubai society. 
The first character, named after Harib’s own grandmother Umm Saeed, represents a 
sharp-witted conservative Emirati from the pre-oil generation, who has a suitable poem and 
saying for any occasion. Another, Umm Khammas, is the troublemaker of the group, an 
outspokenly-loud energetic Bedouin, with a knack for finding unconventional solutions to 
any obstacle. Umm Alawi is the upper-class geek from Iranian descent, who is better 
informed than any of the others on what is going on outside their area and time, although 
she still prefers to live the traditional way. Finally Umm Saloom represents the mild-hearted 
grandmother who misplaces her medicines, gets lost, and constantly misses the point of 
conversations and events by snoozing off. The slogan of the show warns that with “Old 
Ladies, anything is to be expected”, and the style of the comedy manages to combine social 
criticism with an affectionate glance on how much Emirati society has become estranged 
from the older generations. As Harib said in a personal interview, his aim was to make 
viewers start talking about their roots, their heritage and identity.566  
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The first season was such a success that by the second season a large fan base was 
already anticipating the series. Using the flow of the moment, a wide merchandising 
industry was set up ranging from school supplies, clothing, and many other paraphernalia. 
Although the hype around “Freej” subsided after a few seasons, the students from the focus 
groups still considered it a landmark in UAE media production: very “us”568, very funny, and 
professionally made. “Freej”, so they felt, had distinguished the UAE in terms of technical 
standards as well as content. Both aspects are important for the collective notion of having 
a unique identity which is not only traceable on a local level.  
The content provides an image of Emiratis as rooted in a unique historical past (with 
particular attire, language style, and habits), yet at the same time blessed with an equally-
distinguished present which taps the full potential of what modern technology and 
invention can offer. The narrative thus translates the official narrative of clashing 
differences of lifestyle before and after the oil-boom in a reconciling manner: both are valid 
sources of pride for the community. The ability to communicate this understanding of the 
own heritage and present identity to a mass audience becomes an act of profiling, and the 
series a point of reference to explain what characterises Emirati society. By gaining not only 
recognition for the show in the Arab language market the sense of distinction is even 
heightened. Emirati fans could identify with the international recognition Harib achieved 
because it contributed to Dubai’s international brand image, thus recognisability. 
The creator of another cartoon series called “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” has gone a 
different way to market his product. The caricaturist Haidar Muhammed Haidar developed 
his first 2D-animations as small 50 second clips, which were distributed via mobile 
phones.569 The cartoon brings together a collection of multi-ethnic male and female 
characters portraying the multiple facets of Emirati society. The strength of the cartoons lies 
in its sarcastic humour targeting all stereotyping nationalities and gender via their accents 
and tempers as they deal with everyday situations. In the classic Donald Duck-style 
exaggerated choleric outbursts and mishaps are reoccurring themes. The focus group 
students appreciated its multifaceted reality: by not only showing the perspective of the 
Emiratis, but the interaction and coexistence of all ethnicities it seemed a real mirror of 
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society. Also, by bashing all groups portrayed, it avoided seeming unfair or racist. Unlike 
Harib, Haidar did not found his own company but is working with the company for mobile 
content production, Qanawat Media.570 The cartoon started to be circulated in 2004 and 
slowly became more and more popular among young Emiratis. By 2006 its popularity was 
recognised by the channels Sama Dubai, who broadcasted it in daily two-minute clips, until 
it became established as regular 15-minute episode series in 2008.571 Following the trend of 
3D animation “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” managed to remain true to its caricaturist origins by 
leaving the characters in 2D, but setting them up in front of a 3D background. This modern-
vintage mix gives the series a unique distinctive style reminding of “Les Triplettes de 
Belleville.”572 By 2009 the hype around “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” had made it a brand similar to 
“Freej”, with an array of merchandising.573  
 
Image No. 6. 2: The 2012 advertisement for the animation series “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” on Sama Dubai.
574
 
 
 
With two highly popular Emirati animation series established in the UAE media 
landscape, the third animation broadcasted by Sama Dubai was up against a great deal of 
competition. Najla Al Shihhe could rely on a certain amount of fame as a scriptwriter for 
“Freej”, when she decided to start her own animation series “Khousa Bousa”, which was 
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broadcast in Ramadan 2009.575 It shows a modern Emirati family and their everyday 
adventures. Having experience not only from working with Lammtara but also from being a 
marketing director before, the author founded her own animation production company for 
film and TV production to finance her project. The focus group students remarked the series 
did not meet the artistic standards of “Freej”, which it seemed to copy. And even the 
content did not convince many students, who mainly thought it was an attempt to merge 
elements of “Freej” and “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn”. Although it hit the market at a time when 
everybody seemed to be crazy about Emirati animation it did not have a unique flavour to 
the design or even content. Some focus group students even said they perceived it as racist 
in the way it stereotyped for example the Egyptian mother of the Emirati family, or other 
Arabs. 
 
 
6.2.2 Wrapping criticism into comic relief or becoming main stream: what kind of 
humour is acceptable? 
 
In an interview with Najla Al Shihhe she stated that so many scenes were cut by the 
NMC that several jokes changed their meaning and thus appear merely flat or meaningless. 
She mentioned a scene, which incidentally had been pointed out by a student in the focus 
group, to illustrate the dilemma.576 In the original scene the Emirati family drops off their 
child at a private day-care centre run by a retired Syrian school teacher. The teacher 
demands a high admission fee to her nursery and explains that given the rising living 
expenses in Dubai, she does not have a choice. In her fluent speech she complains that 
everything needs to be paid for in Dubai, lately even the parking spaces, so that you cannot 
make a move without spending money somewhere. According to Najla, the NMC rejected 
this elaboration on rising costs of living in Dubai and cut the scene. As a result the joke, 
                                                          
575
 To produce the series, Najla Al Shihhe founded the production company Busy Bee Studios. The title of her 
first animation series are the first words of a popular nursery rhyme, and are not translatable (child-language). 
By 2012 the company shifted its focus to applications and online games for children. The animation series was 
only aired for one season. (See: Staff-Reporter, 2012. Busy Bee Studios.) 
576
 Al Shihhe, 2009. Arabic Cartoons, [Recorded interview]. 
236 
 
which was hinting towards the newly established ‘Park & Pay’ system, became deflated and 
the meaning of the whole scene shifted accordingly. As the focus group student pointed out 
when she described the scene as it was broadcast, it seemed like a joke on behalf of Syrians 
who are supposedly greedy for money and highly inventive in finding ways to obtain more 
than justifiable from their customers. 
In this example the producer, Najla Al Shihhe, felt that the NMC executed a direct 
violation of her media product, and said that the reasons were probably shading a 
potentially bad image on Dubai.577 During 2009, when the discourse of the financial crisis 
was in full flow, certainly any reminder of the financial dilemma which Dubai saw itself in 
was treated as extremely sensitive. Seeing themselves as upholders of moral and protectors 
of the UAE’s public image, it is not surprising that the NMC rejected any allusions to a social 
fact which was not yet normalised. After all, the new ‘Park & Pay’ system affected almost all 
UAE residents and was not established enough to allow any jokes about it. In this light it 
does not appear so random that the NMC let other similar scenes go by uncensored. For 
example in “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” a scene makes fun of another government invention, the 
public complaint system.578 In a 2009 episode for example the main character clashed with 
the pseudo complaint system at a government entity. Unable to apply for a service using the 
ready-installed brand new complaint box, his application merely dropped to the floor 
several times instead of even landing in a post box. The scene refers to non-functional 
government services going with a widely advertised complaint system, which never seems 
to reach the right people.  
Why the two different allusions to potentially critical or at least laughable practices 
invented by the government were estimated differently by the NMC cannot be said for sure, 
but the examples hint towards a phenomenon specific to humorous genre and censorship, 
not unknown throughout history: humour, satire, cartoons, and cabaret have a strong 
potential in states with high level of censorship. This is because they can distort the reality 
in a way which seemingly detaches it from experienced real life but at the same time 
highlights things which are to be criticised. Therefore satire and caricature have always been 
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among the most dangerous media genre from the perspective of the censorship authorities, 
and at the same time highly popular among viewers. Autocratic regimes would like to keep 
humour harmless, reducing it to slapstick and situational comedy. But allusions can easily be 
slipped in, recognisable to those who are sensitive or looking for them. 
A famous cabaret performer and former citizen of the GDR described in his 
dissertation on subversive humour how the audience would evaluate the quality of a play by 
the political references which were so distorted that they managed to remain undetected 
by the authorities.579 The audience however, was looking out for them. By walking the line 
between euphemism and debunking, cartoons thus create a higher level of closeness to real 
life than other genre.580 It is important to consider why some criticism is potentially 
inflammatory and other is not? Allusions to elements of society which are already 
established or carried by an assumed consensus of their usefulness (in this case the 
complaint system) are not perceived as potential threats. Newly established rules which are 
still under scrutiny and criticism by the people who are not yet used to having them in their 
lives will be estimated differently. What is not normalised and established might still face 
collective opposition. Whether the NMC really considered the scene from “Khousa Bousa” 
as such a case may not be proven but the general line of thought is useful to keep in mind 
when considering the popularity of cartoons. In one focus group the theoretical question 
was raised as to how series like “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” would be perceived if they were not 
animations, and many students said they would find several things rather insulting.581 By 
wearing the masque of exaggeration, criticism is not perceived as “personal”, and the comic 
genre can become “charitable, but at the same time [...] not gullible", a basis on which it 
“has the potential to form a strong sense of belonging among its fans.”582  
Putting aside possible ideological considerations from the NMC, in practice Emirati 
producers such as Najla, perceive their censorship as coincidental and arbitrary, which 
makes it difficult for her to adjust their content. Especially when working towards a pressing 
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deadline, this arbitrariness leads to anticipatory self-censorship just to avoid delays and 
extra production costs. Furthermore, the amount of censorship by the NMC seems to vary 
from season to season: what may pass by in one Ramadan might be cut during next. In any 
case, from the cartoonist’s perspective they have the difficult task to be just as provocative 
and critical as they are funny in order to remain popular with their fans. Becoming 
successful and mainstream can potentially weaken the critical aspects, as the development 
of “Freej” over four seasons of shows. The potential of the blockbuster effect during the first 
season was rapidly scooped out, and by 2009 “Freej” was already broadcasted with English 
subtitles to expand its fan base to non Arab speaking audiences or those unfamiliar with the 
local dialect.583 With the focus groups’ students, “Freej” has gone down in popularity over 
the years. By season three it was perceived as lecturing, boring and since it lost its novelty 
effect of the animations, not worth watching anymore.  
Looking at the development of “Freej” during the four years it has certainly gone 
through phases of controversy in the beginning, but become tame and harmless with 
further development. In its second season, one episode caused a minor scandal among 
religious figures. In the episode in question, Umm Khamas who is diagnosed to die shortly 
becomes over religious and ends up establishing herself as a religious advisor for other 
women of the local community. Lacking any religious educational background, she invents 
her own fatwas, which are accepted by her admirers without questioning, although they are 
blatantly silly.584 Although the episode can be seen as a criticism of gullible people who 
rather have guidelines from seemingly religious people than think for themselves, Harib was 
criticised by religious authorities for this episode.585  
Unlike other media producers the episode was neither banned nor cut, which 
encourages a cartoonist to continue along provocative lines. But Harib chose to avoid 
criticism and benefit from the branding potentials of the show. By and by “Freej” has over 
the years lost its inflammatory potential and become more a brand for the pending theme 
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( Harib, 2007. False Alarm, [TV broadcast].)  
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park in Disneyland-style and other major publicity stunts. Mohammed Said Harib uses all 
marketing options to the full, and using playful humour makes “Freej” more sellable. At the 
same time, by eliminating political criticism he gains more and more official support by the 
government. Their aim is after all to establish the image of young Emiratis as “leaders” and 
“innovators” of the future as the employability campaigns proclaim.  
It is useful here to recall the priority for Emiratisation of a population who is 
massively under 30 years of age and facing difficulties in finding employment. Multiple 
government training programmes are designed to strengthen the confidence of these young 
Emiratis and enable them to compete in a labour market defined by the high standards of 
expatriate consultancy companies. Since the government wants to motivate Emiratis to seek 
employment in the competitive private sector, the narrative of ‘empowerment’ is an 
important aspect of Emiratisation campaign. This overall discourse of a nation who proudly 
looks into its past and confidently faces the future needs role models. Local rulers like 
Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid and his children lead by the example of their self branding but 
are not so much practical role models as idealised figureheads. An Emirati who can be 
presented through a narrative of identification is an invaluable agent. His story can motivate 
others because it follows the line of ‘he was one of us, had high ambitions and managed to 
fulfil them – so can you’.586  
Accordingly the case of Mohammed Harib illustrates how individual priorities can 
change not by negative ruling factors such as direct censorship but better opportunities. 
What may initially be motivated by the urge to translate a part of self into a creative format 
and share it with the members of the imagined community can become overpowered by the 
importance of heightening success. Thus the urge to satisfy all members of society, the 
religious conservatives, the government, adults as well as children can lead to a loss in 
uniqueness ‒ as seen with “Freej”. Therefore, ultimately, compliance with a de-politicised 
uncritical mainstream makes Harib act similar to television channels’ policies: play safe, 
don’t risk confrontation or offence in order to ‘stay in the game,’ as the phrase goes. And 
similar to the channels, this approach leads to a simultaneous loss of character and hence 
popularity with the audience.  
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How difficult it is for a media producer to “stay in the game and exceed his business 
prospects became apparent in 2010, when the production of “Freej”, had to be stopped 
after the ninth episode of the 5th season due to the lack of sponsors.587 After having already 
limited the show to a mini-series in style of a game show in 2009, this seemed to hint that 
“Freej” was in serious financial trouble.588 But by 2011 Mohammed Said Harib seemed to 
have picked himself up again and was back with seven full length episodes on Sama 
Dubai.589 
 
 
6.2.3 The trouble with financiers and censorship for film makers 
 
For independent media producers around the globe financiers always have influence 
on the content of a media product. The difficulties of financing a media production and 
navigating censorship have an even more pressing quality n the UAE. To make the media 
project with a minimum of interference (i.e. by letting the government finance a 
production) producers have to become business people. If they do not want to rely on 
government funding the best way forward seems to be for directors to establish their own 
production companies and the necessary networks to realise their own projects. Film maker 
Nayla Al Khaja from Dubai chose to go this way. Her production company D-SEVEN Motion 
Pictures590 produces advertisements among other things. Just as cartoonists, Nayla sees her 
original vocation in using media as a creative way to express her identity and view of 
society. She has produced several short films for which she wrote the script and which she 
directed. The topics she chose for her first two short films were sensitive enough to get her 
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into conflict with the NMC but she found her own ways of dealing with the censorship 
authorities that have to approve the scripts before the films can be screened in festivals.591 
Nayla Al Khaja described how she managed to produce her first two short films, by 
handing in film scripts which were not clear and possibly misinterpreted by the NMC 
members. In the script for her short film “Arabana” she intentionally wrote the script in a 
way that it could be interpreted as a statement against the neglect of children by their 
parents, whereas subtly the film describes the dangers of child abuse.592 She later reflected 
on her experience with censorship in an interview with The National, saying that “Arabana” 
“was actually banned, in a sense that the script was not very… Well... They didn’t really like 
it, the authorities, because it was a bit too controversial at that time, and the funny thing is 
that after two or three years the same person who sort of tried to keep the film from 
happening was the same person who actually gave me an award once the film was done. So 
that was kind of ironic and you can see that – You know the changes that happen in the 
region within a very short span of time, so at least now they are becoming more open to the 
idea of film making.”593  
 Her other movie “Once” (2009) which was screened at the Dubai International Film 
Festival 2009 (DIFF) touches another critical topic which is present in everyday life but 
generally not addressed by the media: dating and romantic encounters between young 
Emiratis.594 The issue of flirting in the malls via Bluetooth on mobiles and secret meetings 
between unmarried lovers has certainly been acknowledged and observed by the media and 
thus has become a part of the public sphere. Nayla’s film approaches the topic from a 
unique angle: it takes the perspective of a young Emirati girl who is not seduced by a man 
(not an innocent victim), but is trying to meet with her flirt. In order to arrange a rendezvous 
she has to lie to her father, cruise the night in parts of Dubai unknown to her, and finally 
arrives in an empty flat, which was set up as a meeting point.  
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The fact that the Emirati girl is behaving in such a manner perceived as inappropriate 
by social morals is daring in itself. By showing the story from the girl’s perspective and 
exploring her moral conflict, her fear of discovery and even of the unknown unspoken 
sexual experience she is about to encounter, “Once” drags the viewer into the position of 
the girl about to commit a sin. She used the film to showcase experiences from her own life 
as a teenager.595 The camera takes her POV (Point Of View), so that the viewers cannot 
easily distance themselves emotionally from the story and take a judgemental position. By 
making public the story of a girl meeting her lover in secret in a film, Nayla reaches out to an 
imagined audience of girls with similar experiences. Remembering how the mainstream 
media either ignore such topics or deal with them within a moralising framework, the 
fictionalised genre has the potential to create an emotional identification with the topic. It 
invites other Emiratis to form a community of sentiment as well as to acknowledge that the 
scenario is not singular in UAE society. 
As was the case with her first short film, Nayla managed to receive the permission 
for the film script by the NMC by distorting the “true” story slightly and by setting the focus 
on values and issue which the film contains but which could be presented as more 
judgemental in the script than they appear on screen. The act of the young girl being caught 
by her father at the end of the movie can appear as a rightful punishment for her lying to 
him, and thus change the focus of the whole movie to tackling the problem of young 
teenagers distancing themselves from their families and vice versa. In her official statement 
about the film, published as a production leaflet, Nayla stresses this point, adding that it was 
her objective “to increase the awareness and get young people connected with their 
families through effective communication.”596 Most importantly however, in the script 
handed in to the NMC, she left it unclear that the two young people who are to meet for the 
first time are actually not married, thus leading the NMC committee to understand that the 
plot is about a couple already married by contract but – as it is not unusual in the UAE – who 
have not met before.597 
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Another film producer, Ali F. Mostafa, had to go to more lengths before obtaining 
the necessary approval to screen his now hailed feature film “City of Life” (2009). The NMC 
did not give approval for the script, without stating any reason, so the producer decided to 
start shooting meanwhile, to edit and finalise it, and signed up for the Dubai International 
Film Festival (DIFF), where the film was accepted under the condition that by the time of 
airing the approval would have been handed in. The NMC claimed that it did not give 
approval for the film due to inappropriate alcohol scenes which gave a bad image of Dubai 
and the UAE.598 Ali however stated in a personal interview, that the NMC never justified its 
decision. He managed to obtain approval to screen the film, through his contacts who 
personally appealed to Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum a few days before the film 
festival.599 Through the ruler’s intervention, “City of Life” was featured at the DIFF, and 
when after the festival a private organisation scheduled a screening in a local cinema, the 
NMC gave a last minute approval of the event.  
After the approval from the ruler and the enthusiastic support by the audiences Ali F. 
Mostafa has become a role model and public figure in the film making scene, invited to 
events, universities and hailed as the pioneer for Emirati feature films. These events leading 
up to the film being sanctioned as welcome contribution to the Emirati media discourse 
illustrate just how different interests often conflict inside the government apparatus. The 
authorities did not seem able to take the risk of permitting a film which had the potential to 
become a showcase for Dubai lifestyle, but could just as well backfire. Only the connections 
of the filmmaker enabled him to jump hierarchies and obtain sanctification from the sheikh 
who is not bound by government or set of rules. The episode effectively adds to the 
observation that the government’s control over media appears unpredictable. At the same 
time it de-legitimises the NMC’s role as executive authority to observe and regulate media. 
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6.2.4 Nourishing and widening a fan base: the self marketing game of getting 
myself out there 
 
Both Nayla and Ali are willing to test the limits, and after having established 
themselves with a fan base and amount of publicity, they obtained a certain level of 
independence to go their own ways in film production. What specifically distinguishes 
cartoonist Mohammed Saeed Harib and film maker Nayla Al Khaja is the level to which they 
use their success to make themselves public figures. In lieu of a star industry to make media 
personalities from television channels’ sides, they explore their own marketing possibilities 
to become celebrities. For Mohammed Saeed Harib the obvious way to go, was to use his 
success with “Freej” to become a self-made star. He has continued his close relations to the 
local universities, thus encouraging more media students to pursue their ambition to 
become animation producers. Media students I met remembered his visit to Zayed 
University Abu Dhabi and Dubai where he gave inspirational accounts of how to start such a 
career.600 But when Harib entered a sponsorship contract with Dubai’s telecommunication 
provider du in 2006,601 he had gained more than a sponsorship: he became one of the faces 
of du, smiling from every advertisement across the UAE.  
 
Image No. 6. 3: Two examples of the public image of Mohammed Saeed Harib, on the cover of the magazine 
Dubai Society, and as seen on the advertisement for du
602
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In comparison, Haidar Muhammed Haidar’s “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” was ranked more 
popular among the focus group students, but only few knew him as a person, or even his 
name. His fame is his product, and the way he widened his audience from a grassroots start-
off via mobile phones to the national television screen is singularly significant. But in terms 
of self marketing the creative brain behind “Šaʿabīyat al-Kartōn” (although there are 
newspaper articles and television shows about him and his team) does not go the length to 
widen his fan base by for example engaging in Facebook.603 Nayla Al Khaja’s case is slightly 
different.  
As a film-maker her productions are to date restricted to film festivals and therefore 
cannot reach an audience as broad as television Ramadan series. She equates this initial 
disadvantage through self marketing, using the government’s interest in promoting Emirati 
women to establish herself as a celebrity. The focus on Emirati women in media is a general 
trend, implemented by the channels by positioning women in key-roles.604 The appointment 
of Noura Al Kaabi as chairperson of TwoFour54 can be seen as such a step. If media 
presenters complained about the unwillingness of individuals to be seen on screen as talk 
show guests and interview partners, Nayla al Khaja could be called the opposite. She gives 
interviews for all media, distributes press releases for her latest projects and achievements 
as a film maker and the local media is glad to provide her with the publicity she seeks. What 
the country needs are role models - especially for women. And Nayla uses that trend, not 
only to market her films but to create a network of film support with her in the centre.  
Among the achievements that make her a pioneer in media development is the 
establishment of a film screening club (the Scene Club). On her website, Facebook page, and 
Twitter she updates about her productions and publishes her achievements. But her 
engagement goes beyond establishing herself in the media scene. Like Mohammed Saeed 
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Harib, she struck a deal with du, not to advertise her productions however, but to create a 
support network for business women in the UAE. The slogan tells a lot about Nayla’s vision 
for herself in the business world: “Behind every successful woman entrepreneur is her 
Business Super Plan.”605 The visual advertisement is an abstract portrait of her. Her 
eagerness for publicity invites criticism as well as praise. In several interviews with film 
making students remarks such as “there are much more talented people” or “she only 
wants publicity” were made – yet she has it. And by marketing herself she has not only 
created fame and public visibility (certainly a tough call for film makers in a country without 
an established film industry), but benefited financially from it.  
In the context of public visibility and ‘ways of seeing’ (discussed in chapter 4) 
commercially-driven people like Nayla can be seen as more than mere business people 
banking on fame. They widen the acceptability of publicity from the rulers to ‘ordinary’ 
Emiratis. The rulers use publicity to appear close to their people, while business people 
exemplify that being in the public domain is something every Emirati could do. Whatever 
opinion one might have about the culture of celebrities, the concept once established can 
lead to a generally more relaxed attitude towards performances of self in public. Noura Al 
Kaabi stresses the importance of building up a community, developing local talents, and 
training UAE nationals, in order to produce local media. But without role models, who will 
the coming generation of media producers relate to?  
Especially female media professionals have stated that they often encountered 
resentment from their families for being on television. They could not refer to many local 
role models identifiable enough in order to encourage other women to pursue their dreams. 
The women interviewed from the ADMC Emirates Channel were pioneers in their own right: 
as they narrated their stories, it became obvious that they had overcome many obstacles to 
convince their families that working in the media was an acceptable option for Emirati 
women. With no suitable example to strengthen their argument albeit their families, they 
outperformed the common path for female careers and became scriptwriters, radio 
presenters and news reporters. However, since their stories are not known, they are in a 
way useless to the next generations of women who cannot use them as examples in their 
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cause. Moreover, sheikhly female role models cannot qualify as examples, since they are 
from the political elite whose rules do not apply to ordinary woman. In this sense Nayla fills 
exactly the need of both the government and an audience ‒ the need for role models and 
pioneers who do not shy away from publicity. 
 
[This image has been removed by the author of this thesis/dissertation for copyright reasons.] 606 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nayla and Mohammed Harib are perhaps among the most famous – but certainly 
not the only – Emirati media professionals who made themselves publically known without 
waiting for a channel or other authority to discover and promote them. The Dubaian TV 
presenter and DJ Marwan Parham (alias DJ Bliss) has his own publicity manager who ensures 
his visibility in the public domain. Like Mohammed Harib and Ali Mostafa, he accepts 
invitations to talk to university students. Like Nayla, he is active via social media, and by 
hosting an Emirati heritage show in English language he rounds up his public image 
perfectly. He represents the modern yet heritage conscious Emirati of a new generation. 
What these mentioned people have realised is the nature of the visibility-invisibility complex 
of Emiratis when it comes to media. They have realised that there is an audience for 
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celebrities and not many people willing or capable to cater this audience. Their ambitions 
are mainly commercial, which helps them overcome shyness towards exposure.  
As media producers they at the same time use the media they have to get financial 
independence, which will lead them to more possibilities in terms of freedom over content. 
By outperforming and bypassing the official censorship, filmmakers Ali F. Mostafa and Nayla 
Khaja have shown that there are ways to take advantage of the inconsistent censorship 
habits of the NMC and the blurred rules existing around “sensitive topics.” Their actions 
confirm the statement by the NMC member that local producers are often not aware of 
what they can actually do and thus are led to censor themselves in advance instead of 
pushing boundaries. Since they are willing to push boundaries of censorship they can take 
advantage of the fact that often censorship in the UAE is based on personal preferences and 
estimations of individual NMC members, opinions which can change or be influenced by 
higher authorities ‒ as in the case of Ali F. Mostafa. These possibilities make Nayla look 
positively into the future of Emirati film making, when she states:  
 
“We do have a long way to go [...] Whenever I’m writing a script, there is 
always this thing in my mind that flashes, like ‘that’s not going to pass 
through! Find another way to do this!’ - I don’t want to have that. Right 
now I have no choice, but I think it is changing and it is changing fast.”  
 
And she adds: “I do think that within a couple of years I will not be worried about 
censorship whatsoever.”607 With raising fame and popularity these film producers can 
potentially widen their possibilities backed by a fan audience, the government’s need for 
Emirati media pioneers and role models, and their own financial independence. Producers 
like Nayla Al Khaja and Mohammed Harib are using publicity as a contributing pillar for their 
careers, following the strategy ‘publicity is power’. From a non-government incorporated 
angle all reviewed media producers are contributors to the demand of both government 
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and audiences: a diversified media landscape which is recognisably Emirati. Instead of 
joining the official media from the off-start and getting disappointed by the lack of support 
from the media companies, they build themselves financial back-up and public recognition 
to face the government media on terms they can negotiate better to their advantage. This 
seems to be the only way at the moment for media talents in the UAE to implement their 
projects.  
On first sight it might seem astonishing that the government, with all its restrictions 
and censorship, supports such attempts, but on the other hand the government media itself 
is struggling with the reconciliation of different interests in terms of media and Emirati 
identity: the political control, the commercial interest, and the nourishing of a local brand 
which can be a stabiliser of the ruling elite. In a way, government media and independent 
media professionals follow the same interests from different angles, and whilst a film maker 
might mainly be driven by talent and personal ambition, the goal is to become known, to 
become profiled and recognised as the creative special ‘self’.  
 
[This image has been removed by the author of this thesis/dissertation for copyright reasons.] 608 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This aim matches media identity aims of the government as well, and by supporting 
independent media producers the national brand of the country is enriched – on a local as 
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well as on a global level. Especially with regard to films, the global outreach is inherent in 
the genre, which makes them even more attractive from the government’s side to use as 
contributors for their branding policies. How the branding on local and global levels 
interrelate and how the UAE government is trying to ameliorate its identity image beyond 
an audience of nationals is the starting point of the following chapter. Whilst the set up of a 
film industry for the UAE seems to mainly run along the same paths as TV industry, there is a 
noticeable difference between the genres when it comes to audience support. What is 
contested by Emiratis on a local level, such as the homogenisation of audiences, is met with 
approval on a global level. 
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7. Let’s go global: buying into global media culture 
 
 
The demand for Emiratis to be visibly represented does not stop at the borders of its 
territorial space. Not only is the government eager to promote a brand, Emiratis themselves 
want their national identity to be displayed towards non-Emiratis. They are embedded in a 
dialogue with international media and on a daily basis encounter foreigners who form a 
large proportion of their local population. While the representation towards a non-Emirati 
community has to find a different media language than that consumed by nationals, on the 
level of images and narratives popular media has its own mainstream code which is 
understood and most importantly appreciated by a multinational community.  
Previous chapters (see chapter 5) have shown that the acceptance of a mainstream 
does not necessarily imply a loss of local identity. Mass-media was defined as productions 
which try to address as many audiences as possible. Building on a definition of mass media 
as productions which aim for maximum dissemination, a mainstream enters into a dialogical 
interaction with other media styles and narratives. This chapter will use the example of 
representation via films to further explore the correlation between global and local images 
of national identity. 
For the analysis of Emirati cinematic films it is useful to remember Appadurai’s 
observations on the globality of media. He stresses that global media is interpreted 
differently in different localities, thus creating “cultural landscapes.”609 From a consumer’s 
perspective, global media will be interpreted by each community as it suits them. On a 
practical level the dichotomy between local and global is dissolved.610 Fraser makes a similar 
observation when she describes “parallel discursive arenas”611 for various publics. But while 
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these are in practice interlocked,612 the ideological dimension of representation of 
communities is more complex.  
On an ideological level, all media are associated with production centres and the 
ideologies of interest groups who finance and produce films. The Hollywood industry is a 
prominent example of a media industry which exports the values of US interest groups and 
influences media productions around the globe. Hollywood is not only a dominant discourse 
of narratives but the carrier of ideological messages, and its persuasive potential can lead to 
a competition with local ideologies, such as the official UAE identity narrative. The aim of 
the government is to engrain the official narrative of national identity into the Emiratis, so 
that they will perceive it as their ‘natural’ identity and themselves as part of a unified 
community. Censorship and the complex structure of the local UAE media industry try to 
safeguard the citizens from fragmentation into interest groups which could contest the 
government’s claim to legitimacy.  
At the same time both the people and the government of the UAE “buy into” global 
cultural phenomena. This colloquial expression pinpoints the socio-economical aspects and 
dynamics in its own way: not only do UAE business people buy shares in global businesses 
(such as football clubs, cultural institutions, the car industry and the media), but these 
assets come with an appreciation of, and willingness to contribute to, the cultural meanings 
evolving around these enterprises. People “buy into” car brands on an ideological level, and 
the students of focus groups “buy into” American talk shows such as Oprah. They do not 
merely consume: Their acceptance does not remain on the level of interaction on a local 
level alone, but goes hand in hand with the urge also to interact on a global level with these 
circulators and creators of cultural meaning. While this is still merely financial on several 
levels (like buying a football club) the ultimate goal is certainly to become part of the 
producers on an ideological level. 
How this is undertaken in the UAE and which difficulties emerge from this task is the 
topic of this chapter. As with the development of the local television industry, the UAE’s 
attempt to join the global film industry causes conflicts and requires negotiations of self-
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perception and representation towards an imagined other. On an industry level the 
dominant discourse of UAE identity has to be reconciled with equally strong global media 
narratives. The same process is triggered on a personal level through media consumption. 
The interviews have shown that through the prism of TV the official image is problematised 
and perceived as neither contemporary nor relatable to daily experiences. The question is 
whether similar notions apply if the UAE media joins the global film market.  
Part 7.1 will introduce the concept of a Hollywood narrative and mirror it with an 
Emirati feature film. Based on this example Part 7.2 will explore the details of localised 
stereotypes and their perception by Emirati viewers. The previously applied concept of 
‘ways of seeing’ will be reintroduced here as the experience of the ‘other’s’ gaze. Part 7.3 
will bring the observations together with the notion of branding and marketing the UAE on a 
global scale. The main question will be whether the usage of established stereotypes can re-
interpret their message or simply emphasize their supposed validity. 
 
 
7.1 The Need for Diversified Local Media and profitability of Mainstream 
Cinema 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, media makers are juxtaposed alongside a 
dominant mainstream media in the UAE, which is not structured to allow diversification in 
either business set-ups or content. Especially in Abu Dhabi, government-affiliated media 
companies monopolise funding and training possibilities, so that film-makers are left with 
few opportunities to express their own notions of identity in a new way. In Dubai the 
situation is slightly different due to the more commercialised character of the media 
industry itself. DMI’s strong preference to sell media to as many audiences as possible has 
given the viewers more say in what kind of media is produced. The business strategy to 
establish a diversified media, even if only within the DMI, has led to a variety of channels 
with clearly distinguishable target audiences and genres. In Abu Dhabi channel identities are 
still in a phase of development and experimentation, trying to serve as many communities 
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as possible but not yet managing to develop a clear character for each channel (with the 
exceptions of the sports channels). 
Even so, the reconciliation of economic and ‘cultural’ interests threatens the 
government’s control over the media message. In order to be sold, media has to be 
accepted by audiences who have affinities to, and experiences with global media. The focus 
of the first part of the following section is on dimensions of the local mainstream media 
which has developed under the umbrella of the government. This aligns film producers with 
the style and content dictated by the film-producing companies.613 But as is the case with TV 
broadcasting, the dialogue between different audiences equally influences the film 
productions.  
The second part of this section will discuss how global media styles influence local 
audiences and how, consequently, the knowledge of media and its global content moulds 
the way Emiratis perceive and consume films. Their demand for local film productions 
mirrors the difficulties Emiratis experience with their local media: mainstream global cinema 
homogenises audiences under one best-selling product or brand, just as the local 
government media tries to impose a one-sided national identity. 
In practice the member of a marginalised subaltern community can just as easily be a 
consumer of several variations of mass-media without seeing it as a contradiction. 
Appadurai and Eickelman’s stand on the cross-fertilising nature of interpretive exchange 
supports the notion of complex and creative affinities to various – even contradictory – 
publics. These observations will illustrate how different ‘ways of seeing’ are interlocked with 
multiple layers of understanding, utilising and identifying with symbols introduced by the 
different media products and situations. What has been observed with regard to television 
consumption can be applied to other imagined communities: an individual imagining herself 
or himself as a member of a mainstream opinion or dominant imagined community can as 
well feel mutuality towards a marginalised group or subaltern counter-public. Interest 
groups thus formed are not fixed and their members can simultaneously belong to several 
publics. Depending on genre and situation, symbols of cultural identity can be perceived as 
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reinforcement of the collective identity towards another imagined community, or as 
stabilisation between the members of the imagined community of nationals.  
Since different ‘ways of seeing’ can exist side by side, one person can be part of both 
global and local audiences at the same time. How a local film tries to reconcile mainstream 
‘ways of seeing’, global outreach and a unique Emirati locality will be exemplified by the 
Emirati production “City of Life” in the last part of this section. A review of this film’s plot 
and style illustrates how the producer translates his personal view on Emirati society into a 
cinematic language understood by both local and international audiences.  
 
 
7.1.1 Reconciling profitability: independent film industry or Hollywood 
Mainstream 
 
Within a wider perspective of media politics in the UAE, the rapid establishment of a 
film industry through semi-governmental production companies such as Imagenation in Abu 
Dhabi, and TwoFour54, is certainly an ingenious step towards ensuring a monopoly over the 
local film production market. Yet, as is the case in the television industry a major problem 
lies in the perception of diversification and accessibility of media. Following Habermas, the 
public sphere is established by institutions which step into dialogue with the government. 
Only with access to the public sphere can public opinion be formed.614 Accepting the 
existence of multiple publics, the latter still have to be given access to various platforms of 
exchange in order to formulate their collective identities and become interest groups. It is 
my belief that communities of sentiment will search for space in which these identifying 
dialogues can take place. If there are no institutions to offer such platforms, alternative 
spheres will be utilised. When applied to media, examples have shown that, if they cannot 
find points of contact in the official media, people turn to form communities around 
alternative media - such as the internet.615 If ‘diversity and accessibility’ simply mean 
providing media channels, the UAE has a diversified and accessible media with widespread 
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provision of internet and telecommunication opportunities. Taking the perspective of 
communities the access to media is limited to voices representing a homogenised public 
rather than diversity. True diversification which would promote a public sphere would have 
to support public institutions which, as Curran says, promote a collective and, most 
importantly, public dialogue,616 rather than sophisticating the delivery of media from large 
media conglomerates to as many consumers as possible. The development of media which 
are independent of government-controlled companies would have to be supported by an 
environment encouraging private investors. In the field of film production this would mean 
fostering the development of an independent film landscape.617 
The discussion among financiers on local film production during the Circle 
Conference 2010 evolved around different approaches towards the definition of 
independent films and their distribution. Most representatives of financing companies 
focused on commercial considerations, highlighting the importance of a wide distribution 
market. Their strictly commercial point of view defined independent film as a co-production 
of several companies from possibly different countries in contrast to films produced and 
linked to one studio (such as Warner Brothers). A content-based approach characterises 
independent films in terms of content, acting, and techniques. Depending on the financiers’ 
view on what an independent film should be (i.e. profitable of ideological), their readiness 
to support specifically local films will vary. It is this ideological difference which has resulted 
in European cinema (especially French and Italian) be repeatedly mentioned as role models 
for Arabic film industry.618  
Representatives of European production companies showed an interest in unique 
local content which should not only satisfy an already existing demand but also cultivate and 
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nurture society. They spoke as representatives of countries with a national film culture, in 
which the state was interested in developing and strengthening local films and thus local 
identity. This was achieved by the support of short films, films clubs and other screening 
events, which allowed local films to be shown to a wide audience. This created and 
supported a demand and in return motivated exhibitors to see local screenings as 
profitable.619  
Film clubs would certainly be a step on the way to changing the UAE screen culture 
as can be seen from examples from other countries, such as France and the UK. They 
worked together with art societies to develop a demand for non-mainstream cinema which 
eventually influenced cinema chains. In these countries the government intervened to 
diversify the cinema landscape by providing financial support and premises.620 The film club 
within the Abu Dhabi Cultural Foundation was shut down in 2008 after a period of at least 
three years, during which it merely screened blockbusters after they had been removed 
from the general cinema programmes. Small film clubs are run by private sponsors in Dubai, 
such as Nayla Al Khaja’s Screen Club, and the film screening events established by Mahmoud 
Kabour, director and owner of Veritas Films. Other groups organise film evenings and rent 
cinema auditoriums.621  
Such initiatives are aimed at offering spaces for different publics, which ultimately 
contribute to a diversified media promoting unity through diversity.622 Trying to unify such 
acts of diversification under one government institution is ultimately counterproductive and 
can only lead to what Curran classifies as a weak media economy, in which one mainstream 
media dominates the market.623 Letting aside the economic aspect, on the level of 
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practically-experienced daily culture, the attempt to limit the media sphere to a 
homogenous community with government-approved narratives of identity can only clash 
with the aim to strengthen a local identity. A mere mainstream media can neither reflect 
nor cater for a diversified national community, especially if it is produced for a wider 
regional or global audience. Certainly, in the process of diversification of local television 
broadcasting, the government can potentially play a controlling role to ensure that multiple 
publics are catered for by the range of channels.624 
If the government takes an interest in nourishing the national community, 
regulations of the media landscape have to make space for multiple identities. Otherwise, as 
seen in the case of television, the local media loses its role as focal gathering point for 
nationals and remains merely a reminder of what Emirati identity should be rather than 
what it is. Potentially the government’s role as controller and educator may not necessarily 
be experienced as patronising or unwelcome to the national community. With a demand for 
authentic local media, in the particular case of television, the stimulation of local film 
productions could widen this demand in the film sector. 
As the government’s policies do not reflect the desire to create a framework which 
admits multiple national identities into the media sphere, the comparison with other 
countries merely highlights the difficulties media makers face in the UAE. The incorporation 
of local talents into a commercialised and government-affiliated UAE film industry is about 
to limit the possibilities of developing an independent film industry and culture: The 
establishment of private funds for film production, as called for by Nayla Khaja625 will 
become obsolete considering scholarships and financial support given by Imagenation and 
the official film commissions. Within the establishment of government-affiliated companies 
for film production lies a danger of bringing individual potential in line with established 
structures from the start, which in turn may jeopardise the potential to develop a UAE own 
style of cinema. The pseudo-diversification and privatisation of the film industry does not 
force individual producers to approach official institutions for funding. But since these 
institutions offer easier access to production support, they are currently establishing 
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themselves as a monopoly on the production scene. The style they import (via teachers and 
other staff) will influence the way local cinema will develop and since they will be the key 
players in the media landscape, it will be difficult to develop an independent cinema inside 
the country. 
The evolution of independent cinemas is an expression of criticism of Hollywood 
mainstream cinema. A key concern of alternative industries is to find an individual or local 
cinematographic style. In this context the language of the film or style of communication is 
the main determinant of identity, making a film, for example, specifically European, Indian, 
or Egyptian and recognisable as such. Yet in order to reach a global audience, an 
independent local film industry has to establish a trans-national fan base and be known 
before it has opportunities to be screened in cinemas around the world. The Indian film 
industry is a perfect example of this, having already produced more than 200 films per year 
during the 1930s626, it was not until 2000 that it established a global fan community.  
The development included adaptations of Hollywood style structures and ideas; but 
over time, Bollywood has developed into a specific cinema genre, which in turn influences 
Hollywood productions. Since the support of an independent film industry relies not only on 
the support of film makers but on the development of audiences, the current focus of media 
companies with regard to the support of local film makers appears short sighted. The 
profitability of a local film industry relies equally on audience demand, which makes it 
profitable for cinema exhibitors to screen independent films. After all, cinema is an event 
which has to be sold, hence the development of mainstream cinema culture as a global 
phenomenon. Offered by global cinema companies, the screening is sold as an event. As 
Mark Woods, head of the Melbourne International Film Festival Investment Fund, remarked 
when attending the Abu Dhabi Film Festival 2010, the establishment of a local screening 
culture cannot merely transfer audience demands from television to cinema.  
Contrary to television, which is licensed and controlled by the government, cinema 
theatres are part of a privately-owned event industry, making more money from selling 
beverages than from actually screening a movie.627 People all over the world can see good 
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films on DVD or television; therefore going to the cinema has to be worth the effort. 
Expectations towards a movie event include more than a well-made film with a strong 
narrative. Instead the experience of going out, seeing other people, having popcorn, and 
enjoying special effects (good sound, 3D-effects etc.) makes people choose to go to the 
cinema rather than watch a movie at home.628 From the exhibitors’ perspective, Hollywood 
blockbusters embedded in globally successful events and rituals promise financial success, 
whereas independent and art films are a financial risk. A panel member of the Circle 
Conference explained that people going to the cinema would seek the “other” experience, 
not the everyday local stories, meaning that Arab youth would rather watch a Vin Diesel 
movie, than a story from the neighborhood.629 
 
 
7.1.2 The Hollywood narrative applied to a local story 
 
The lack of independent films or, in the case of the UAE, non-government-funded 
films, suitable venues for screening, and audience development are phenomena of a more 
general issue of UAE identity: the relationship between local and global in the perception of 
those who make and consume media. What lies behind the struggle in media production is 
in the eye of the viewers who are highly globally trained in media consumption.  
The Hollywood Narrative is a structure which sketches the field in which a filmmaker 
can elaborate and expand his ideas. It determines expectations of a story line and 
dramaturgy. The structure is, within the Hollywood school of films, closely linked to the 
stereotypes used in the development of the characters, images, topoi, etc. Hence, it 
indirectly determines the stories best suitable for the structure (black and white characters, 
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clear hero, elements of a coming of age story etc.).630 It is a phenomenon of a globalised 
media community that a global mainstream cinematographic language is not only accessible 
but understood within the global community of cinemagoers. In the process of 
standardising narratives to produce films with a good chance of making a lot of profit, the 
Hollywood industry and its early conflict with regional media expectations and ideal of 
public sphere, sheds light on a conflict which until now can be observed in UAE (visual) 
media. As Hansen points out, Hollywood cinema engendered a new global media-defined 
community as “a collective, public form of reception shaped in the context of older 
traditions of performance and modes of exhibition.”631  
As a profit-making film production industry it elaborated on and standardised a 
certain mode of narration, which limited unpredictable reactions by the audience and, as a 
consequence, the commercial success of a movie too.632 This has created a media 
community with shared anticipations towards a movie as well as a public which is less 
engaged in rational judgement of the media but rather in the consumption of “an 
alternative horizon of experience.”633 The dream industry Hollywood has created a global 
interpretive community consuming popular culture consumers. But it also created tension 
between different demands of publics towards media. Hollywood provides entertainment at 
a high level of technical perfection combined with narratives which do not disturb the 
comfort zones of film-goers. In juxtaposition are the demands of media to be educational 
and informative. As such (since they are globally accessible) Hollywood standards have set a 
landmark for the other commercial film industries, which have to merge the Hollywood-
influenced expectations of the audience with local bases of identification in order to sell.  
As Vasudevan explores in his analysis of Indian popular cinema, the incorporation of 
“Hollywood codes of continuity” with narratives of national identity and plots rooted in 
Indian society, made the Bombay cinema a successful global phenomenon rather than only 
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in countries of Indian immigration.634 The plots of Indian cinema are rooted in the logic of 
kinship relations and Indian family structures but the acceptance of Hollywood editing 
features has resulted in a new genre which does not simply copy Hollywood but forms a 
new dramatic genre with characteristic structures of “narrative, performance sequence, and 
action spectacle”, thus finding a “way local forms reinvent themselves to establish dialogue 
with and assert difference from universal models of narration and subjectivity.”635 Egyptian 
film production, which is the largest and most popular Arabian film industry, followed a 
similar strategy and thus successfully established itself in the Middle East. Both examples 
are worthy of observation due to the way they translate national identity into a film 
language which can survive alongside Hollywood. 
The rise of local film industries, such as in Egypt, show that there is a demand for 
local stories told in a cinematic style which television productions cannot achieve. The local 
film industries, therefore, have to incorporate global cinema standards (set by Hollywood) 
into plots which reflect national identity by telling stories from within their societies. 
Whenever a local film industry emerges it faces a power struggle of cultural spheres for a 
largest possible audience, as with television dramas. As Niewkerk shows, a struggle of 
ideologies for the media consumer takes place in both genres but with different 
proportional distribution of (financial) powers regulating and influencing the media product. 
Many local television and film producers are torn between the consumer’s preferences and 
the demands of the channels. The latter have a clearly-set line on how each ideology should 
be transmitted. The film industry in Kuwait for example produces specifically for a wider 
Gulf audience, counting on the surrounding countries to buy their content as a “Khaleeji” 
soap opera. In the case of a non-existent film industry, as in the UAE, the producer is not yet 
obliged to adjust his film to the demands of established financiers who represent a 
mainstream. 
Based on such observations an Emirati film producer faces the question: how 
commercial do I want to be, who do I want to address with my film and how do I acquire the 
audience I want? A film about the personal experience of an Emirati youth, for example, can 
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attract young Emiratis who had a very similar experience and then form a micro public 
brought together by an emotional reaction of recognition. The same is true if the producer 
visualises a very personal interpretation of UAE society or specific aspects of it. An 
interpretive community will identify with the notion, and hence experience the film as a 
visualisation of their perception of reality. But such an individual expression of self can easily 
fail to be financially feasible. To widen the audience spectrum the producer can therefore 
draw upon technical features and effects, expected and appreciated by a wider audience.  
Another possibility is to change the plot and narrative, to make a very personal 
experience more general so that it can be a basis of identification for a wider audience. This 
option reduces individuality and provocative potential of the film. By adapting the 
Hollywood success-strategy, the film maker will be more successful on a commercial level if 
he or she merges different narratives and techniques to satisfy more diverse expectations – 
at the expense of being more personal, more local and thus more plausible in the eyes of an 
Emirati audience. Films which manage to embody the multi-ethnic character of the emirate 
and attempt to ‘go global’ are in danger of losing the support of the locals, locating these 
films in a mesh of overlapping public spheres.636 Applying Appadurai’s observation that 
globalisation is a “marker of a new crisis for the sovereignty of nation-states” to the conflict 
a UAE film producer faces, one might say that the globalised film narratives, funding 
possibilities, and global interpretive communities mark his or her crisis in translating 
individuality, national identity and ‘the local’ into the film.637 
 
 
7.1.3 “City of Life” as a local translation of the Hollywood narrative 
 
The Emirati feature film “City of Life” by Ali F. Mostafa is to date the only example of 
a local feature film which managed the leap from film festival to the Grand Cinema 
complexes of Dubai. With strong support from government officials and social networks it 
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has become both a poster child of UAE culture and a falsification of it. By adapting a 
Hollywood format to a storyline set in Dubai the film managed to win over audiences from 
different Dubai communities. By using a mainstream style to translate and dramatise social 
reality in Dubai the film had to put a gloss on details in order to be understood by a global 
audience. Its global character makes it a local answer and message (“this is who we are”) to 
an imagined global cinema audience. Accordingly the film was viewed by the local audience 
as a blueprint for global scrutiny of UAE society and Emiratis. 
The film revolves around different ethnic groups, represented by the main 
characters, and describes their experiences and dreams in Dubai. Their paths are 
determined by their origins and occupations, which portray them living in parallel societies, 
only interacting by chance in a car accident at the climax of the movie. Not only does the 
intertwining of parallel lives in a car accident seem a UAE version of “Crash” (2004), but like 
Paul Haggis, Ali F. Mostafa was inspired by personal experiences incorporated into the story 
of young Emirati Faisal, a pampered upper-class idler who gradually realises that he has to 
change his lifestyle and assume responsibility for his family, status, and society. Throughout 
the story, his father acts as the voice of morality and traditional values by confronting Faisal 
with the expectations Emirati society has towards him and the shame he causes his family 
by not assuming his role as a useful member of society. The philippics of his father and loss 
of his best friend Khalfan, an Iraqi-Emirati from the lower classes, lead him to accept his 
expected role. He abandons his dandy friends and makes amends for Khalfan’s death in the 
car accident by marrying Khalfan’s sister. 
Image No. 7. 1: Faisal and Khalfan in the movie “City of Life”
638
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The other main protagonists of the film are, like Faisal, stuck in positions and roles 
strongly defined by those ethnicities that they try to escape from: Basu, an Indian taxi driver 
has to work in Dubai to support his family in India, while trying to use the opportunity of 
being there to fulfil his dream of becoming a Bollywood star. After taking up a low paid 
moonlighting job as a singer in an Indian night club, the car accident costs him his job and 
leaves him scarred for life. He reinvents himself as an actor in villain roles supported 
throughout the movie by an Indian businessman who acts as his ‘fairy-godmother’. Another 
protagonist is the Romanian ex-ballet dancer Natalia, who is safely but unhappily employed 
as a flight attendant, is thrown into the path of a British advertising businessman Guy and 
falls in love with him. After he betrays her and threatens to ruin her if she does not abort 
their child, she learns to go her own way instead of being led by circumstances and the 
decisions of others. While Natalia came to Dubai merely for the job, her Russian flatmate 
and colleague Olga is a fortune hunter of another kind, taking every pleasure the 
flamboyant city can offer while trying to catch a rich beau.  
Each protagonist’s story rehashes the stereotypes associated with different 
nationalities and their occupations in the UAE. In real life, flight attendants of Emirates 
Airlines, the largest major airline in the Middle East, are not only visible everywhere in Dubai 
but form an important part of the local clubbing scene, which would otherwise be 
dominated by male businessmen.639 The cabin crew form a class of their own in Dubai with 
an average age of 26 years, and their general perception can be pinpointed in a journalist’s 
statement, observing that “many of the airline's recruits are from developing countries in 
Asia, Eastern Europe and across the Middle East. For them, the airline is a rare ticket to see 
the world in style, and for women from conservative countries like Iran and Egypt, it's a 
chance for independence.”640 Whereas Olga is portrayed as a negative stereotype of a 
hedonistic Russian, the naive Natalia is intended to create sympathy and moments of 
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identification for the young single working European who gets caught in the maelstrom of 
Dubai, struggling to find her way in life.  
A similar constellation is set around Faisal: his best friend is the careless, hot-
blooded but honest and truthful Khalfan. He follows his juvenile impulses while disregarding 
his responsibility as only male family member towards his grandmother and sister. 
Consequently, though good natured, he perishes. The actor who plays him, Yassin Al 
Salman, describes his Khalfan as “representative of the Arab society. There are so many of 
us out there racked by an identity crisis of some sorts.”641 Whereas Khalfan’s honesty makes 
him a sympathetic figure, Faisal’s other friend represents the negative image of a pampered 
Emirati dandy, standing at the end of the road which Faisal is taking and developing away 
from. Rashid is introduced as a young man dedicated to pleasure, fast cars, and parties with 
women and alcohol. His cowardice when Faisal is in trouble turns him into a despicable 
character.  
Drawn as representatives of different aspects and people of Dubai’s multi-ethnical 
society, the protagonists are developed to draw the audience into the day-to-day lives of 
the different ‘Dubais.’ They engage viewers to experience ‘their Dubai’ from a different 
angle – an angle of which they have an inkling, but will never experience themselves due to 
their ethnicity and social class. An example of this is the taxi business. Most people who take 
taxis only know what it means for an Indian taxi driver to live in the UAE via brief encounters 
in the car. Basu is taking them “behind the scenes” of what really troubles and drives these 
people they know so little about. The same is true for all the other protagonists and forms 
the great potential of the film storyline: the opportunity to see what ‘my Dubai’ is like for 
others, alongside seeing ‘my Dubai’ experienced by a protagonist to empathise with. In such 
recognition lies the key to both the success and the flaws of the film. A reader of TimeOut 
Dubai commented accordingly: “Strictly recommended to all Dubai residents who will 
tremendously enjoy seeing and recognizing all familiar places, situations and characters, and 
to those non-residents who think Dubai is a 7-star paradise.”642 
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Looking at the success of “City of Life” and its overall positive perception by UAE 
residents (both Emirati and foreign) one might call it a successful projection on screen of 
multiple identities in a metropolis combining global narratives and cinematographic 
techniques with “a local story”. Being as such a novum for UAE film production was certainly 
a key factor in its success. Most viewers appreciated the changing perspectives on Dubai via 
the multi-ethnic protagonists, remarking for example: “the whole things, the movement 
from the expats to the Indians to the nationals it was great how he managed to put them all 
in one film.”643 
 
 
7.2 Representing Emiratis via stereotypes 
 
By adapting a standardised narrative and style, “City of Life” became part of what 
Donald calls “a normative discipline for living in a mediated present.”644 The standardised 
narrative draws its appeal from stereotypes and narrative patterns expected and accepted 
by the members of a globalised interpretive community. At the same time the standardised 
style hand in hand with the knowledge of its global nature and distribution. 
The protagonists of the movie are, strictly speaking, not characters but stereotypes, 
reinforcing those already existing in Dubai society, such as the hedonistic Russian, the 
dishonest English businessman, or the pampered Emirati645. The protagonists in “City of 
Life” are allegories of the ethnic groups in the Dubai population. Whether confirmed or 
criticised, they are always evaluated on the basis of how they will be perceived by the 
audiences. Accordingly, certain perceptions towards specific ethnicities already existing in 
Emirati society are reinforced rather than questioned. Most Emirati viewers commenting on 
the movie not only accepted but confirmed the stereotypes as plausible, with remarks such 
as: “how he showed the Indian I think he did picture him in the right way, he just pictured 
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them as how they are, he didn’t add didn’t remove just how they are: he pictured the poor 
Indians who are here.“646 Only a more multifaceted character could question a notion of 
otherness, for example from an Emirati perspective towards that of an Indian, and show 
similarities between them. Significantly while Russian, Rumanian, Indian, and British are 
each represented by one ‘typical’ protagonist, the Emirati identity is translated into several 
different ones who themselves embody different stereotypes. Hence the image of Emiratis 
is more diversified and seemingly more ‘real’.  
The first part of this section will explore which aspects of “City of Life” were 
perceived as Emirati embodiments. The opinions of local viewers will indicate another 
dimension of Berger’s ‘ways of seeing’: his concept was used in previous chapters to 
describe interpretive frameworks influenced by media consumption. In this part the focus 
will be on the ‘watching’ other. After introducing the concept of the ‘global gaze’, the last 
three parts in this section will examine different aspects of this notion in relation to 
experiences of media consumption. The real spaces of film viewings will merge with the 
imagined dimension of a global cinema auditorium symbolised by the screen. 
 
 
7.2.1 Reactions to images of Emiratis à la Hollywood 
 
The necessity to differentiate the Emirati stereotype from other ethnicities shows 
not only an Emirati perspective but exemplifies the situational redefinition of categories and 
the stereotypes attributed to them. In certain situations imagined communities will be 
reformed and referred to as ethnic, regional, religious etc. In a business context, for 
example, with European work colleagues, an Emirati and a Palestinian may form a “we” 
group of Arabs. In the next instance the Emirati might join the “we Emiratis” and categorise 
the Palestinian as “Shami” (Levantine), again narrowing the definition down to 
“Palestinian”, when talking to “the Lebanese”, and finally over lunch with all of named 
people plus an Indian Muslim he can join the group of “we Muslims”. These notions of 
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communities of sentiment can take as many forms and allegiances as required depending on 
the situation, and do not have to be perceived as contradictory. 
In the film “City of Life” the individual storylines of the Emirati protagonists become 
representations of the story and characteristics of a whole community. Hence, Faisal’s 
development is not the story of an individual character but stands for the difficulties faced 
by young Emiratis from the upper class when finding their way through various temptations. 
Comments from the audience show that the Emiratis perceived Faisal and his father as 
representatives – either accurately or by misrepresenting Emirati society and identity. 
Faisal’s drinking habits, for example, were perceived by some Emiratis as negative, not 
because it made him an unsympathetic character, but because it supposedly gave a wrong 
impression of Emiratis. 
The organiser of a movie screening for a local social networking group summed this 
criticism up, saying:  
 
“The feedback we got was ‘yes the movie was nice and yes it does 
represent some [aspects] of the Emirati culture, the things that happen in 
the city but still it showed that alcohol was something normal, something 
we do’”647 
 
As such the scenes involving alcohol were criticised within a framework of 
representation towards an imagined other, when for example a viewer said that “some 
people are going to see it later and they don’t know anything about Dubai and the Emirates, 
you know and if they look at it they will assume that drinking is not prohibited or drinking 
everywhere in Dubai is normal.” She added that  
 
“Even if it’s happening we still shouldn’t highlight it as something we are 
proud of, [..] if we’re not proud of [it] we shouldn’t show it that much, 
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even if it’s happening we should tell people that these things are 
happening but we’re not proud of it, we don’t do it as Muslims, as 
Emiratis, you know.”648 
 
Another negative image of Emiratis was represented by Faisal’s upper-class Emirati 
friend Rashid, who, like Faisal, lives a pampered carefree life but in contrast to Faisal is not 
reformed in the end. The actor Saoud (Faisal) summaries: 
 
“Faisal is better than Rashid in the movie, because Rashid: he’s lost, that’s 
it, this is his life but Faisal started to think in a good way and also because 
of his problems his emotions he had a best friend and he had his father 
who always told him to do the better”.649 
 
As a counter balance to Faisal, who finds his way to a religious lifestyle in harmony 
with the expectations of his Emirati heritage, the figure of Rashid could be important to 
highlight how exceptional Faisal’s reformation is. However, in the movie version of the film 
several scenes with Rashid have been deleted, thus changing for the better the overall 
perspective on Emiratis. 
When Faisal is kidnapped by a gang of Ajamis650, Rashid calls Khalfan for help and 
stays in the background crying and not daring to interfere to help his friend. His cowardice is 
set in contrast to Faisal who, when threatened with mutilation by knife faces his opponent 
bravely, saying “Go on then, you coward!” By cutting the scene of the helpless Rashid the 
focus of attention is drawn to Faisal’s bravery together with Khalfan’s who literally drops 
everything to rush to the aid of his friend. While the decision to delete the scenes may just 
as well be attributed to arc of suspense, the effect is that the one negative Emirati 
protagonist is marginalised and less influential within this Emirati quartet. 
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The general acceptance of stereotypical protagonists as well as its evaluation within 
a framework of global representation shows how local audiences are instantly aware of an 
imagined global audience if a film follows the established Hollywood style. Accordingly, the 
representation of the own imagined community through such a film is evaluated under the 
influence of an imagined outside scrutiny, or what I call global gaze. 
 
 
7.2.2 The global gaze of scrutiny 
 
As a term analogous to the “male gaze” introduced by Laura Mulvey in her criticism 
of Hollywood cinema, the global gaze expands on the notion of “to-be-looked-at-ness”.651 
The concept is based on the dialogical relation between object and viewer, which 
determines that a spectator, when seeing an object, instantly steps into a relation between 
self and object. Laura Mulvey draws on psychoanalytic frameworks based on Freud and Lacan 
to explain how Freud’s concept of scopophilia is satisfied, and at the same time intensified 
through visual media.652 The “pleasure in looking,” as Mulvey calls it, is strongly focused on 
isolated aspects of the human body, especially erotogenic zones.653 Women in this 
constellation are objectified and castrated as objects of desire and marginalization. Even 
more, the pleasure of consuming such media comes from what Mulvey calls “voyeuristic 
separation”, i.e. the knowledge of being the spectator who is not scrutinised in return.654 
The consuming audience takes a unified stand with the protagonist, which necessarily 
implies that female spectators also adapt the gaze of the “ideal ego”, the hero on screen, 
thus objectifying themselves.655 
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Mulvey’s psychoanalytical-political concept has triggered, as Chandler points out, a 
whole new angle on spectatorship studies, which “focus on how 'subject positions' are 
constructed by media texts rather than investigating the viewing practices of individuals in specific 
social contexts.”
656
 In these contexts class, race, ethnicity, and gender are analysed to explain a link 
between political power relations and individual representation via media.
657
 Foucault’s precept, 
“Power is everywhere: not that it engulfs everything, but that it comes from everywhere,”658 
can be seen as a link between the psychoanalytical approach of spectatorship on a micro-
public level and political power relations on a state level. The texts of a popular culture 
discourse are reinforced by events, such as the spectacles of viewership. These contribute 
towards consolidating a related discourse on a macro-communal level. The cinema 
auditorium and act of viewing symbolically represent the nations, regions, and on-looking 
world community, who judges or excludes, or evaluates in any form.  
Although his genre of interest was not primarily film but literature, Edward Said’s 
concept of Orientalism brings together many of the concepts related to the “gaze”, the 
texts, the audience and the political power relations it consolidates. All these evolve around 
narratives which influence people’s notions of others as imagined communities. In 
particular, the stereotypical objectification of Arabs since 9/11 has been a central interest of 
post-colonial criticism of American media and Hollywood. Many analysts showing how in 
Hollywood films Arabs and Muslims are portrayed as terrorists, Islam as a violent religion, 
and how this discourse has created the hyphenated American-Muslim, marginalised and 
discriminated against by a Western audience.659 This stereotyping, particularly of Arabs, can 
best be summarised under the term Orientalist gaze, since it mainly relies on visual signals and 
concepts observed within the discourse of Orientalism. The Arabs as portrayed by Hollywood 
and Western-dominated media are thus subjected to the gaze, a marginalisation and 
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scrutiny, experienced by other communities. The criticism follows the lines of Spivak’s 
differentiation of the burden of representation in terms of re-presentation or “placing there.” 
Arabs are portrayed in a certain way and these media texts form what Spivak calls the construction 
of "the Other simply as an object of knowledge, leaving out the real Others because of the ones who 
are getting access into public places due to these waves of benevolence and so on.”
660
 
The importance of analysing these discourses of stereotyping others is important in 
order to change the status quo of groups in power over marginalised communities. 
However, attention here should be drawn to another aspect, which goes back to Mulvey’s 
original concept of “ideal ego.” Her idea of the audience, even females taking the position of 
the ideal ego on screen means that (guided by the camera) women take on the male gaze: 
at least for the moment of the screening event, women see their own bodies objectified. Is 
this possible, and transferrable to other marginalised communities? Mulvey’s concept of the 
(male) gaze implies the transferability, situational or permanent, of the gaze to a community 
marginalised by it. For example, a Tunisian could watch Indiana Jones sweeping the 
humongous and dim witted Arab from the streets with one stroke of his infamous whip. And 
while he, contrary to most non-Arab speaking viewers, will additionally be able to identify 
the ridiculed enemy as Tunisian, he can still laugh and enjoy the scene and the “Raiders of 
the Lost Ark” movie as a whole. This does not contradict his ability to walk out of the 
auditorium and angrily write about the stereotypical marginalisation of non-White races in 
Steven Spielberg movies. 
The gaze shifts and changes, just like the notion of mutuality to different imagined 
communities depending on ideological priorities and complex situational factors. It is 
important to highlight that in practice an individual can experience affiliations to different 
imagined communities simultaneously. The viewer of “Raiders of the Lost Ark” could have 
gone to the movie with an American friend, both talking throughout the film and laughing 
together. In this situation it is most likely that enjoyment as well as criticism of the scene in 
question will overlap. Mulvey highlights the importance of feeling unobserved in a dark 
auditorium, seeing but not being seen; for her this consolidates the voyeuristic pleasure of 
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media consumption. However, this does not fully describe what happens in an auditorium in 
terms of group dynamics. 
 
 
7.2.3 Experiencing ‘the gaze’ first hand 
 
In the UAE the spaces where the ‘gaze’ that mediated through film can be 
experienced first hand, are cinemas and film festivals.661 The event of coming together to 
view a film in the public space of a cinema auditorium breaks the dichotomy of private and 
public spaces in a unique way. The act of coming together for a limited period of time with 
strangers, sharing emotions and reactions, as well as cathartic experiences, is a strong factor 
which makes cinema survive in a society where individuals can easily access the films they 
are interested in (by buying them or even downloading for free).  
Every weekend cinemas in the UAE are crowded with groups of youths, families, and 
couples who form an engaged audience interjecting audibly and responding to the events 
on screen by texting, talking on their mobile phones, laughing and commenting together. In 
a way the cinema auditorium can be seen as a micro-representation of a public media 
sphere, one where different communities come together to form one audience and interest 
group. At the same time they foster an understanding, not only of the screened film, but of 
reactions from others, as represented by cliques of cinema goers. The awareness of 
representation towards an imagined global community is the extension of the local spaces 
of screening (linked to the spheres of circulation). It is the imagined space of all cinemas 
screening the same movie implanted around the same rituals. The knowledge of the global 
fan community of movie goers complements the global film narratives (such as the 
Hollywood narrative) and induces awareness of the global gaze on representations of 
identity.  
Film festivals, just as film clubs, are an extension of the film screening as a spectacle, 
since they involve direct discussions between audiences and producers, hence for a moment 
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bringing all parts of the media process together in one media experience. Apart from the 
value of offering a platform for possible distribution, the importance of such spaces for 
encounters lies in their ability to directly channel interpretation and clarify 
misunderstandings of concerns translated into the screened media. In the event of film 
festival screenings the notions of direct and imagined scrutiny of a media identity come 
together.  
The knowledge of multiple communities present in the space of the cinema 
auditorium is not only directed towards international communities, but can also lead to 
confrontations between local groups. A minor incident during the Middle Eastern 
International Film Festival 2009 (MEIFF) exemplifies how this can occur. Since the films 
screened during the festival are not censored,662 the universities for female students are 
anxious not to expose them to indecent scenes when sending their classes to the films. A 
public relations coordinator working for the MEIFF received complaints from Zayed 
University Abu Dhabi for not informing them that the American movie “The Messenger”, 
which was attended by a class of female media students, included a sex scene. The latter 
caused offence and could potentially lead to complaints by parents, thus making the Faculty 
of Media and Communications responsible. Interestingly, a student within a focus group 
interview who had attended the screening remarked that she and her classmates had felt 
obliged to leave the cinema. According to her, it was not the sex scene itself which led to 
that decision, but the embarrassment of being subjected to such a scene in a mixed 
auditorium: the male students from another college would all look over at the girls to see 
their reactions.  
As Hansen points out in her review of cinematic history, cinema has particularly 
reformatted public and private domains with regard to women.663 She refers to the 
phenomenon of popular culture which projects the male body, semi-nudity, and intimate 
physical action on screen, thus offering them to a female spectator who has traditionally 
been banned from such sights. For the UAE the shift of traditional gendered domains of 
public and private goes even further: the participation of women in the event – be it within 
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the protective circle of their family, school- and university classes, or even more freely as a 
group of friends, is a novelty in itself. Gatekeepers and agents of decency certainly try to 
minimise such a development by censorship of films. Even if the perception of the class in 
question regarding this singular event is not representative for Emirati female audiences, it 
exemplifies the unique position of cinematic screening as a dramatised spectacle. This 
brings together members of the public sphere who form an interpretive community 
consisting of sub-communities. They communicate and interact with each other, triggered 
by the mediated events on screen. The group of Emirati students who decided to leave the 
auditorium reinforced a conservative notion of public and private domain and gender. Other 
female Emiratis within the audience who did not leave664 also made a statement towards 
their male observers with regard to the acceptance of UAE women being part of public 
visualisation and commodification of sexuality.665  
Interpretive communities, coming together for a film screening, do not only 
communicate their interpretation of the film narrative directly (via interjections), but can be 
forced by the film to make a statement. Feeling under scrutiny by other members of their 
society, such a statement can reflect their opinion on social standards, values, and gender 
formations.666 The notion that women should not be exposed to nudity on screen does not 
necessarily lead to a “walking out” statement. Reactions from the audience and 
participations in discussions of the films can consequently be seen as events during which 
representation is negotiated and different reactions tested. While in the example described 
the group of females performed an act of protection from the situation by extortion, other 
cases in which the audience remained are a statement in themselves. They could for 
example be interpreted as a non-awareness or nonchalance towards an outside gaze. 
However, within a framework of knowing that Emirati females are potentially viewed as a 
part of society which has to be protected by exclusion (a view indirectly voiced by the 
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interviewed Emirati news presenters earlier) they can even represent an act of defiance and 
change. 
 
 
7.2.4 The global gaze experienced through watching a film 
 
Similar to the exposure to the male gaze is the notion of a global audience being 
made aware of and looking critically at UAE society through the film. In the case of “City of 
Life” this scrutiny was directly present through the protagonists. In fact, the concentrated 
observation of the ‘national self’ by ‘others’ was perhaps the most ‘local’ aspect of the film. 
It translated the “burden of representation” on screen. 
Faisal’s father has the important role of correcting the otherwise crooked image of 
Emiratis. Accordingly, one viewer stated: 
 
“The good thing they had this sentence saying that the father said ‘you do 
not represent the Emiratis, remember when he said ‘you’re not a good 
example of an Emirati’? This was the strongest thing that they had in the 
film because they showed the part of the Emirati which they don’t want us 
to be, like some people are like this but we don’t want to be like this.”667  
 
Throughout the plot, Faisal’s father appears in staged confrontations with his son 
and is perceived by Emirati viewers as a ‘typical’ Emirati of the older generation, 
representing dignity, pride and social consciousness. Some Emirati viewers appreciated him 
as the voice that transferred a moral message. One scene in particular, where the father 
reproaches his son, was identified as a reflection of social reality for young Emiratis. One 
viewer described the scene as follows:  
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“The father used terms that we hear from our parents every day, like what 
he said: ’I’ve always told you that Dubai is a small city and everything goes, 
everything goes [round] quickly and people know about it’ so this is what 
we hear every day before leaving the house: ‘be careful and remember 
that Dubai is small’”.668  
 
Thus, reconciled by the father and with a positive ending to the film, the four Emirati 
protagonists serve as a warning to young people to listen to their parents . What the film did 
not attempt, is a critical exploration into the generation-conflict between Faisal and his 
father. The father’s failure to prepare his son for the role he was expected to take in life was 
not voiced neither were the completely different worlds in which both men live. The film 
“City of Life” does not have the potential to arise or provoke such social criticism but brings 
the official discourse of Emirati identity onto a new global level. The need to protect local 
culture and the local image emanates from the global outreach of the movie: the audience, 
aware of the global target audience, adapts its way of viewing the film as a representation. 
Since several ethnic groups are present on screen, ‘the Emirati’ protagonist is directly 
compared to the other characters. Accordingly, the film cannot touch sensitive topics 
without causing a feeling of shame among Emirati viewers.  
Distancing self and social reality from the story on screen is, on the other hand, what 
Donald suggests as the potential of films. Through their ability to translate and represent 
events into a dramatised spectacle, the audience (though distanced from the event by time 
and location) experiences the mediated reality as a “mediated public.” This can provoke a 
feeling of enthusiasm for the actual event represented via the film.669 The effect of 
distancing oneself can trigger self awareness and criticism, or as Donald points out, the 
audience, although distant from the actual scene of action, will form an opinion based on 
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aesthetic judgement. The film not only triggers face to face or mediated discussions about 
the event (e.g. via social internet media); social reality is translated into a spectacle which 
Donald describes as “an aesthetic-political mode of judgement which sustains the new force 
of public opinion.”670 The reactions of Emirati viewers show identification with those 
characters of “City of Life” who re-narrated established positive clichés of being Emirati (as 
embodied by the father). Simultaneously they distanced themselves from less comfortable 
aspects, such as the indulgent lifestyle of Faisal, or the consumption of alcohol by Emiratis.  
This interpretation of the film prioritizes a positive image over a potential 
opportunity to address unflattering social issues. The focus on the ability to project a 
positive image is directly related to the imagined global gaze, which it tries to rectify by 
applying an accepted established narrative. The more conventional narrative of Emirati 
identity in an anticipated genre and style as communicated through the film, found strong 
acceptance while disguising the less pleasant aspects. These were considered minor flaws in 
the film or uncomfortable elements which did not threaten the overall positive image of 
UAE identity perceived by the viewers. Rather than evading the global gaze, the film 
attempts to join the dominant discourse of global media production and change it from 
within. But following the mainstream (in this case Hollywood cinema) jeopardises the 
potential to trigger discussions and change local social dynamics. As it is, the film aims to 
rectify an image which is presumed to be distorted.  
 
 
7.3 Mainstreaming films to represent ‘our city’ as a brand 
 
The inflammatory potential for the local community is diminished in “City of Life” by 
the stereotypical protagonists and predictable narrative. To use a film’s potential to become 
a forum for the articulation of public opinion,671 it would have to use a more precise and 
direct language as a basis for identification of an interpretive community of locals. Hence it 
might not be understood by a mainstream audience. As it is, the film is a prototype for the 
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developing mainstream media industry in the UAE, which is oriented towards optimum 
sales.  
How the emerging film industry, with Abu Dhabi as its vanguard, tries to capitalise on 
such best-selling practices will be the subject of the first two parts of this section. By 
promoting more Emirati film makers to follow the example set by Ali F. Mostafa’s film, the 
government once again shows its eagerness to become the sole facilitator for media outlets. 
In the case of cinema, TwoFour54 particularly tries to induce Hollywood film producers to 
spread the word about the new filming location in the Middle East, Abu Dhabi.  
As a flagship for the global ambitions of local media productions, “City of Life” is the 
translation of political directives and becomes even more significant by not being funded by 
government institutions and its struggle to obtain screening permission from the NMC. 
Indeed, the director, Ali F. Mostafa, had not only to cut several scenes but ultimately deploy 
his personal connections to the ruler of Dubai.672 As a prototype for a unique UAE film style, 
“City of Life” could be flatly rejected as an attempt to copy Hollywood style, or to apply a 
globally understood narrative, while at the same time drawing attention to the locality of 
Dubai. The strongest statement of identity made by the film is in fact its failure to use an 
own unique language and style. Instead it features local characters behaving like 
protagonists from an American street-gang movie but wearing kandōra and speaking Arabic. 
This reflects the conflict displayed in the UAE’s attempt to present itself as a globalised 
modern city while at the same time preserving touches of local identity. 
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The eagerness to become a global player leaves no time to focus on an Emirati 
cinematographic style or to challenge stereotypes. They are accepted as a set of images to 
be modified and countered via contra-stereotypes, while leaving their dimensions 
unexplored. The third part of this section will pose the question of whether “buying into” 
the global film market does not only reproduce clichés but lead to their internalisation. 
Going a step further, the significance of the internalised global gaze will be 
discussed. The film had to perpetuate the polished version of ‘the Emirati’ as it was 
intended for a multinational audience and therefore representative of Emirati life and 
society. Audience reactions showed that they tacitly accepted the censorship policies of the 
NMC, although this meant excluding elements characteristic of the community. It can safely 
be assumed, for example, that the Emirati audience approved of the censorship of one 
scene showing the main Emirati protagonist drunk-driving through the UAE.673 The 
audience’s reception of the film while, underlining the demand for an international film 
about the UAE, also reflects a notion of art as being representative of parts of the ‘culture’, 
which therefore has to be protected (e.g. by an institution). Drawing from Edward Said’s 
observations on representations of Arabs, this last part will question how the film projects 
notions of representation into dichotomies of global and local. 
 
 
7.3.1 Government attempts to mainstream local and global films 
 
The political struggles evolving around the production of “City of Life” make it a 
prototype for the direction the UAE media industry is currently leading: in a way the film’s 
only novelty in a way is featuring the city, or brand of Dubai; everything else is based on 
existing patterns. This is confirmed by the comment of Masoud Amralla al-Ali, director of 
the Gulf Film Festival (GFF), in an interview with Lebanese Daily Star newspaper:  
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“In most of the stories that [depict] the past, you see human relationships. 
The city is always there in the background but very few films allow you to 
feel the pulse of the city and to understand how the city works.” 
 
According to him, making Dubai the hero makes “City of Life” “the first film of its 
kind […] Maybe the start of a different quality of film than what we’ve seen until now.”674 
The city in the movie is more than a random location for a plot, but the moulder of identity 
and provider of the experiences the protagonists undergo. Because their constellation and 
experiences are specific for Dubai they could not easily be set in a different city. It is specific 
for Dubai for example, that Natalia has to fear losing her job due to pregnancy outside 
wedlock, that in a city of about 3.5 million inhabitants, word of Faisal’s fight on Jumeirah 
Road reaches his father even before he returns home the same evening, or that a former 
clerk in a UK advertising company can afford a luxurious lifestyle with villa and a yacht. 
These aspects make the film specifically “local” in the eyes of its residents, and a 
representation of Dubai’s atmosphere and pulse of life consistent with its global brand. 
As a brand the representation of Dubai is of flourishing urbanism well able to attract 
international attention and investment ranging from real estate to business, media, and 
tourism.675 Since the economic crisis in 2009, in particular, the Dubai Media Affairs Office 
'Brand Dubai' (DMAO) was established specifically with the aim to “facilitate greater 
communication and coordination among different organisations that are directly or non-
directly responsible for Dubai's image.”676 Television channels directly pick up the brand 
idea in their mix of urban and Bedouin style symbolism. But while television is directly 
influenced by political guidelines, “City of Life” was not a direct government production. 
Hence it reflects an acceptance of the brand by the producers.  
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Although “City of Life” is merely one film, government-supported film productions 
currently underway are likely to follow a politically defined brand, thus using the potential 
of a globally marketable film to advertise the Emirates. Abu Dhabi’s developing film 
infrastructure is supported by an own brand, distinguishable from Dubai, which in its 
essence is reflected in the film projects sponsored by TwoFour54. Abu Dhabi’s brand is less 
urban and more traditionally Bedouin than Dubai’s. Under the slogan “Travellers Welcome” 
it largely relies on desert romanticism and symbols globally associated with a Bedouin past, 
such as camels, falcons, Arabic coffee pots, tents, mysteriously veiled women with burqa, 
and wise old men in kandōra stirring a fire in the vast dark sea of the Arabian desert. 
The first Emirati feature film produced by the production company of TwoFour54, 
Imagenation, is the coming of age film “Sea Shadow”,677 mainly set in the less urban 
northern Emirates. Its director, festival award winner Nawaf Al-Janahi, said about his film: 
 
“We want the world’s movie industry to sit up and take notice of what we 
are doing here in the Emirates. Sea Shadow will help us do that. It is a 
perfect showcase for our local acting and film-making talent and offers 
genuine cultural insights which should be at the heart of all good films.”678 
 
While the film is hailed as a purely local production, it has also been the centre of 
alleged corruption and government interferences with the director’s work.679 As an 
upcoming prototype of Abu Dhabi’s film productions, it already showcases the 
monopolisation of film content by government-related institutions, previously observed in 
television broadcasting.  
The incorporation of local talents in the global branding and marketing process of 
the country is certainly the best strategy to find a local brand which is accepted by viewers 
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outside the UAE and appreciated by locals as a representation of their identity to the world. 
The outrage caused by “Sex and the City 2” has shown how the attempt to utilise an 
American production to represent the country can backfire. Despite the censorship 
problems revolving around the film’s production, which ultimately led to a banning of the 
film in the UAE, “Sex and the City 2” blatantly advertises the country as a tourist destination. 
To achieve this, it uses symbols from the Abu Dhabi brand as well as narratives from cultural 
books and translating them into a language understood by an audience unfamiliar with life 
in the UAE - yet with a certain image of the oil-rich Gulf States. 
Although the film was eventually shot in Morocco due to differences with the NMC, 
the movie clearly promotes the emirate of Abu Dhabi as a luxurious and exotic tourist 
destination. Not only is the name “Abu Dhabi” repeatedly mentioned by various 
protagonists throughout the movie but the famous New York friends take the audience on a 
luxury airline designed in the colours and style of Etihad Airways to a world class hotel 
similar to the new Shangri La in Abu Dhabi. Pampered by private butlers with exotic food 
lounging between divans, pool parties, and discos, the protagonists set off to follow the 
typical advertised tourist programme for the emirate: camel trips, dune bashing, and 
shopping. Throughout the film, one of the characters takes on the role of informant on local 
culture by reading to her friends from a tourist guide. She explains the abaya and kandōra 
fashion, import regulations, as well as local customs of decency in dress and how to behave 
in public.  
All possible pitfalls of Western tourists are thus explained and experienced by the 
protagonists, ending in a comical twist when one of the characters violates the local decency 
rules and the friends get deported. The signal is clear: you can have luxury and fun in Abu 
Dhabi but must take the laws seriously. The analogy to repeatedly occurring cases of 
inappropriate clothing by tourists in public is obvious. The fact that the film undertakes to 
promote holidays in Abu Dhabi, gives rise to the question of whether or not the production 
team’s break with the local authorities was final. It is therefore unclear whether not the Abu 
Dhabi Tourism Authority paid for promoting their country. If that were the case, the film 
would be a strong statement of Abu Dhabi’s willingness to outshine Dubai as a tourist 
destination. This features most significantly in a scene with an invented sheikh from Abu 
Dhabi, Khalil, who introduces his emirate to one of the Americans by saying “Dubai was 
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yesterday, Abu Dhabi is the future.”680 Unfortunately, since the movie wasn’t released in the 
UAE only very few impressions from local viewers could be collected. Those viewers of the 
movie who gave their opinion were mainly outraged by the distorted image of the UAE, the 
marginalisation of Dubai, and especially the condescending image towards local women, 
who are portrayed as secretly aspiring to become like the friends from New York. 
The incident showcases a failed attempt to utilise a global brand (“Sex and the City”) 
to market their Abu Dhabi brand. It notably backfired due to censorship regulations but also 
because of the way in which local identity was portrayed. Admittedly, not a single Emirati 
character plays a role in the film but the comments on people, the image of the city, and 
especially of the women was enough to cause offence and for the NMC to appear as an 
institution backed by a majority of Emiratis. 
 
 
7.3.2 ‘We appear like this, but...’ Reinterpreting stereotypes to create a global 
identity 
 
The translation of local culture into a representation which is understandable to a 
global audience is bound to become a subject of negotiation between conflicting interests. 
Transnational media has to utilise a mainstream code and satisfy expectations not only 
towards a certain story line but to the image of people and culture. Hence the portrayed 
community becomes subjected to the global gaze.  
Reinterpreting established stereotypes requires a process of educating and guiding 
the audience towards a new code. Existing images have to be used and modified. The 
recognition of, and identification with, an introduced image or narrative can form the basis 
of a change in perceptions. Such a process runs along the line of argumentation: “we might 
appear like this, but...” In their very different ways the films “City of Life” and “Sex and the 
City 2” showcase the encounter of stereotypes on screen. The general acceptance of the 
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former and rejection of the latter shows that the local audience shares an interest in 
reinterpreting what is perceived as strong globally-established stereotypes.  
It would go too far to state that the attempt to create a globally acceptable image of 
the UAE (via brand marketing for example) is merely a top-down government policy. In the 
focus groups with students they expressed their appreciation of global events to establish 
an image of the UAE as part of the Western world – a notion they associated with openness 
and a fun life-style. Many students, for example, saw events such as the Formula One race 
as a tool to change an existing negative image of Arabs and making themselves known to 
the world. Students from Abu Dhabi repeatedly remarked that whenever they were 
travelling, nobody knew Abu Dhabi or even the UAE, only Dubai. The need to change a 
negative image of Arabs in general was expressed by one student, saying:  
 
“I think it’s hard changing the idea of Arabs in[the] media, it’s too hard 
because even when they are making movies outside, they always 
represent Arabs as.... like : they are rich, [...] always searching for [a] 
woman, they are stereotyping. It’s too hard to change this.”681  
Another student added:  
“Even if we try to have shows that represent us in the right way, it will be 
hard to show them [because] they won’t show this TV show in the US or 
other countries.” 682 
 
These comments express not only anger at being misrepresented as a “community 
of Arabs”, but the need to be represented fairly as a community Hence the strong support 
for the development of an Arab cinema which can rectify the distorted image of the 
Hollywood discourse. Only with an additional discourse and alternative narratives can the 
marginalised community introduce ‘ideal egos’ with which viewers can identify and which 
can change the existing representation of Arabs in the media.  
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This strategy seems to be accepted as the right way to go forward, sanctioning the 
interpretation and validation of “City of Life”. However, with this aim the community of 
Emiratis is voluntarily taking up competition with an already established strong narrative 
discourse - let alone industry. The hurdle of distribution must obviously be overcome: in 
order to be seen, the rectifying narratives have to be screened beyond the limited spaces 
and audiences of film festivals. As a student from one of the focus groups remarked:  
 
“They [the Emirati film festivals] do help, but there is just a limited type of 
people who would come to the film festivals here and might get a different 
idea – might change the idea he (the Film festival visitor) already got about 
us Arabs.”683 
 
Moreover, as is the case with the branding of the cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, a 
characteristic film style and language has to be found to make the Emirati productions 
recognisable. However, by entering into competition with an already established structure 
the Emirati film makers will need to re-code the own language along already defined lines. 
The pattern thus runs along parallel lines to the individuals who attempt to change the local 
television industry from within. As with the control over the television industry, productions 
focus on making a name for Abu Dhabi and marketing Dubai as an “Arab city of international 
spirit and sensibility.”684 This focus makes it scarcely possible to have the potential to through 
a new angle on UAE society, tackle taboo topics, or develop a unique style. Feeding into a 
global media language means to focus on the importance of representation towards the 
global other, hence reinforcing the global gaze.  
Such was the case with “Sex and the City 2”, a brand which the UAE could not 
compete against. It touched aspects of the local culture which were considered necessary to 
shield and protect towards the global gaze. Its message was twofold. For one, the UAE 
might appear as a place of luxury and high life, but underneath there are conservative 
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values represented by rules of decency. While this message is merely taking a different 
angle at the message conveyed in “City of Life”, the second message was unacceptable to 
the local audiences: Arab women might cover themselves up, but underneath they aspire to 
be like their Western role models represented by the quartet of women from New York. 
This was conveyed in a key scene where the New Yorkers, escaping from an outraged mass 
of Arab men, are rescued by a group of fully covered Arab women. The latter take off their 
abayas in front of the dazzled Americans, displaying the newest Italian fashion and stating: 
“Oh yes, Arab women are the most elegant.” The presumption of global keenness on 
fashion might have been excused just as the devotion to cars is shown by the Emiratis in 
“City of Life”. But true to its female target audience, “Sex and the City 2” fell into a trap 
which “City of Life” carefully avoided: the exposure of the Emirati woman to the global gaze. 
The flagship city of Dubai and even Emirati men may be considered critically yet necessarily 
subjected to global scrutiny. But the female aspect of Emirati identity is still under so much 
internal scrutiny and negotiation of acceptable representations, that it does not seem ready 
for the leap onto the global screen, let alone portrayed as twinned with its Western 
counterpart.  
Criticism of Emirati women as soon as they expose themselves to the scrutiny of an 
imagined global audience does not only concern fictional characters. Exactly how much 
rejection of the imagined audience is a realistic fear became apparent in the incident of Dr. 
Lamees Hamdan from Dubai. The wife of a prominent Dubai business man, she appeared on 
the “Oprah Winfrey Show” in October 2009 talking about women’s lives in the UAE.685 In 
one focus group several female students criticised the fact that she was not entitled to 
speak for and about Emirati women. During an animated discussion, one student pointed 
out: “Dr. Lamees is not even truly Emirati, she is Iranian.” But when another suggested that 
their student and her colleagues might have been able to give a more realistic impressions 
of life in the UAE, there was a strong objection. The quoted student suggested that an older 
Emirati, preferably a Bedouin woman, should have been on the show.686 A crucial discussion 
point was Dr. Lamees’ role as representative of Emirati women. Some people defended her 
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by pointing out that Dr. Lamees had not claimed to speak for all Emirati women. In fact she 
insinuated exactly that, by mentioning “we in Dubai” several times, but leaving this aside, 
the discussion makes an interesting point about representation and individuality. The 
students demanded ‘credentials’ for anybody who speaks publically about their society. 
Perceived authenticity is the key to having a right to speak for all. Some students remarked 
on ethnic authenticity as an Emirati, while others considered social class crucial. For them 
Dr. Lamees did not represent mainstream UAE lifestyle, given that she was an upper class 
privileged woman. Again other students focused on religious purity, criticising Dr. Lamees 
for not covering herself in any form. 
Dr. Lamees’s message was similar to the fictional character in “Sex and the City 2”, 
trying to create a basis of mutuality between UAE and Western women. She obviously tried 
to reinterpret the stereotype of Arab women being forced by an oppressive religion to veil. 
Her statement that sheela, abaya, and burqa were treasured symbols of tradition rather 
than religious obligations was surely given with the intention of building bridges between 
cultures. But she was attacked for misrepresenting the collective of Emirati women by 
removing any religious connotations from the traditional female gown. Given the reality 
that many Emirati females do not wear their local attire in a religious way, it becomes clear 
that the criticism was due to the discrepancy between ideal and reality. Those attacking Dr. 
Lamees as a misrepresentation felt that the ideal should prevail over the reality with regard 
to representation to outsiders.  
With such a focus on an ideal outside image, the creation of an industry of 
representation can develop its own perpetuating dynamic which covers up the existing 
diversified national identities. The multiple identities disappear behind the brands of cities 
and self-created stereotypes of identity. As such the case of “Sex and the City 2” highlights 
more than the indignation felt by Emiratis shows more than the notion of being 
misrepresented and subjected to the global gaze. The attempt to change a dominating 
discourse from within by literally “buying into” the Hollywood industry at the same time 
validates the latter. Even “City of Life”, trying to provide different perspectives on multi-
ethnic communities in Dubai and multiple Emirati identities, copies stereotypes as seen 
previously. By using these it becomes assimilated to the approved structure of stereotyping. 
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Hailed as a pioneer of Emirati cinema it indicates a local cinematographic language which 
has accepted the structure of subjection to the global gaze.  
 
 
7.3.3 Acceptance and internalisation of the global gaze 
 
In her article “Can the subaltern speak?” Spivak argues that Foucault’s writings on 
centuries of European imperialism actually reinforce narratives of imperialism. The very 
structures and spaces which consolidate the power of elites and limit the possible range of 
action of other communities are “screen allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader 
narratives of imperialism.”687 Drawing from theoretical works of Derrida, Spivak’s criticism 
of Foucault’s historical and example-based works targets the fact that his criticism of classes 
and structures ultimately consolidates their validity of dominance: “Foucault’s appeal can 
hide a privileging of the intellectual and of the ‘concrete’ subject of oppression that, in fact 
compounds the appeal.”688 From her linguistic framework she observes that the subaltern is 
perpetually reconstructed by its attempts to break out of the subaltern objectified 
position.689 Hence the subaltern cannot speak as long as it uses the language of the 
dominator. Spivak’s criticism of Foucault goes further to say that a stereotyping and 
objectifying view on the own imagined community involuntarily accepts and consolidates 
established frameworks. Even criticising these on a theoretical analytical level (by writing 
against them or deconstructing their discourses) ultimately gives them validation.  
Spivak’s concept can be applied to the attempt to counter negative stereotypes of Arabs in 
the media. The media has to be encoded in the understandable mainstream language, thus re-
enacting and solidifying the discriminatory discourse. Furthermore, by focusing on such an 
ideological aim, the Emirati media productions will be evaluated on the basis of how well they 
answer to or make relative the global image of Arabs, rather than on the basis of how well they 
translate an Emirati identity which perceives itself as free from outside scrutiny. The power of the 
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global gaze, as with the power of oppressing social categories, lies in its application as a prism 
through which all mainstream media is evaluated. Accordingly, instead of evaluating a film on the 
basis of how real and identifiable it portrays Arabs for Arabs, it is assessed with regard to how it 
represents Arabs to non-Arabs, and to what extent it demolishes prejudices. 
If the global gaze becomes the yardstick of evaluation of representations, it can easily 
transform from narrative reality to internalised reality. The stereotypes then become the only, the 
‘right way’ of representing the community of Emiratis. Seemingly, “City of Life” fulfils the demand 
for global recognition and rectification of a negative image. Applying its message to the 
named formula, it would be: ‘We might appear as fun driven pampered big-shots, but 
underneath we have values of our pre-oil days, of religion, honesty, courage, and loyalty.’ 
These are represented by the old generation (Faisal’s father in “City of Life”), and they form 
a basis of constancy to which the younger generation will resort as soon as they 
comprehend that the shallow high-life leads to disaster. The ‘right way’ of representing is 
linked to ownership of the produced image, thus breaking free from the role of Spivak’s 
“subaltern”. Just how strongly Emiratis felt the need to take ownership over the 
representation of Dubai, is revealed through their criticism of the film, which targeted 
aspects relativizing the prominence of a polished representation of UAE society. One viewer, 
for example, said Faisal’s father should have played a larger role. Several other viewers 
independently criticised the last scene of the movie, which shows a paperboard collector 
winning 1,000,000 AED from a scratch card found in a bin and crossing himself thankfully. 
One viewer felt that this scene took the film away from the Emiratis of Dubai showing it as a 
“city of Christians rather than Muslims”, whereas the same viewer positively remarked on 
the ablution of the dead Khalfan because “it showed non-Muslims some aspects of Islamic 
identity.”690 
Calling for ‘the right way’ of representation runs along the same lines as foremost 
comments about the “right way” to wear sheela and abaya, which Dr. Lamees neglected 
and Emirati news presenters found so important when representing on screen. What has 
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been criticised on a local level is demanded on a global level: a homogenized censored 
image. The underlying structure of a firm basis in traditional values, represented through 
Faisal’s father, is similar to the strategy applied by Dr. Khalifa in his TV talk shows: when 
featuring what is potentially perceived as image-damaging content he pacifies his audience 
by his repeated reassurances. Whatever phenomena of UAE society he may broadcast and 
discuss, in his person he reassures the underlying agreement of existing traditional values. 
Hence the sting is taken from acknowledging the phenomena of mustarjilāt or drunken 
Emirati youngsters. 
On a local level the demands for a diversified media admitting various publics show 
an acceptance of different discourses of identity which are in constant negotiation and 
change rather than in conflict. However on a global level, the marketable image gains 
priority. The overall moral message of identity makes the flagship film “City of Life” 
withstand the global gaze. The negotiation of Emirati identity on a transnational level 
therefore seems one step behind the television discourse, where the lack of plausibility has 
led to an acknowledgement that there is no such thing as a homogenous Emirati identity. 
People feeling excluded from the media discourse aim to be heard and seen by their various 
audiences. This aim acknowledges that there are different yet overlapping identities within 
the Emirati community. 
It seems that the exposure to multiple publics via alternative media helps overcome 
the need for one perfect and pure representation. Although on a local level it is accepted 
that it is not possible to isolate one ‘local’ culture, this is exactly what is demanded for a 
global level. Based on such a notion media products will tend to be a reaction or response to 
a thus accepted notion of the global gaze. Certainly one might argue that such 
developments need time to evolve691 as well as reconcile government and communities’ 
interests. The monopolisation of the existing media industry as well as the growing film 
infrastructure by the government hindering the development of independent films 
therefore remains a main obstacle. However, as a concept internalised by audiences 
themselves, overcoming the global gaze seems more complicated and deeper rooted. 
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7.3.4 Shifting from stereotypes to self-orientalisation? 
 
Spivak’s observations on the relationship between dominant and subaltern 
discourses show how the subaltern ‘other’ is objectified and unable to deconstruct the 
dominant discourse without developing an own language.692 The way in which Emirati 
audiences perceived both television and cinema industries with regard to representations of 
their identities, shows a practical dimension of her concept. In the TV channels the 
presenters felt subjected to a structure which is already in place and which it is almost 
impossible to evade. Similarly, the Emirati film makers appear as ‘newcomers’ on the stage 
of global film production and have to navigate their way through various obstacles.  
For the individual film producer, translating an ideal ‘self’ becomes problematic 
when this representation has to be incorporated into a code the ‘other’ (in this case, the 
international audience) understands. Ultimately the ‘quality’ of the other’s gaze is imagined, 
but it is fuelled by experiences and images. By using stereotypes as representations, the 
producer enters a sphere of ambivalent contesting meanings. The stereotypes are 
reinforced by their perpetuation and can thus be confirmed as valid or ‘true’ images and 
experiences. Based on the fluctuant meaning of such codes, their usage also grants the 
possibility of modification.  
The established structures and discourses are at the same time part of the 
individuals’ media consumption, thus contextualising their lives and experiences. The 
images of the worlds in Hollywood films are part of their identities as Emiratis, hence the 
aim to re-contextualise the stereotypes rather than opposing them. The students expressed 
an imbalance of media exchange between their imagined community, which consumes 
‘original’ content produced by Western media, and their Emirati forms of expression.693 
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While Emiratis are consuming a primary source from which they can form an opinion of 
American society. Arabs, however, have their impressions represented for ‘them’ by others. 
Such representations are secondary sources and portray Arabs through the prism of 
Western stereotypes. The frustration of not having a voice despite an international 
community of TV and film consumers, explains the interviewees’ approval for “City of Life”: 
the character of Faisal represents the stereotype of oil-rich Arabs criticised by the student, 
but he transforms during the movie to become a ‘self-made’ stereotype. By the end of the 
film he has become the prototype of the ‘modern’ yet ‘authentic’ Emirati, exemplified by 
Sheikh Zayed. The aforementioned Dr. Lamees was perceived as a misrepresentation for not 
conforming to the official narrative, which is perceived as the only acceptable one towards 
‘outsiders’.  
The example illustrates the remark made by Edward Said regarding reinterpreting 
misrepresentations of the ‘other’. In the context of representations of the Orient, he 
stresses that they “can also be unmade and rewritten, [...] always with shapes imposed and 
disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ East, ‘our’ Orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and 
direct.”694 The students welcome the stereotypical representation of Emiratis, which they 
criticised in local television shows, when confronted with an ‘other’ (Hollywood) which 
enforces a negative image of Arabs. Since both positive, as well as the rejected stereotypes 
however, draw their interpretive material from an Orientalist discourse, the question arises 
whether this indicates a form of ‘self-Orientalisation’.  
As a technical term derived from Edward Said’s “Orientalism”, several researchers 
have used self-Orientalisation to describe how the validity of Western scholarship to analyse 
the Orient has influenced scholars from the Middle East and Asia. Mehmet Akif Kirecci 
analyses how Western images of a declining Orient were accepted as ‘facts’ by Egyptian 
intellectuals.695 Other researchers use the term in the context of Agehananda Bharati’s 
concept of the “Pizza-effect.”696 This approach, often applied to studies of popular culture, 
explores how ‘Oriental’ artefacts invented by the West, are re-imported into their supposed 
countries of origin. Ann Marie Leshkomich and Carla Jones, for example, analyse the 
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phenomenon of “Asian chic” as a trend in China.697 They show how Western fashion 
designers have invented an image of the mysterious Orient and now benefit from marketing 
it globally. In China, which has been used as an inspiration, this trend is adapted as 
distinctively ‘Chinese’, thus symbolically affirming the validity of the invention. Such 
research touches upon the topic of ‘cultural origin’ which is relevant for the adaptation of 
stereotypes of ‘self’ alluded to in the previous sections of this chapter.  
Based on the concept of dialogism and authenticity as a practice (as discussed in part 
2.2), disputes about ‘cultural ownership’ do not lead to a better understanding of the 
dimensions discussed in the context of self-stereotyping. The Arab perspective could also 
argue that images of the Orientalist discourse are as ‘originally’ Arab as Ibn Khaldoun’s 
romantic laud of the Bedouins during the 14th century.698 Homi Bhabha pointed out that the 
Orientalist colonial discourse is ambivalent. He stipulated that “the reason a cultural text or 
system of meaning cannot be sufficient unto itself is that the act of cultural enunciation – 
the place of utterance – is crossed by the difference of writing.”699 Similar to Barthes’ 
“Death of the Author”, Bhabha acknowledges that languages (or code systems) are hybrid 
and potentially independent of the initial ideology. Simply using or “tolerating” stereotypes 
cannot therefore be considered as self-Orientalisation. “City of Life” is what Cameron Bailey 
called “cinema of duty”700: the attempt to reinterpret stereotypes of a subjugated 
community. This reaction to a strong discourse is based on the film producer feeling 
representative of her or his imagined community, which does not have access to the 
mainstream ‘world cinema’. “City of Life” not only re-stereotypes ‘the Arab’, but discredits 
the foreign Orientalist view of the Gulf: the English clerk, who, in an Orientalist manner, 
sees “the East as a career”701 is vilified as superficial and dishonest.  
Whether the use of Orientalist symbolism succeeds in re-labelling stereotypes is 
doubtful on local as well as global levels. The international community of Hollywood 
consumers can easily reject attempts to define a ‘new’ stereotype for the Orient as lip 
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service by a marginalised group wanting to be recognised. This attempt therefore only 
confirms the validity of Western superiority. An example from the aforementioned film “Sex 
and the City 2” illustrates this interpretation: in anticipation of their trip to Abu Dhabi the 
friends from New York are frequently told that “this is the new Middle East”, only to be 
persecuted by a mob for their promiscuous apparel.702 Among a local Emirati audience, on 
the other hand, the stereotypes find only approval under the influence of the global gaze. As 
soon as the imagined community of Emiratis considers itself to be among peers, the lack of 
diversity is criticised. Examples of local society talk shows have amply demonstrated that 
there are multiple situational ‘burdens of representation.’ In the sphere of local TV, 
individuals demand re-presentations as opposed to the patronising representatives in the 
official media.  
The burden of representation, however, is protected by the official narrative of 
identity. The image of collective self, which is deemed suitable for the global community, is 
imposed on the Emiratis by the ideology of nationhood. The nation-state defines being 
Emirati and how it is expressed, ultimately assuming the role of the ‘omniscient’ Western 
researcher in the Orientalist discourse.  
In the case of “Asian chic”, Jones observes that “those who partook of the Orientalist 
trend adopted a distanced, self-Orientalizing perspective on the charms of their imagined 
ethnic heritage.”703 This comment is very similar to the heritage discourse in the UAE. The 
Emiratis perceived the ‘stings’ of their local TV channels in a similar way and appreciated the 
imagery of Bedouin heroism. The difference between these cases is that in the UAE this 
‘imagined ethnic heritage’ is not ‘imported’ through consumer goods but as local 
production. 
For Said there is no “real” Orient, but since the Orient cannot represent itself, 
Orientalist texts act as a substitute, using “techniques of representation that make the 
Orient visible, clear, ‘there’ in discourse about it.”704 Thus Orientalists construct a 
representation of the Orient which claims to contain its essence.705 In his survey of 
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“Orientalism Now”, Said stipulates that “the modern Orient […] partakes in its own 
Orientalizing.”706 He explains this as an active re-enforcement of Western dominance 
through consumerist behaviours along with unreflected acceptance of stereotypes:  
 
“There is a vast standardization of taste in the region, symbolized not only 
by transistors, blue jeans, and Coca Cola but also by cultural images of the 
Orient supplied by American mass media and consumed unthinkingly by 
the mass television audience. The paradox of an Arab regarding himself as 
an “Arab” of the sort put out by Hollywood is but the simplest result of 
what I am referring to.”707  
 
His view is problematic: it applies the same concept of cultural ownership as the 
previously mentioned ‘Pizza effect.’ Following Appadurai’s remarks on globalisation of 
cultures, it has to be acknowledged that even if originating in the USA, Coca Cola has a 
different cultural meaning and involves different connotations depending on the local 
context of its consumption. Coca Cola does not ‘belong’ to the USA any more, and criticising 
its adaptation needs to target a multi-corporate enterprise, not the nation in which it was 
invented. As an inventor of a corporate identity, Coca Cola and other companies indeed 
exert a colonialising power by inventing mainstream identities (such as consumerist 
behaviours), but as this does not specifically target the Orient, its acceptance can be labelled 
as commercialism or materialism, rather than Orientalism. 
Secondly, as this research has shown, the stereotype of “Arab” is not simply 
accepted. It is not only academics who criticise the stereotype but ‘ordinary people’ too 
experience it as a burden. The fact that they feel categorised as “Arab” or “Emirati” is not 
because of the Hollywood stereotype but the omnipresent ideology of (in the case of the 
UAE) being Emirati. A mainstream Hollywood film is not ‘seen’ as reality but for what it is: a 
piece of entertainment working with master narratives and stereotypes. This is criticised 
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and considered a misrepresentation. But while the self categorisation as “Arab” is 
situational and genre-specific, the government discourse is not. Whatever an Emirati does, 
Emirati identity is unavoidable, and any expressions of self and individualism are framed by 
the official identity. 
Whether or not individuals accept the content of the discourse, as soon as they 
enter any kind of public domain, they get caught up in the network of being representative 
of and having an Emirati identity. A film maker like Nayla produces films about very personal 
issues, such as dating for the first time, or, in her latest production in 2011, boredom within 
married life. Invited for an interview on Dubai TV, the focus of discussion was not the 
provocative content of her productions but her national identity and gender representation. 
The interviewer inquired as to how she felt as an Emirati woman who makes films, whether 
she had any messages for other Emirati women, how the experience of shooting a film in 
India was for her as an Emirati woman, and so on.708 As in the case of the TV presenters, the 
individual disappears behind the predefined categories of representation. 
I therefore propose a modified reading of what Said calls the Orient’s “own 
Orientalizing.” The government ideology ‘Orientalises’ the Emirati citizens, by monopolising 
the narrative of identity, as invented by the privileged ruling elite. To enforce this ideology 
all best-practices of manipulation are utilised, as far as the branding of a national ‘history’. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of the research was to explore perceptions of Emirati national identity through the 
prism of the media. At the centre of the research were Emirati media makers who are not part of the 
ruling elite but have an interest in both being consumers in relation to the media and in translating 
national identity into a product for consumption. Accordingly, they have to make sense of 
contradictory narratives and practices, to define their own position within the social discourse and 
create their own personal contributions. The research focused on their experiences of situations and 
narratives, as well as their ideals and role models. The interviews illustrated local specificities of the 
UAE media landscape and the significance of anthropological grassroots theories for research on 
Gulf societies.  
A general benefit of the research conducted was the focus on individuals as central figures 
around which communities gather and which they use as inspiration to create their identities. While 
other pieces of research on Gulf societies have focused on rituals and artefacts this research draws 
attention to role models.
709
 The construction of role models in the UAE has significantly changed 
over time. It started with the imported personality cult around Nasser, which demonstrated the 
importance of a local figurehead for the nation. More modern figureheads include sheikhs such as 
Sheikh Hamdan. A political personality cult has developed using modern methods of branding 
usually reserved for celebrities. The political leaders of the nation have become part of a wider 
celebrity discourse and indirectly compete with other Emiratis with high public profiles. Case in point 
is Sheikh Hamdan, whose public image is not created by focusing on any political agenda but on his 
role as representation of the nation’s people. By choosing the angle of representation as one which 
operates through individuals, this research has contextualised the UAE media audience of nationals 
and the ruling elite within a transnational discourse revolving around individuals and their symbolic 
meaning for communities.  
While the media landscape in the UAE demonstrates several similarities to local media in 
other Arab states, the specific demographics of the UAE have led to features which guide the 
dynamics of its development. The large proportion of foreign media professionals involved in the 
local media production has strongly influenced the relationship between Emirati audiences and their 
national media. The creation of content for local TV copies or emulates what international media 
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channels create. This means creating mainstream content to please the widest possible audience. 
However, in catering to this lowest common denominator, the local media makers miss the chance 
to have the diverse communities of UAE nationals identify with the content and thus become loyal 
viewers. The dedicated fan channels (such as Bollywood, drama, and sports channels) have resulted 
in a media landscape which is intended to 'have something for everyone' but which is instead 
considered to have no relevance for the national community. This development provides evidence 
which corroborates the prediction of media scholar Elihu Katz that the availability of private 
television networks and independent production companies has fragmented audiences and reduced 
the potential of 'national media' as a form of mass communication for an audience within the 
territory of a nation state.710 
Simultaneously the UAE provides a strong case for James Curran’s perspective on national 
media in a global age. He argues that national media has to produce “unity through diversity” to 
preserve its relevance for the nation.711 According to Curran, public broadcasts ideally attempt to 
create the conditions for sub-communities to co-create a national media which accounts for its 
different and sometimes contradictory expressions of national identity. In the case of the UAE, the 
government is obviously unwilling to provide such a framework and has instead developed a media 
strategy which ensures that the integrity of its invented national identity remains untarnished. What 
makes the UAE’s version of a homogenous media landscape stand out among that of other local 
Arab media industries is not the degree of governmental control itself, nor the orientation towards 
uncritical, complacent mainstream entertainment. What is unique about it is how the status quo has 
been received by many Emiratis and, more importantly, the opposition it has triggered. Rather than 
opposing the government as initiator of an unconvincing media, or even the conspiratorial notion of 
global media corporations invading the local media landscape, criticism is deflected towards the 
country’s expatriates who sometimes occupy senior roles in the local media production industry. 
They symbolise the ‘other’, non-Emirati element of the local media and are consequently referred to 
derisively under the collective term ‘Media Mafia.’ The conflict between homogenous and diverse 
media is thus deflected away from an inner-Emirati conflict between ruling elite and people. The 
notion of the Lebanese “Media Mafia” plays into the hands of the government who can thus 
maintain their image of closeness to the Emirati nationals. 
Another particularity of the UAE case lies in the government’s specific concern with 
representing a polished image of the ruling elite and the nation as a whole. This preoccupation 
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translates itself into the control and manipulation of media discourses on all levels of production. 
The media are caught between the governmental urge to control and the desire to appear open 
both in their relationship with the community of UAE nationals and in that which they enjoy with 
members of other nation states. This aim spreads from the macro-level of legislation into individual 
notions of representation of the nation. Ella Shohat’s concept of the “burden of representation” 
defines a pressure experienced to develop a positive and distinctive image of the collective 
community.
712
 In this scenario individual deviations from the invented ideal image are discouraged 
in favour of that image. The imagined ‘other’ becomes a main consideration in the production of 
media images. This research has shown that in practice Emirati media personalities reject the 
necessity to represent an ideal image but simultaneously agree with the principle. Just as the 
government wishes for the nation to be acknowledged and recognised by other nations, the Emiratis 
are overanxious about the assessment of Emirati identity by outside communities. This fixation is 
intertwined with media representations of collectives through stereotypes and can be overcome on 
a micro level through personal encounters and dialogue with individuals from ‘outside’ the Emirati 
community. The international film festivals are examples for places where communities to gather in 
real time, interact, and have a dialogue. But these events are exceptional and limited to a select 
group of media professionals.  
On the whole, the focus on ideal representations hinders the development of a distinct 
Emirati media style, so strongly sought for by producers. Rather than permitting space for 
experimentation and development, films, in particular, are produced with the sole aim to compete 
with established film industries such as Hollywood. Master narratives and their symbols are adapted 
in the attempt to re-interpret them and use them to showcase the Emirates to a global community 
of movie goers. The necessary internal dialogue between ideal, constructed images and varieties in 
practice within the community thus becomes a self-initiated limitation of expression.  
 
 
Confirmed and challenged frameworks 
 
On a theoretical level the research of this thesis has demonstrated the applicability 
of Arjun Appadurai’s concept of globalisation and the dimensions of its possible relevance to 
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anthropological studies of the Gulf region. Similarly to Stuart Hall, Appadurai criticises the 
dichotomisation of ‘global’ and ‘local.’ Its limitations are indirectly expressed in the term 
‘glocal’, a term which ultimately tries to dissolve a previously created dichotomy. Appadurai 
and Hall highlight that ‘global’ is part of a framework which tries to discover ‘authentic’ local 
elements by contrast. Most importantly both scholars criticise the perception of the notion 
as a ‘modern’ phenomenon.  
This thesis has treated the terms ‘global’ and ‘local’ as components of what 
Eickleman calls ‘world views’, which do not contradict each other. They are part of a 
framework which defines identities but can neither claim empirical ‘truth’ nor be completely 
discarded as obsolete theory. In the context of media the research has suggested an 
understanding of ‘global’ as a collection of economic practices and code systems which are 
accepted as convincing and meaningful by media consumers around the globe. This does 
not exclude its ‘localisation’, since every society attributes different meanings to such code 
systems. The use of branding strategies for example can be called a global media 
phenomenon although it is contextualised differently in each situation. Especially with 
regard to film production, global code systems have been criticised due to their 
stereotypical forms of representation. The review of their incorporation into Emirati films has 
illustrated both the power and limitations of their use in local media contexts. Familiar with global 
media, the research participants have appreciated the attractiveness of global media 
formats whilst simultaneously criticising the lack of uniquely Emirati expressions of identity. 
Whilst the copying of stereotypes and mainstream narratives in the local media was 
criticised by the research participants, their media usage and the taste displayed in their 
adaptation dissolved the dichotomy.  
In the context of the UAE, the dialogical nature of identity formation, as outlined by 
Michael Bakhtin, was often vocalised as a power struggle between ‘us’ and the imagined 
‘other.’ Harmonised in practice, global influences were interpreted by many as a potential 
threat to the local identity. An imagined international media audience, for example, was 
experienced as judgemental scrutiniser of Emirati and Arab communities. In anticipatory 
defence, media audiences demanded representations of their collective identity which 
could deflate any possible criticism. This prism of the evaluation of their own media has 
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illustrated the effects of the dichotomising world view observed by Appadurai in other local 
contexts. 
To reiterate, the intensity of the need to represent and deflect any possible 
challenge to local integrity is correlated with the demographics of the UAE. Since the 
nationals are a minority in their own country the notion of the overwhelming ‘other’ is a 
daily experience. This explains the emphatic demands of Emiratis to have a specifically local 
media. Their longing for a media space exclusively for UAE nationals has confirmed the 
applicability of Homi Bhabha’s remarks on ‘homecoming’ in literature to the visual media.  
Consideration of the discrepancies between local influences and those deemed to be 
global through examination of the media has shown how they influence the negotiation of 
forms of representation. Merging global trends of representation with local audience needs 
whilst simultaneously criticising ‘global’ as ‘foreign’ has also shed light on the 
conceptualisation of Orientalism in the UAE. The negotiation of hegemonic forms of 
representation has raised the question whether Emiratis orientalise themselves. From 
within the framework used here for the analysis of media structures this research does not 
lead to such a conclusion, whilst the acceptance of a dichotomy between global and local 
would support this perception. As signifying a form of imposed representation, Orientalism 
is not mediated by the Emirati media consumers or producers but by the UAE government. 
The element of “Orientalising” does not lie in the fabrication of a stereotypical discourse 
and set of images but in its enforcement and it is through a complex structure of control 
that the UAE government exercises this power. 
The means by which self-Orientalisation is enforced is as complex and various as 
were the linguistic discourses originally analysed by Edward Said to define the concept. 
Media accessibility is high in the UAE and anybody can construct and circulate 
representations of self ‒ for example on the internet. While individuals and small 
communities can enjoy their notions of mutuality and community, the official local 
discourse is closed to alternative voices. Even more so, the currently developing film 
industry already features the attempt of the government to transfer its structure of control 
to foreign producers. The method is similar to the structure established in the local media: 
foreign producers are offered incentives to use the UAE as a shooting location in exchange 
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for content limitations. This has already led to conflicts and ultimately stands in the way of 
the UAE becoming a real competitor to favourite Hollywood shooting locations such as 
Morocco and Tunisia.  
The structure of incorporating all available means and stories and aligning them into 
a one-sided narrative of UAE identity means that variations are existent but prevented from 
a fruitful, dialogical exchange with other images. Communities interact among themselves in 
their specific media spheres. The power of this structure of parallel monologues to express 
national identity is criticised and challenged by Emiratis who demand diversification within 
the media. However, the real power that produces such a homogenised world of images to 
signify identity lies in the fact that the media industry is controlled by a monopoly. In the 
UAE, the government is the sole owner of the infrastructure and in order to access it, 
Emiratis have to navigate it and compromise their individuality to satisfy the demands of the 
local media sponsors. An Emirati film maker applying for funding for a film project will have 
to modify her or his script to make it nationally significant.  
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, there are some film makers and animators 
who have shown how they can use this structure to their advantage and, while feeding into 
the Emiratisation discourse, introduce small variations from the official narrative into their 
productions, which the audience will recognise. These micro-dynamics of change can 
change the tonality of the official narrative over time yet still strengthen its validity. The 
repeatedly expressed willingness of Emirati media makers to change the one-sided profile of 
the media and their practical attempts to challenge the government’s control cannot be 
interpreted as the first signs of a media revolution. To induce more open and drastic 
change, the discontent would have to outweigh the benefits offered by the governmental 
media institutions, and the government strategy takes care that this will not happen.  
 
How will the media landscape develop? 
 
The specifics of the UAE media landscape and the aims of the research participants 
for the national media are indicative of the directions in which the local media may develop. 
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Modifications of official media policies, effective at the micro-level of Emirati media 
producers, have already led to the incorporation of former taboo topics into the media. In 
particular, the example of talk show host Dr. Khalifa has shown how the aim to educate 
Emirati audiences can result in opening the media stage to subjugated communities, such as 
lesbians. In society at large, these voices are strictly controlled and framed by an 
authoritarian set of values In fact the official media can be seen as using such marginalised 
communities in this way to strengthen its own image of openness while at the same time 
demonstrating the legitimacy of ostracising them as disruptions to an otherwise harmonious 
Emirati national community. This framework matches the media practices of other Arab 
satellite channels, as Dabbous-Sensenig observes for Al Jazeera. She highlights that live talk 
shows unintentionally problematise the absence and marginalisation of counter groups in 
society at large.713  
Examined from this perspective, it is possible to see how a live TV show which 
catches the popular imagination can, perhaps, lead to a significant adjustment in social 
discourse, or create a media trend. Currently Dr. Khalifa’s live show is the only show in UAE 
society specifically dealing with personal and taboo themes. He has filled a need and 
managed to establish an Emirati fan base, thus strengthening the channel’s profile. It is to 
be expected that more Emirati presenters will strive to follow his example, profiting from 
the lack of Emirati media personalities. Several young presenters have already referred to 
Dr. Khalifa as a source for inspiration – even if only to highlight what they would do 
differently. More live shows on social issues can act as reminders of a social diversity the 
media currently ignores. Even if Emiratis differentiate themselves from the style of Western 
talk shows, arguing that their idea of UAE identity does not promote a display of personal 
issues worthy of the tabloid press, they have explained that they nevertheless watch these 
foreign shows. Their displeasure with Emirati versions of this format may indicate that 
closing the debate on certain issues may well problematise their absence. 
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Another development is conceivable with regard to the form of national ideology 
circulating through the media. The disputes on national identity disrupting the official media 
are telling for the amount of personal interest Emiratis take in defining what it means to be 
an Emirati. In their daily practices as media professionals they find ways to navigate 
obstacles to self-expression or reinterpret them to their advantage rather than openly 
confronting the official national identity. Female presenters, for example, count their 
blessings for being able to widen their range of actions rather than criticising the patronising 
policies of the channels they are working for. The cases in which authorities were directly 
opposed have been rare but of significant magnitude for the notion of Emirati identity. The 
example of the mixed marriages dispute is directly related to a gap between the formal 
narrative of a shared ethnicity and the social reality. The outrage it provoked shows how the 
notion of an ethnic community of Emiratis is no longer sustainable. This will have 
implications for the official narrative of the Emirati heritage, yet will not eliminate it from 
the discourse of community identity. 
For the government, the nationhood narrative is a form of legitimising rulership, by 
presenting themselves as the ‘sons of the nation’s fathers’. For more and more Emiratis, 
however, this notion does not relate to their family backgrounds. Hence they criticise the 
notion of an ethnically ‘pure’ Emirati as racist. They see themselves as patriots and Emiratis 
in their own right and demand to be acknowledged as such. The case of the mixed 
marriages was one case in which people were so infuriated that they disputed official 
nationalism. The government is thus confronted with a dilemma: Emirati nationals are a 
minority in their own country, and the government needs to accept all sectors of society as 
Emirati. The nationals they recruit for the policy of reinforcing the officially sanctioned 
nationhood narrative, however, are mainly ‘mixed’ and hence do not fit into the original 
ethnic national ideology. Either the government will have to change this ideology or allow 
the people themselves to change it. I am confident that the dispute over what makes a 
person Emirati will more and more be focussed upon by the media, because ‘mixed’ 
Emiratis feel discriminated against. Their perception of media as a tool to express the 
individual self may assist in this: the media makers do not simply see themselves as 
educators of the masses, but as individuals whose personal life experiences can be 
transformed into a product of consumption. Because their stories are of interest they may 
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increasingly use their profession to communicate this. Media personalities can draw from 
the pool of symbols and narratives fabricated by the nation’s founders and re-interpret 
them. It is possible that the symbols of Bedouin identity for example may no longer be 
directly linked to the ethnically ‘pure’ Bedouin but to values this imagined past represents. 
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